Wrong. Our final brain structure wouldn’t exist in the first place without our DNA.
That presupposes some precursor nervous structure. Where does this come from?
By the same token, try removing all the DNA from the nucleus of a just-fertilized cat zygote and see what happens.
Quoting from your argument:
Can you elaborate on this? More specifically, can you explain what you mean by “giving a foundation for truth” and why that matters?
Maybe this response is simplistic, and I’m a total newbie myself. But I experience the process of making choices and acting on those choices. I experience this in a way that FEELS like I originate my choice/action.
Two things are possible. 1) I’m experiencing an illusion, or 2) I am experiencing the world as it really is.
#2 appears to be the simplest answer, and also the only one that has any PRACTICAL application. If my experiences are illusory then I have no practical way of analyzing my existence or taking action, and in order to explain the existence of illusion I must construct a fairly elaborate set of assumptions.
Don’t get me wrong. The DNA provides for the actual cell design and some basic connections. However, the big, finals capacities of the brain as dictated by its growth in structure are determined by stimulus.
Furthermore, I agree with you that to calculate the future you would need the states of all current molecules and their properties, though I do not see why you would need all past states if you know the current state.
Here’s a copy and paste response from the blog from one of the comments:
If determinism is true, you can still evaluate the truth value of the question: your evaluation is predetermined, but you can still get things right or wrong.
First let us define the conditions under which someone can know whether something is true (here I steal a set up from a guy I debated with on this issue)
Now supposing that you believe at time t that statement x is true. Now at time t+1 you evaluate your belief and demonstrate, by using the laws of logic or some empirical evidence, that the statement is in fact false.
If determinism is true then you would be in the odd situation in which you can identify whether a statement is true yet you cannot change your belief. From which it would follow that you cannot change you belief on the basis of its truth value which would therefore undermine the truth value of all your beliefs; in fact one could argue that this separation of belief and knowledge undercuts the cogency of knowledge itself. The only situation under determinism which you can change your belief is if you were determined to change it at t+1 which would be question begging.
Therefore determinism gives no foundation for the knowledge of truth.
Addendum: When I say foundation for truth I more precisely mean foundation for the knowledge of the truth. As shown above we must assume a truth, a true statement, to exist since to deny it pressuposes it. Now you could say that the idea of the existence of a truth is an arbitrarily chosen axiom. Indeed it cannot be justified since it is an axiom however to deny it would lead to outright scepticism- even to the extent of denying our own existence and all laws of economics. So to say a truth exists and it is in principle knowable I take to be a self evidently true statement. It follows from this as shown above that free will is necessary or we could not, in principle, know that truth.
This does not mean we have exhaustive knoweldge but provides a foundation of any knowledge whatsoever.
As may be clear I’d hold to something similar to the correspondence theory of knoweldge.
With all due respect, I don’t find this setup satisfying. What do you mean by “knowable”? How do you distinguish between “knowledge” and “belief”? How is “belief” basic by necessity? Do you see a distinction between the existence of a truth and awareness thereof?
I fail to see how, in the bolded statement above, the conclusion follows from the premise. Determinism to me in no way prevents a person from “changing his mind” later. Furthermore, what question do you think is being begged by the notion that one is determined to “change his mind” at time t+1?
One of the biggest issues in epistemology, in my opinion, is the semantics of the terms “know”, “knowledge”, vel sim. Another one is the semantics of “true” and “truth”. I’m not sure which issue to consider bigger here. But in any case, the conclusions one reaches in epistemology will depend greatly on the definitions he presumes for these terms.
If denying a proposition requires presupposing it, that would make it justified, wouldn’t it? Essentially that’s a proof by contradiction. On the other hand, to say a truth exists is to invite (if not beg) the question of what this truth is.
Could you provide your definition of “intuitive”?
“I don’t know what you mean by ‘glory,’ ” Alice said.
Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. “Of course you don’t—till I tell you. I meant ‘there’s a nice knock-down argument for you!’ ”
“But ‘glory’ doesn’t mean ‘a nice knock-down argument’,” Alice objected.
“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.”
“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so many different things.”
“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master that’s all.”
Alice was too much puzzled to say anything, so after a minute Humpty Dumpty began again. “They’ve a temper, some of them—particularly verbs, they’re the proudest—adjectives you can do anything with, but not verbs—however, I can manage the whole lot! Impenetrability! That’s what I say!
Lewis Carrol, Through the Looking Glass
What’s your point?
Sorry for the late reply. I’ve been rather busy the past few days.
Yes, I do see a distinction between existence and awareness (or knowledge) of a truth. The former pressuposes the latter- metaphysics is logically prior to epistemology though we do not know what exist without applying epistemology.
