You can replace libertarianism with any theory of objective ethics and what you said would be true.
“regardless of what conception of ethics anyone has, they cannot use it to refute anti-humanism (i.e., prove a statement that is contradictory to anti-humanism).”
This is, of course, due to the impossibility of proving normative statements. You cannot use this line of reasoning to justify libertarianism. It doesn’t even make libertarianism more tenable than other moral codes.
Premise 1 is not self-evident. It is possible to accept the notion of wqxfzogyt without accepting that libertarianism is wqxfzogyt. Furthermore, accepting that libertarianism is an example of or included in the wqxfzogyt paradigm does not equal accepting the validity of the theory. Even if objective ethics makes sense, and I accept that libertarianism is an example of an objective ethic, I am not bound to accept the statement that libertarianism is true.
Premise 2: “Libertarianism is an wqxfzogyt, but not the correct one. anti-humanism is the only true wqxfzogyt.”
Premise 3: Oh? Let’s talk about actual objective ethics now, and see if that is true. Someone who doesn’t believe in the existence of objective ethics cannot ‘prove’ any normative statement. A moral subjectivist can make the (unlikely) assertion that violence is good (to him). This is surely inconsistent with libertarianism, which places a positive obligation on each individual to refrain from certain actions that are within their power.
The conclusion is demonstrably false, as I doubt the validity of both wqxfzogyt and objective ethics. I can also make the claim that ‘negative rights’ is a vacuous concept, that they are merely restatements of positive obligations (on others), and that violence is so awesome, without being contradictory.
I’m interested to see it.
edit: I just wanted to add that this has been a very civil discussion and to me one of the most fruitful discussions on the topic we have had. Thanks to all involved.
If somebody has a conception of ethics as being something objective, then they can indeed make a statement that is contradictory to anti-humanism: “Anti-humanism is objectively wrong.” This statement will not be self-contradictory in the same way that “Libertarianism is objectively wrong” is. The former statement is at least internally consistent, whereas the latter statement cannot be accepted even by someone who accepts that it is meaningful.
Libertarianism stands out because it remains irrefutable even when it is assumed that objective normative truth does exist. If, however, we assume that it does not exist, then we libertarians do not have to prove that libertarian-subjective-ethics is “more tenable” than nonlibertarian-subjective-ethics, because the two do not contradict each other. If all that ethics is is statements of the form “I (dis)like X,” then the libertarian can maintain the belief “I like libertarianism” without having to disprove other people who say “I dislike libertarianism.”
(In all of the above, we assume for the sake of argument that Argument G can be found.)
Again, the disproof of this is Argument G.
For the sample argument I gave, “wqxfzogyt” is intended to be analogous to “objectively right,” not to simply “objective.” So if someone accepts that “Libertarianism is objectively right,” then they aren’t going to also say anything that is contradictory to libertarianism. They are already on our side, so to speak.
When this moral subjectivist uses the word “good,” what does he mean?
As AJ was saying, there are several ways that we can interpret this statement: “I like being violent,” “Being violent has good consequences for me,” “Society approves of me being violent,” and so on.
But none of these statements are inconsistent with libertarianism, since the libertarian can accept them without contradiction. I can acknowledge the fact that you like being violent, and that does not have any implications for whether or not I “should” defend myself against you.
Well sure, assuming by libertarianism you meant an objective ethical conception of libertarianism, they can make the claim that objective ethics is not a meaningful concept. The objective libertarian would have to refute that to in order to be consistent.
So it’s true that an objective ethicist may not be able to refute an objective ethical conception of libertarianism. However, anyone who has a conception of ethics that is not objective can then consistently reject any objective ethical theory on the grounds that objective ethics isn’t meaningful. Whether they can “use [their ethics] to refute libertarianism” depends on exactly what you mean the word ethics to strictly entail.
I took that to mean “…do not necessarily make any claims…” A hidden premise in the passage of your I quoted was that you were talking about objectively ethical libertarianism, so with my substitutions the hidden premise becomes that we’re talking about pangalactically ethical libertarianism. That’s of course to illustrate what can happen if the meaning of “objective” isn’t clear. So, in that context, we can say that those who don’t accept pangalactic ethics as meaningful do not (necessarily) make any claims that are inconsistent with a pangalactic conception of libertarianism.
