Absolutely not. It works in all cases, in all situations and in all contexts. Human action is human action. One of the pillars of praxeology is the idea that one acts to ease one’s discomfort. It is even more apparent when one is under duress. That is, if one is extremely uncomfortable, one will perform an action that will make one less so, even though the expected result of that action may still be less comfortable than “normal”.
Oh, I see. “Context” is you’re all wrong for being stuck thinking in general terms.
Still two questions unanswered,
Quite frankly, this is a laughable dogma that is disproven by psychology 101. It’s basically a simplistic form of an outdated teleology and an assertion of a form of psychological egoism, and the most cursory observation of human behavior disproves it as a universal claim about what motivates people. Hell, even Ayn Rand knew that this is wrong. At best, it’s trivially true by stretching definitions to the point of covering everything.
LS, “context” is the factors that may constitute whether your rules apply or if there is an exception.
I don’t understand what your first question has to do with anything or what it’s trying to prove.
Your second question doesn’t even make sense. Context isn’t something people decide upon, it is the circumstances in which what’s in question takes place. The purpose of the question, in either case, is obviously meant to imply the old canard of imposition.
Quite frankly, every attempt to disprove it has been laughable. I’d be happy to look over your source(s) though.
That also is laughable. “[T]he most cursory observation of human behavior” proves it beyond all dispute.
Fallacy! Appeal to medicore novelist and worse philosopher…
Trivially true is still true. Which definitions are being stretched?
And those factors are what?
You claim that feelings of fear and dependence are part of the context, yes? Who is responsible for creating/causing those feelings?
I asked you how the context arrived at? How have YOU determined the context of A and B in a drowning scenario? From A, B or by yourself?
Basically, it’s the thick libertarianism thing. To be more specific, I don’t think that you can have a functional free society without at least a base-line egalitarian ethos being dominant and that ethos manifesting itself in a lack of extreme heirarchies.
Thats pretty interesting actually. I, a thick libertarian, don’t think you can have a functional free society with an egalitarian ethos. (Merit is whats most important)
So long as human beings act to remove a source of dissatisfaction, it could not be said that they act in a void of self-interest. They act in the persuit of satisfaction, which is their percieved self-interest. They employ means for the purpose of obtaining desired ends. The statement that humans act in self-interest on a fundamental level and that human beings are rational animals does not mean that humans will always make correct choices, that the ends they desire are necessarily logical and ethical, or that the means they employ in the persuit of such ends are the proper or most efficient ones toward obtaining their goals. It is merely a description of how human action works, that human beings are volitional creatures with goals and the capacity to choose among means for the purpose of obtaining their goals.
On one hand, every single person is rational in the sense that they possess the faculty of reason and are self-aware. They have the ability to freely make choices. In this sense of the word, noone can be more rational then anyone else because this is merely a description of our fundamental natures. On the other hand, in terms of their actual beliefs and choices, noone is consistantly rational if we are using rational to mean in accordance with objective reality and their actual best interest. People make all sorts of choices that can easily be demonstrated to be harmful to them, and people believe plenty of things that are not in accordance with objective reality. In this sense of the word, some people are simply more rational then others, make more coherant arguements and better choices.
Quoted from Guess Who?
Crickets.
(no surprise)
Quite frankly, this is a laughable dogma that is disproven by psychology 101. It’s basically a simplistic form of an outdated teleology and an assertion of a form of psychological egoism, and the most cursory observation of human behavior disproves it as a universal claim about what motivates people. Hell, even Ayn Rand knew that this is wrong. At best, it’s trivially true by stretching definitions to the point of covering everything.
Wait Rand wasn’t chasing windmills when she attacked the dreaded altruists? Seriously, what psychology 101 class have you taken, as mine covered the the Law of Effects as well as the Reward System (anatomy) seem to buttress the case for psychological egoism.
If what anti-egalitarians generally favored really was meritocratic, and if we construed egalitarianism as necessarily being a premise assuming that everyone is inherently equal in their intrinsic capabilities, I’d be more inclined to agree with you. But I don’t think either of those are the case. So we then have, at least, a definitional distinction over the use of egalitarianism, and more substantively we have disagreement over the extent to which various disparities can be chalked up to a meritocratic natural order. I generally view such talk as bad apologetics.
If what anti-egalitarians generally favored really was meritocratic, and if we construed egalitarianism as necessarily being a premise assuming that everyone is inherently equal in their intrinsic capabilities, I’d be more inclined to agree with you. But I don’t think either of those are the case. So we then have, at least, a definitional distinction over the use of egalitarianism, and more substantively we have disagreement over the extent to which various disparities can be chalked up to a meritocratic natural order. I generally view such talk as bad apologetics.
I don’t see what possible difference it could make what other anti-egalitarians favour and that of yourself (or myself, do you have any reason to doubt my my favour of merit?) There are, after all, many forms “egalitarian” you don’t seem to have a problem making distinctions with them (I assume you don’t believe that people are equally capable, but are still maintain some form of “egalitarian” regardless), so why not amongst the antis? Also, I cannot see any reason to assume such a definition of egalitarianism just to be dismissed. Is there a point?
