Can You Define Natural Rights as a Meaningful Concept?

Well, Hoppe’s argument here is not unclear, it’s just a misunderstanding. He writes as if emotivism is an ethical theory, when it is merely a theory about what people mean when they use ethical language. Emotivism is the position that when people say “Stealing is wrong,” all they really mean is “Boo to stealing” or “Down with stealing.” But with this definition, Hoppe’s paragraph makes no sense:

“[Emotivism] simply would not exist as a position that could be discussed and evaluated with regard to its validity”

But to determine whether emotivism is valid would require no more and no less than figuring out what people intend to mean when they say “Stealing is wrong,” which of course is something that can be discussed and evaluated. If Hoppe had written,

“‘Boo to stealing’ simply does not exist as a position that can be discussed and evaluated with regard to its validity,”

He may have had a point. But emotivism is not “Boo to stealing” or “Boo to” anything. [By the way, emotivism is not my position.]