The argument appears logically valid, but where is Premise 2 from? And shouldn’t Premise 3 be, “Those who don’t accept that “wqxfzogyt” is meaningful do not necessarily make any claims that are inconsistent with libertarianism”? <— In which case the conclusion wouldn’t follow.
All we’re then saying here is that Alice can state her subjective reasons against libertarianism, and Bob, as an objective libertarian can respond with “Yeah, so?” because her argument doesn’t refute his. However, that doesn’t mean that the notion of objective libertarianism can’t be attacked - Alice need only assert that “objective” is not well-defined.
To recap, Alice’s assertion of her subjective preference doesn’t negate Bob’s objective ethics in and of itself, but that does not mean she cannot refute it. I think we’re in danger of equivocating on the meaning of “ethics” here. We may want to pin down exactly what is entailed in “one’s ethics”:
A. Only one’s subjective/objective/etc. statements of what is “right” and “wrong” (“good” or “bad”, etc.)
or
B. One’s entire position on ethics, including - if need be - what would be one’s position on any other ethical theory put forward
Alice’s A-ethics don’t refute Bob’s A-ethics, but her B-ethics might.
By “libertarianism” I mean “behavior that that libertarians believe to be a right.” This heading encapsulates actions such as defending one’s life, homesteading property, defending it against latecomers, and so on. Remember that for the purpose of this discussion I was using “libertarian” as a description of action, not belief. If it helps, replace “libertarianism” with “Action L” and “libertarian” with “person who does Action L.” The question then becomes: for what values of “L” do the premises hold?
To clarify: What I meant was “…necessarily do not make any claims…”
Again, “libertarianism” here refers not to a belief system, but to a certain type of behavior or action.
Premise 3 should be understood as “Those who don’t accept that ‘wqxfzogyt’ is meaningful necessarilydo not make any claims that are inconsistent with libertarianism.” If we replace “wqxfzogyt” with “objectively right,” do you disagree with this statement (keeping in mind that “libertarianism” refers to a particular kind of behavior and not any particular set of beliefs)?
As for Premise 2: If you put “objectively right” back in the place of “wqxfzogyt,” Premise 2 is just the idea that someone who accepts the statement “Libertarianism is objectively right” has already been won over, so to speak. Just as before, when we saw that the idea of “objectively wrong” is at least meaningful enough that we can truthfully say that “Believing that ‘libertarianism is objectively wrong’ is inconsistent with libertarianism,” so too can we say here that “Believing that ‘libertarianism is objectively right’ is inconsistent with non-libertarianism,” which is Premise 2.
What I’m saying is that Alice can state her subjective reasons against libertarianism, and Bob, as a libertarian-acting person, can respond with “Yeah, so?” because her argument doesn’t contradict his actions.
Yes, the notion of “objective libertarian ethics” can be consistently (i.e., without internal contradictions) attacked, by denying the meaningfulness of “objective ethics.” However, according to Premise 3, doing this undermines Alice’s more fundamental goal of making a statement that is inconsistent with Bob’s libertarian actions.
Again, explaining Argument G is the next step, which I haven’t gotten to yet. I don’t want to get ahead of myself, because the current discussion is complicated enough as it is.
Sorry, I thought it was previously posted and I just missed it. It seems that I will have to wait for your argument G (is it anything like Jasay’s epistemic arguments?) to see if my previous objections hold any merit.
Before I reply to the full post, could explain how you conceive of the idea of a statement being inconsistent with certain actions?
I see how a statement can be inconsistent with another statement, but not how it can be inconsistent with an action. (…unless the statement explicitly states someone contrary to the fact of an action, like how someone who is eating pizza saying “I am not eating pizza now” is inconsistent with their current action of eating pizza - but I don’t see that the statements and actions we’re talking about are of that nature).
