I guess ‘morality’, in the descriptive sense, may have a ‘truth’ value as in the physical laws of the universe. For example, it is true that humans generally feel empathy for one another, avoid murder, and cooperate with one another. One may challenge this claim by arguing that not all humans feel empathy and cooperate, but the physical laws of the universe also behave in this same way. For example, if you classify the ‘law of natural selection’ as a physical law, it does not apply to all living organisms at all times. The law of natural selection states that organisms that successfully survive and reproduce will more likely pass on its genes to its successive generations. However, earth’s climate may change, which might decrease the fitness of an organism’s successors.
Not all physical laws apply correctly to all situations. Same thing with human’s genetic composition. Each human has a different genetic composition. With different genes, not all humans may have the genes which force them to feel empathy for others. Therefore, we cannot possibly identify a ‘standardized’ set of hardwired ‘moral’ drives (such as empathy and remorse) within all humans. Not all humans feel empathy. Not all humans feel remorse.
We have previously discussed that the laws of logic can have two different senses: the normative sense and the descriptive sense. We have just shown the same thing with ‘morality’.
No it does not. I will go as far in rejecting the ‘cognitivist/non-cognitivist’ dichotomy itself.
First, we will define our terms: ‘Ethical cognitivists’ claim that ethical sentences express propositions. ‘Ethical non-cognitivists’ claim that ethical sentences do not express propositions.
The concepts of ‘true’ and ‘false’ is found in mathematics. However, the notions of ‘truth’ and ‘false’ do not ‘exist out-there’ as ‘mind-independent’ entities in ‘objective reality’. For example, mathematical axioms are ‘true’ only by definition. So the notions of ‘true’ and ‘false’ can exist only by definition.
Just like in mathematics, you can define ethical sentences as either ‘true’ or ‘false’. Even though ethical sentences may not be intrinsically ‘true’ or ‘false’, you can define them as either ‘true’ or ‘false’.
We have proven that ‘ethical cognitivists’ merely have a differenent definition of ‘truth’ than the ‘ethical non-cognitivists’. They define ‘truth’ broader than how the ‘non-cognitivists’ do.
Some may dispute the above claim because they cite that Kantian ethics and Molyneuvian ethics (which are ‘cognitivist’) are different from the ‘non-cognitivist’ ethical theories. However, even though those two ethical systems belong to ‘ethical cognitivism’, it still does not suggest that ‘ethical cognitivism’ necessarily endorses any concepts from Kantian ethics or Molyneuvian’s UPB. ‘Ethical cognitivists’ does not necessarily endorse ‘ethical apriorism’ or reject Hume’s moral sense theory. Even ‘ethical subjectivism’ can be ‘cognitivist’! The difference between ‘cognitivism’ and ‘non-cognitivism’ is merely based on the definitions of ‘truth’. All other associations of the terms ‘cognitivism’ and ‘non-cognitivism’ are irrelevant to their definitions.
So the difference between ‘cognitivism’ and ‘non-cognitivism’ is purely based on the different definitions of ‘truth’. The ‘cognitivists’ merely have a broader definition of ‘truth’ than the ‘non-cognitivists’.
One may choose to be a ‘cognitivist’ by merely expanding one’s definition of ‘truth’. One may choose to be a ‘non-cognitivist’ by defining ‘truth’ less broadly to exclude ethical sentences. Neither school of ethics is ‘more correct’ than the other. That merely depends on the definition of ‘truth’.
This is why I reject the ‘cognitivist/non-cognitivist’ dichotomy.