Can You Define Natural Rights as a Meaningful Concept?

Thanks for posting these definitions.

As for emotivism and non-cognitivism, they are both simplistic and easily disproven as far as universal application goes. Just find anyone who merely intends something different - something besides yay/boo or nonsense - by their moral statements and you’ve disproven both positions. Example: A person who says, “By ‘That’s wrong’ I mean ‘People around here don’t like that’.” Neither emotivism or non-cognitivism applies to such a person.

However, it is surely true that some people sometimes do merely mean “yay/boo” or something non-sensical when they use ethical wording. Or sometimes they mean multiple different things, including but not limited to implications of the legal, religious, consequentialist, group opinionist, or threatening sort. Hence my position on meta-ethics reflects the broad diversity of actual usage senses for these words in the English language at least.

What does this have to do with the foregoing?