I thought we had agreed on at least one instance of inconsistency between belief and action:
In any case: We say that Action X is inconsistent with Statement Y if doing X implies not believing Y. For example, suppose I were to say “I hate X so much that I would not do it under any circumstances” while at the same time doing X. This is an inconsistency: the fact that I’m actually doing X implies that I don’t really believe my statement.
The statement “X is objectively wrong” can be thought of as another such statement: the fact that I’m doing X implies that I don’t really believe that “X is objectively wrong.” Now, I suppose it’s possible that someone could disagree with this principle, but then they would just be in the same group of people as the ones who are already handled by Premise 3 above.
At the time of that posting, I hadn’t realize (or forgot) that you were using libertarian to mean someone whose life practices are consistent with libertarianism, or in your words, “‘someone who lives, uses property, and does all those things that libertarianism holds to be rights’: in other words, with regard to action and not mere internal belief.” I didn’t see the relevance of that definition at first, but since it is apparently of central relevance to what you’re saying, I think now is a good time to discuss it. I can’t really see what you intend by the concept, because it seems by that definition most people are libertarians. All people live and use property, and most people take advantage of certain libertarian rights when they are available (but no one takes full advantage of them).
Sure, but this actually states what action someone won’t take, so it’s easy to see how that statement is inconsistent with that person’s actual taking of said action. Hence this seems a shade different from the kind of statements we’re talking about.
How so? Surely, at least in theory, someone can do something they believe is wrong (in any sense).
But all right, I’ll take this to mean that, within the context of what you’re presenting, a statement that “X is objectively wrong” entails the statement “I will never do X.”
I still wonder how you distinguish between someone who performs some of the actions in the set called Action L, and not others. Again, no one performs none of the actions, and no one performs all of the actions. So how can a “person who does Action L” really designate any particular people? It seems it either refers to everyone (if doing some of the actions is enough to say that one is doing Action L), or to no one (if one isn’t doing Action L unless they are doing all possible activities that Action L encompasses).
So you meant: “Those who don’t accept that “wqxfzogyt” is meaningful necessarily do not make any claims that are inconsistent with libertarianism [Action L].”?
Based on how you’re defining libertarianism and claims consistent or inconsistent with it, it seems important to specify who is performing Action L, and to ask whether you intend to mean that a person making a claim inconsistent with Action L must be the same person performing the action. In other words, you seem to be saying that unless someone makes an objective statement or a “wqxfzogyt” statement, they cannot make any claim inconsistent with Action L. Do you mean to say that if I make a subjective statement that I am opposed to Action L (a statement that would indeed make me inconsistent by your definition if I were the one performing Action L), then I am not making a claim inconsistent with Action L? Does that square with how you mean to define inconsistency?
As per above, I’ll have to hold off on an answer until I know exactly where your conception of consistency starts and ends, and what Action L must or can/cannot entail.
I don’t think I have agreed with the bolded part, and in any case I’m pretty sure we’re going to have to clarify the concepts of Action L and consistency before continuing along this line.
Sure, in the sense you seem to be using contradict or inconsistent, this is a clear result, because it is only Bob who can declare, “I will never do action X [non-libertarian action]” and then proceed to do it. It seems, if I understand you correctly, that you’re defining contradiction in such a way that, in the ethical realm, it’s only possible for a person to contradict themselves, not another person…perhaps unless they make on “objective” statement (which seems to imply that “objective” refers to something to with other people - but that already goes too far into speculation as to your position).
Although I await clarification on the above-mentioned points for a full answer, I may be able to say something useful here right now:
If Alice’s goal is to make a statement inconsistent with Bob’s performance of Action L, and this notion of inconsistency is defined such that - by definition - a subjective statement (by someone other than the acter [the performer of Action L in this case]) is insufficient and an objective statement is sufficient, the argument would seem to be circular.
Action L refers to an unspecified particular action, not a category like “libertarianism.” I’m using “libertarianism”/“Action L” as a convenient catch-all placeholder for whatever action happens to be in contention. For example, if we let L be “homesteading this particular piece of virgin land,” then the question we ask is, “Can Alice make a self-consistent statement that is inconsistent with Bob homesteading that piece of land?” Or, if we Let L be “killing Alice,” we ask “Can Alice make a self-consistent statement that is inconsistent with Bob killing Alice?” However, the point here is not to consider any specific instance of the argument, but to abstract away to a general form into which any proposed action can be substituted to see if the argument holds up.