Knowable- the essence of a substance (I’m not necessarily implying an Aristotilean position here it’s just the language seems appropriate) is apprehendable by our reasonable faculties.
(I believe man to have two major faculties: reason ( broadly speaking the epistemology of metaphysics and ethics) and imagination (the epistemology of aesthetics). Their domains do cross over though they are primarily within the boundaries stated. If you’re interested in this area, this lecture is rather interesting.
It is a proof by contadiction but it must assume that the law of identity exists which itself is not justifiable. You could say that language presupposes it but one could still argue they use language on pragmatic grounds for their own subjective happiness as such a justification of the type we are discussing is not necessary. Consequently to use the Law of Identity presupposes belief in its existence hence belief is basic by necessity, for knowledge. This does open the door to belief in anything and to claim it’s true since the believer in Marxism is doing the same thing as the Libertarianism. This is where the intutitions play there part. As a method I believe taking the most basic of intutions and building upon them is the way forward for epistemology.
I agree but agreement on the fact that something obscures the sun is more basic, and more easily agreed upon, than what that thing is beyond the fact it obscures.
If determinism is true then you would be in the odd situation in which you can identify whether a statement is true yet you cannot change your belief.
Sorry bad communication on my part. The bolded statement above should have based on that analysis at the end. My point is in the absence of freedom of the will you cannot judge the truth value of a statement based on evidence; you can only believe that which you are determined to believe. The question being begged is how determinism can lead to true knowledge. The options are fallible or infallible determinsim; the latter is clearly false and the former would give one no means to evaluate their beliefs so could not justify there beliefs. Even if we assume you can determine the truth value independent of determinism as I tried to do in my previous post we always come back to the question of on what basis do you change your mind. Freedom of the will allows change on the basis of evidence (clearly not in all cases Mr Krugman) whereas fallible determinism does not.
As you can see above I entirely agree with that. I would say knowledge is apprehending what is. This does not however require exhusative apprehension of all things that are is.
Do you mean the latter (awareness) presupposes the former (existence)? Certainly things must exist before they can be apprehended by other things that exist.
“Reasonable faculties” meaning what exactly? “Reasonable” seems like a loaded word to me.
I don’t think you’ve answered my questions about belief. How do you distinguish between belief and knowledge? And how is belief “basic by necessity”?
So you don’t consider proof by contradiction to be a justification? A proposition which can be proven in such a way is not inherently justified?
If one must believe in the Law of Identity in order to use it, where does knowledge ever factor in? It doesn’t seem necessary to know that the Law of Identity is “true”, it’s only necessary to believe (i.e. assume) it’s “true”. So why bother with knowledge here?
My point was that, when you say “to say a truth exists and it is in principle knowable I take to be a self evidently true statement”, I fail to see how it’s a self-evidently true statement.
At the risk of going around in circles, what do you mean by “true knowledge”? It seems that your issue here is semantic - certain words (such as “judge”) imply to you this notion of free will, or at least non-determinism, because you see them as denoting activities which inhere within subjects. However, the kind of determinism I hold to be true is compatible with free will, because the two concepts require different points of view. Determinism here requires a “universal” or “God’s-eye” point of view, whereas free will requires a non-universal subjective point of view. Hopefully that makes sense. Free will, then, simply denotes one’s inability, as a subject, to know what any other subject will do at any given point in the future. Note here that his future self can be considered another subject as well.
So yes, determinism does mean that one can only believe that which he is determined to believe. But the latter isn’t set in stone. His beliefs may be determined to change at some point - and this seems to me to be completely compatible with determinism. At the same time, however, many people will indeed not change their beliefs, even in the face of their beliefs being proven to be contradictory.
Okay. Given that definition of “knowledge”, we now “fall prey” to the Clintonesque question of what the definition of “is” is. 
As you yourself noted above, metaphysics is logically prior to epistemology. It seems to me that we’ll need to make inquiries in the former area to better understand our differences in the latter area.
Yes.
I used it in contrast to imagination. Imagination and rationality are two attributes of man. In principle the world could be entirely mysterious and thus not apprehendable by the reason but solely through imagination. As I stated before there is a cross over.
Prove to me that the law of identity exists without first assuming that it exists.
Try and live consistently in the world without believing that to be so.
This sounds uncannily like the Calvinsitic/ Augustinian view of predestination. Before the creation of the world God predestines the elect to salvation and the heathen to eternal torment. However each actor play his own free part in the world play except that his script has already been written.
Again my point wasn’t they can’t change their beliefs but they cannot change them on the basis of the evidence because as you outline above, we can only believe what we’re determined to believe.
**
Fair enough. Please outline your Metaphsyics 101.