The point would be to pre-emptively deflect a common line of criticism of egalitarianism (which Rothbard also engaged in; see some of the essays in “Egalitarianism As A Revolt Against Nature” without rose-colored glasses) that is based on a strawman. From this strawman one can attempt to derive all sorts of reductio ad absurdums, but of course that all becomes an elaborate mischaracterization or what ends up being a groundless appeal to consequences.
The point would be to pre-emptively deflect a common line of criticism of egalitarianism (which Rothbard also engaged in; see some of the essays in “Egalitarianism As A Revolt Against Nature” without rose-colored glasses) that is based on a strawman.
So the point is to deflect positions that haven’t been presented? Wouldn’t not bringing it up at all have been easier? I’m not sure how Rothbards attacks on Egalitarianism were a strawman, he definitely did attack egalitarianism, perhaps not the “egalitiarianism” of your own persuasion, but a form of egalitarianism nontheless.
The problem is that I know of just about no egalitarians who genuinely believe some of the things that Rothbard argues against.
The problem is that I know of just about no egalitarians who genuinely believe some of the things that Rothbard argues against.
Did Rothbard specifically direct his criticism towards you and people you know?
Earlier you wrote:
I think the issue of causality is paramount to our discussion. To say that refusing to help a drowning person (for example) can significantly effect the drowning person’s life is to put the responsibility for the drowning person into the hands of the non-drowning person. I can see of no other way to parse the phrase “can significantly effect the life of someone else”. Now as far as I can see, this treatment of the hypothetical situation is inaccurate. The drowning person would have drowned anyways if the other person had not come upon him.
Even more clearly do you seem to put the blame on the would-be rescuer by saying “their decision equates to life or death for someone else”. Again, the drowning person would have (presumably) drowned anyways. To say that the decision not to help equates to death for the drowning person implies (to me, at least) that the drowning person was supposed to have lived. Where does that supposition come from?
As before, I mean no disrespect here. I’m just trying to highlight what I see as a potential mistake in reasoning.
Now with that said, I have to ask about whose definition of “extreme demands” should be followed in these kinds of situations.
How are you defining “control others”? I can understand the part about getting things from people, but not about “controlling them”.
Of course, it can be difficult, at best – impossible, at worst – to determine intangible advantages.
If A promises to rescue B in exchange for B’s life savings, how is that not helping B? Presumably B would die otherwise.
This is just one example of why I think the distinction is of great importance here.
Let me ask you this: by “absolute land property rights”, do you mean property rights in land that trump the self-ownership rights of other people?
I’m afraid I’m not sure what you mean by “egalitarian ethos” or “extreme hierarchies”. Can you elaborate?
I’m not simply talking about me or people I know, a red herring you keep returning to. I’m talking about just about anyone in the history of social philosophy who identifies as an “egalitarian”.
Yes, the non-drowning person did not cause the initial situation, but that is not what is ethically relevant here. What’s relevant is the social context of the non-drowning person being added to the scenario - who knows exactly what is going on and is perfectly capable, without any particular risk, of saving the drowning person’s life. Once such a context is established, the decision to help or not is the essential factor determining if they well live or die. You’re focusing on necessity, I’m talking about decision-making. You’re also shifting the focus to the issue of not doing anything at all, when my initial objection was brought up in relation to using the situation to try to make a power move. Those are two separate things.
The supposition is that knowingly allowing someone to die when one has the power to save their life makes you a relevant factor, no longer making the scenario a matter of necessity.
There is a certain overlap between the two. By “control others”, I mean get them to do things for you. If someone is a guest in my house and I say “take your clothes off or leave”, I’m using my ownership as leverage to control others.
In basic terms of survival, as well as physical and mental health, I don’t think it’s difficult at all.
To grant the self-ownership concept for a moment, I mean to say that I have trouble seeing how the kind of land property rights that anarcho-capitalists generally favor doesn’t come into conflict with self-ownership at some point because of how it manifests as territorialism.
I mean a basic sense of empathy or some notion of reciprocity. As for extreme hierachies, I mean social conditions with a fairly steep level of disparity in power that ends up forming classes with problematic double-standards between them.
How is this irrelevant? This is, in fact, extremely relevant to the matter at hand.
We are all in a position, every single day, to dramatically improve, and in fact save the lives of others without any risk. There are millions of individuals, across the world, that are about to die from malnutrition precisely because they live in nations that do not facilitate entrepreneurship and the accumulation of capital. The fact that we do not devote significant portions of our annual income (any amount beyond what we need for survival) in order to save such lives would mean, according to you, that we are all ethically “guilty” of some crime. But you have failed to establish what crime we, and the individual in your initial example (the person that does not save the other person from drowning) are guilty of.
Additionally, we are completely ignoring the socioeconomic effects of this kind of welfare (forced redistribution, where individual property rights are supplanted by the “needs of society”).
Again, you’re implicitly conflating persuasion with coercion. There’s nothing wrong with persuasion. You could have just as easily said: If someone is physically touching my body and I say “be gentle or get off me,” I’m using my ownership as leverage to control others. So far, the only thing you’ve been able to demonstrate is that people may act in ways that are not agreeable to you. That is, they do not do what you think they should do. But you refuse to acknowledge that your normative judgments are entirely subjective and arbitrary (unless you can show otherwise).