If the sense of “wrong” is such that this can happen, then, again, Premise 3 will handle the statement.
Yes, I suppose that is implied by contrapositive, in the same way that “The ground is dry” entails “It didn’t just rain.”
Yes.
You would not be making a claim inconsistent with someone else doing Action L. If Alice says “I don’t like L,” then there’s no inconsistency for Bob to do L and also believe “Alice doesn’t like L.” (There’s nothing remarkable about this; I can keep eating chocolate while I acknowledge that you don’t like chocolate.)
This kind of self-declaration by Bob isn’t necessarily the only type of inconsistency. Consider also statements such as “You hate doing X more than anything else,” which is inconsistent with the listener doing X. However, up until now, all of the clear examples of action-inconsistent statements have been trivialities - i.e., statements that can be rendered false by a mere act of will on Bob’s part, such as “You don’t like X” or “You are not currently doing X.”
The definition of “inconsistent” is what I gave before:
You’re right if you say it’s not easy to see how we can make statements that are inconsistent with somebody else’s actions but which are not trivialities like the example I gave. However, as long as we just understand what it means for a statement to be “inconsistent” with an action (which we must if we accept that the trivial examples have this property), then we can ask the following question:
Do meaningful statements exist which are inconsistent with someone else’s actions but which are not trivialities?
This question cannot be dismissed as meaningless, since “inconsistent” is well-defined. So the answer is either “yes” or “no.” Someone who says “no” is referred to as a “non-objective-ethicist,” and it is easy to see why this person necessarily does not make any non-trivial statements inconsistent with Action L. On the other hand, someone who answers “yes” is referred to as an “objective ethicist”: they believe that meaningful non-trivial action-inconsistent statements exist. Argument G will (presumably) show that the very idea of such a statement implies that it can only be made against non-libertarian actions.
Do you mean, “We say that Person P’s performance of Action X is inconsistent with Person P’s Statement Y if their doing X implies their not believing Y”?
And could you similarly clarify how the agency works in that definition in the case that we’re talking about two people, say Person P and Person Q (if any changes are necessary)?
[Possible Example: “We say that Person P’s performance of Action X is inconsistent with Person Q’s Statement Y (about P) if P’s doing X implies P’s not believing Y”]
I mean, “We say that Person P’s performance of Action X is inconsistent with the Statement Y if their doing X implies their not believing Y.” A simple statement is something that anyone can believe or disbelieve. In order to be clear about what the statement is actually saying, we should make sure to replace any pronouns in the statement with their referents so that it doesn’t change its meaning depending on who says it to whom. So in all the examples that say “I” or “you,” just imagine these words replaced with “Alice” or “Bob” as appropriate.
I’m gonna try this one more time. A natural right is the implicit permission which an individual has to perform a given action by virtue of the inability of anyone else to meaningfully object (that is, demand that the individual not engage in the action in question).
Now earlier I wrote (numbering added for clarity):
You then gave the following definition of inconsistency:
Based on this definition, any subjective statement by Alice is insufficient for her goal of making a statement that is inconsistent with Bob’s performance of Action L (since the only subjective statements she can make that she could possibly know to be true are about “Alice”; she can’t know Bob’s subjective feelings or opinions). This is <1> from above. If <2> also holds, the argument would seem to be circular.
Now, an objective statement by Alice is either sufficient or insufficient. If all objective statements are insufficient, I don’t see where you are headed with the argument. If any objective statements are sufficient, the argument seems circular (<2> holds).
What would it mean for someone to meaningfully demand vs. non-meaningfully demand? It seems that defining “meaningfully demand” might fall into some form of affirming the predicate.
So we have, “A natural right is the implicit permission which an individual has to perform a given action by virtue of the inability of anyone else to non-contradictorily object (that is, non-contradictorily demand that the individual non engage in the action in question).”
I assume it then falls to something like argumentation ethics to show that this notion of non-contradiction is meaningful?