I haven’t heard of them or can’t recollect. Here’s what Rommen said of Hitler quoted from the book:
“As a practicing lawyer, Rommen watched with alarm as the Nazi party deftly used German legislative, administrative, and judicial institutions to impose totalitarian rule. ‘Our modern dictators,’ he remarked, ‘are masters of legality. Hitler,’ Rommen concluded, 'aimed not a revolution, but at a legal grasp of power according to the formal democratic processes.”
He is the individual who basically said there are no economic laws. He and Menger got off on a debate over methodology.
This reminds me of Roderick Long’s paper “They Saw it coming” in which he talks about 19th century theorists seeing the raise in fascism. In it he stated and I’m paraphrasing that while Communism seeks to end any rivals to the state power, Fascists seek to ally with them. So it is interesting to see the fascists using the democratic legal system to aggrandize their power instead of causing a revolution to destroy it.
Oh, I did hear of him before (Gustav). yes, that tradition isn’t interested in knowledge and learning what is. science doesn’t germinate in such conditions.
yes, their focus is on the will - on power such as that happening inanimately (a rock needs pushed externally and they end up wanting to be the pushers of rocks/people - probably cause their society is made up of bullies and it’s a game of either be dominated or be the dominator for positivists). The intellect is thrown out the window by them and abandoned. For them, it’s about will and apply their will upon others - that’s positivism in a nutshell. They are skeptics, moral relativist, legal positivists, and historical school, etc… advocates not trying to know what is, and simply playing king of the hill for no real reason except to apply their will. Whereas the practical reason of natural law is the unison effort of intellect and will.
I have to ask, is there any reference to Nietzche in the book? Perhaps is master values and slave values? I hear he had great influence on the Nazi regime.
I’m not through with the book… let me look at the index… no he doesn’t mention him. I’ve heard that before as well. Even though Rommen didn’t mention him, I don’t know if that means Nietzche played no part.
He does mention Hume is kin to Hobbe for Hume’s philosophy basically rids intellect all together and therefore has results similar to Hobbe’s effort to anchor any legal system in the state’s will. Hobbe and Spinoza changed what “nature” had meant for centuries. They redefined “nature” and “natural” into meaning ‘might makes right’ and in opposition to civility and reason whereas before and after them (those not infected by their corruption of the terms) the concept was commonly understood to have intellectual and civil connotations. They undermined it’s concept and infused a different definition into what “nature” means to provide aggrandizement to their philosophy and the State (in which their philosophy was trying to make loom as all powerful). They corrupted it’s meaning, but with clarity of intellect it’s true meaning is understood. The nature of a thing is the what is of the thing. Therefore if a person has been able to intellectually apprehended the nature or essence (quiddity) of the object, then that can be called the objects true nature (whatever the object may be) and therefore the person is said to have true knowledge of the object.
As the intellect apprehends these that are - life, liberty, and property - true knowledge of what they are is part of the process in deliberating their nature - their what is.
It is true this knowledge of liberty is liberty (freedom from physical coercion)
it is true this knowledge of property is property.
Definitions usually bog down discussion from expanding, but I’ll expand into this for now:
life being life is the truth of life.
liberty being liberty is the truth of liberty.
property being property is the truth of property.
in other words for each of these: if life is not life that is not only illogical (A is not-A) but false according to what the object - life - is. (liberty and property can be put in place of the term life in that statement and the same would hold true.)
Whatever analogy we bring in, it is simply not the case that not violating a norm implies recognition of that norm, as Hoppe wants it to.
So Hoppe merely “proves” that it would be hypocritical to advocate not letting people speak freely. Except that he doesn’t. A man could easily make statements like this, “Everyone should vie to speak first and everyone else should try to compete to see who can get out their arguments before others do or before others try to stop them.” Hoppe has not shown such an advocate of “violating the right to speak freely” to be inconsistent, as he had hoped to. He has in no way derived an “ought” from an “is.” He has in no way shown the man’s argument to be even unjustifiable (let alone invalid) as a universal norm.
Yes, ignoring Hoppe’s non sequitur, the is/ought divide would be breached, but a logical fallacy is no help to the OP, and even ignoring that fallacy does not give his argumentation ethics any way to derive the NAP. As for universalization, see the argument of the hypothetical man above.
I have not read his predecessors, but either (a) they are right and his “innovation” does not logically follow, or (b) they are wrong and his innovation may logically follow but be invalid in any case because his predecessors’ argument was invalid. I think I and others have Swiss-cheesed Hoppe’s AE enough for a while.
Yes, I contend that even if his AE were valid, it would accomplish less than the NAP, which is already pretty easy for people to agree with. Although people may fundamentally agree with the NAP but discard it for practicality, if people can discard the NAP for practicality, how much more easily Hoppe’s AE? I don’t think there is anything to be gained even if an “ought” could be derived from an “is” (to use Hume’s awkward phrasing).
Again, the same old fallacy that observance of norms implies the validity of those norms. Otherwise me not wearing green would imply that I recognize the norm “You ought not wear green” as valid.
if it was impossible to justify wearing green . yet possible to justify not wearing green . then you could as a point of faith believe that you could wear whatever green thing that you liked, but you could not even defend your claim against dissent, let alone prove your point. the other side would have all the cards. imagine the debate:
“you ought not to wear green because X , Y Z, notice, my oppenent can not even offer a possible counter without instantly lapsing into contradiction and falling silent, thus we know his position to be false”
“I think a man can wear green because …(i cant speak the next part of my sentence or i am in contradiction)”
Hoppe’s links his own “argumentation ethics” with a passage from the Ethics of Liberty in which Rothbard states that “a proposition rises to the status of an axiom when he who denies it may be shown to be using it in the very course of the supposed refutation.” (Rothbard 1984, 32; cf. Hoppe 2002, xxxiv– xxxv) Rothbard, in turn, was hugely impressed by Hoppe’s work and wrote that “[Hoppe] has managed to transcend the famous is/ought, fact/value dichotomy that has plagued philosophy since the days of the scholastics …”