The only problem being that her absurd moral philosophy is nothing more than a poison-pill in this regard.
Clayton -
Have you even read that Wikipedia article you link to?
Can’t we take life as an a priori value? It would be a performative contradiction to claim one did not value life. For one must be alive to make such a claim, and would be dead should they truly not value life.
Using Rand’s own definition of “value” as “that which one acts to gain and/or keep”, then death can be a value just as much as life can.
Is that really true? What does that even mean? One cannot act to bring himself into life. So what do you mean by valuing life? If we can only understand value by action, what action demonstrates valuing life? Just because someone does not act to end his life does not mean that he somehow values ‘life’. All we can say is that he prefers whatever actions he performs to that of suicide.
EDIT: So I see we’re dealing with a Randian rather than a Misesian definition of value.
But we don’t need to worry about those who have come to value death, as they are dead and cannot be dealt with or transacted with anymore, and they can only be said to value death more than life at the moment in which they commit an act which causes them irrevocably to die.
If you are arguing with anyone about values, you can assume they value life, again, a priori by virtue of being alive. It’s essentially similar to argumentation ethics.
Life isn’t automatically granted to you, though you be now alive. You must act to keep yourself alive. You must drink suffucient quantities of water, breath sufficient oxygen, and eat sufficient calories and nutrients. That is, you continually act as if your life were a value to you, and if you didn’t you would be dead in short order.
The above and their corollaries, like obtaining shelter and the rest.
You must act to maintain your life or it rather quickly goes away. If you do not act as if life were a value then you quickly die, via inaction.
What would be the Misesian def of value?
I’m really just recalling my old Randian readings, not necessarily taking this as a position. Feel free to show me Mises’s superior reasoning on value.
Well I think it’s always better to show inconsistencies in one’s arguments using his own semantics. 
However, that can be challenge when his semantics differ significantly from your own.
I think the difference between the Randian and the Misesian definitions of “value” is subtle, but important. While Rand defines it as “that which one acts to gain and/or keep”, Mises (essentially) defines it as “what one is willing to do to gain and/or keep something”.
We need to worry about those who have come to value death in the sense that they disprove the notion that life is an (the?) objective universal value - which was my point. I’m sorry but you seem to be trying to move the goalposts with the above.
Well the answer to this question answers the rest, I think:
Value only exists in reality through demonstrated action, demonstrated preferences. It therefore only refers to preferred actions, not the state of valuing abstract things like ‘life’. Does eating, drinking, finding shelter really show that one values life, or instead that they value - at those particular moments respectively - eating, drinking, and finding shelter to all other possible actions? And is it true that by eating an apple in the USA that I value being in the USA more than I value being in France?
EDIT:
Well that’s true, but I don’t think the Randian definition is very helpful, because it requires an extra level of verstehen, which might be faulty. Do I value growing facial hair just because I eat the food that allows me to do so?
That’s a pretty good point, Ari 
So it seems that it would be a bit of a stretch to claim one values the abstract concept of life merely by taking acts that support it.
It seems like there might be something to that, though. But then we run into problems like, what if there’s a guy murdering someone while he eats an apple. Well he must value only his life?
I think it would be valid to say that people actually value non-pain over pain states. Since most of the instinct to do things like eat and drink are actually about satiation rather than supporting life as a value. You are alive as a consequence of eating and drinking, for example, but what prompted you to eat or drink was actually an uncomfort.
But then, there is indeed a psychological compulsion to remain alive. If you don’t eat or drink long enough, eventually you have the thought, “I’m going to die,” and the pain of not eating at least dissapears within a few days of not eating, which seems to belie the idea that people don’t have an inborn value to live.
If they didn’t have a desire to live, couldn’t they simply stop eating and live out their remaining days. They’d then have no preference towards life or death in that remaining period.
And if they wanted to live at that point, if that was a value, they’d have no other choice but to take steps to support life via eating and drinking.
It might be a bit like saying you like taking trips. And here you’re saying, ‘but you can’t take trips directly, you can only put gas in your car and mechanically operate a vehicle, there is no abstract act of ‘trip-taking’.’
Which I think belies your point a bit. So, color me a bit grayed out between these positions after all :\
Exactly - Mises calls it ‘uneasiness’.
But I think we can much more easily understand specific actions which demonstrate directly valuing trip-taking than we can understand those which demonstrate directly valuing life.
The entire thing. Value is subjective.
Yes but what in particular? I guess you mean her dispute with Mises concerning whether value is “subjective”. Her disagreement is mostly terminological from what I understand. I don’t think she assumes value inheres in the object, but rather that it arises through a relationship between the valuer and the valued..
“Existence exists”
It means that reality is independent of consciousness as far as I can tell. You cannot deny existence without contradicting yourself anyway but I don’t think she meant that.
That might be the case, though I don’t think we can actually know this (perhaps we are, after all, just existing in the mind of God as some religious metaphysics claim). Regardless, the part of reality that matters to moral issues - valuation - is not independent of consciousness. So the dependence/independence of existence on consciousness is irrelevant.
Clayton -
I don’t see many flaws in Objectivism. If I really had to criticize anything, it’d be her epistemology. Science functions by induction; due to the “direction of time,” so-to-speak, we are always dependent on the future to validate hypotheses…thus there is no deductive theorem. Who knows: on day one of 14 billion years, maybe the entire universe will cease to exist. Basically, she maintains that induction equals knowledge, which it doesn’t in the sense of being certain about an outcome.
This song always reminds me of Rand, particularly “The Fountainhead.”
