What is the definition of “moral” that you use?
That which is conducive towards the flourishing of the human being. [ Voluntary trade/exchnage, non-violence with the exception of self-defense ]
I think you mean “Yes I am contending that amoralists are suffering from performative contradiction…”
You are using the term “value judgment” extremely vaguely, and conflating it with judgments based on rationality, preference, deliberation, etc… you must apply context, otherwise its just a meaningless rhetorical device.
Exactly. Amoralists, by definition, do not speak in terms of morality, they can however still speak of morality.
Says the individual who is trying to prove Natural law is simply ‘incorrect’
Speaking of morality implies a sense of morality. Otherwise like you said they are merely making platitudes like ’ I am an amoralist.’ You are trying to establish a contradiction by saying I can be an amoralist but make value statements about the morality which is bad. Going back to Giles explain of an atheist an analigious case would be: I am an atheist but I think God is evil. I am an amoralist but Natural Law is wrong. If one were truly an atheist then God wouldn’t exist therefore God couldn’t be good or bad. Likewise for an amoralist, lacking a distinction between right and wrong implies that one cannot distinguish if natural law is right or wrong.
The word “right” is a synonymn of the word “correct” and the word “wrong” is a synoymn of the word “incorrect”. If you want to describe some thing that is morally incorrect, then use the phrase “morally incorrect” or “morally wrong”.
If that is the definition of “moral”, then how it is even possible to be an amoralist?
Then establish how natural law is ‘incorrect’ without inserting value judgements. You will just be speaking in platitudes.
What is the definition of “natural law”?
A system of rights derived from the logical deduction concerning the welfare of the human being. What are rights? legitimately enforable claims that establish obligation between two or more individuals.
I have done no such a thing, nor attempted to. I’m just correcting your errors.
You’ve gotten the analogy wrong. Just as an atheist can say their is no god, him doing so doesn’t imply in any way a sense of god. An amoralist can say natural law is wrong (as in factually wrong, incorrect), however he cannot say natural law is evil (as in morally wrong), that would be the performance contradiction. The amoralist can still make value statements, just not value judgements from any moral framework. Hes rejecting morals from another ground, like reason, or deliberation. Again, you are using the term too vaguely.
You were stating that you can deduce the correctness or incorrect of natural law without value statements. I would like to see you try.
I’m not saying that a amoralist suffers from performative contradiction by simply saying ’ I am an amoralist ’ they contradict themselves when they say ’ I’m an amoralist but I think natural law is wrong’
Strange, before you were saying you have done no such thing nor attempted to and now you are saying you can.
Again I ask you to prove that you can deduce correctness or incorrectness alone without value judgements.
What is your definition of “legitimately”? Please don’t use ambiguous words in the definition.
Nope. I said an amoralist can call natural law correct or incorrect without making the judgment from a moral standpoint.
Please, quote where I said I was an amoralist, or cease this nonsense.
Again, I never said otherwise. I’ve even taken the time to point out how you are misusing the term value judgments. Again.
Please take the time to read.
If you believe it, prove it.
@ the OP
How about Hoppe’s From the Economics of Laissez Faire to the Ethics of Libertarianism? It owes nothing to the Natural Law tradition. However, it still conforms to the Natural Law tradition which holds that “universally valid norms can be discerned by means of reason as grounded in the very nature of man.”
“3: accordant with law or with established legal forms and requirements <a legitimate government> b : ruling by or based on the strict principle of hereditary right <a legitimate king>
4: conforming to recognized principles or accepted rules and standards <a legitimate advertising expenditure> <a legitimate inference>”
Which of these do you mean?
Thank you, Stephen.
I read the applicable section on pp. 64-65 (emphasis mine).
No, Hoppe, to make the statement correct you would have to replace “an implicit recognition” with “a degree of non-violation*.”* However, one’s non-violation of a right does not imply one’s recognition (implicit or otherwise) of a right. Else doing nothing to “violate” a murderer’s “right” to murder would consitution a recognition of the murderer’s “right” to murder.
To fulfill my duty of charitable interpretations I will attempt to rephrase Hoppe’s statement to something a bit more precise in the same spirit:
“It is only as long as there is an implicit recognition no violation of each individual’s right not to be hindered in speaking freely that argumentation can take place.”
But again, non-violation does not imply recognition. Hoppe’s argument goes nowhere. However, it does serve as a good illustration of how being loose with words lets you derive any conclusion you want.
Please take the time to read.
What is there to tell? That merely saying “I don’t believe this!” isn’t a demolition? When is “scepticism” ever by itself a “demolition”?