I am making extensive alterations and additions to this piece. So that anyone interested can read the new information and access the new reference citations without re-reading the whole piece, here is my edits list:
Global change: “inbuilt” instead of “innate” and “built-in”
old: When Austrian economist Thomas DiLorenzo testified before the House Subcommittee on Domestic Monetary Policy recently
new: When Austrian economist Thomas DiLorenzo recently testified before the House Subcommittee on Domestic Monetary Policy
old: (cue the scary music)
new: [cue the scary music]
old: the epistemological issues concerning even the natural sciences, let alone the social sciences.
new: even the epistemological issues concerning the natural sciences, let alone the even more neglected epistemological issues concerning the social sciences.
old: Before Carl Menger had even started the Austrian tradition, German Historical School economists were denouncing the “bloodless abstractions” of the Classical School.
new: Before Carl Menger had even started the Austrian school, the members of the German Historical School thought they could discredit the Classical School of Economics, not by actually grappling with its arguments, but by simply dismissing the whole enterprise of theoretical economics as “bloodless abstractions”.
old: it may seem appropriate to simply ignore them and to “let the dogs bark and pay no heed to their yelping.” And to "remember Spinoza’s dictum: “Indeed, just as light defines itself and darkness, so truth sets the standard for itself and falsity.”
new: it may seem appropriate to simply “let the dogs bark and pay no heed to their yelping,” and to remember the dictum of Baruch Spinoza that, “just as light defines itself and darkness, so truth sets the standard for itself and falsity.”
after: “let the dogs bark and pay no heed to their yelping.”
footnote: Ludwig von Mises, Human Action (HA), Introduction, Sec. 2.
after: so truth sets the standard for itself and falsity."
footnote: Ibid.
old: However, Mises rejected such an “above it all” approach. He wrote:
new: However, Mises rejected such an “above it all” approach, insisting that:
after: its underlying motives or its background.
footnote: Ibid.
old: He considered the spelling out the foundational underpinnings underlying “praxeology” (the science of human action, of which economics is a sub-discipline) to be essential.
new: He considered spelling out the foundational underpinnings of economics to be essential.
old: For this reason, Mises devoted a significant amount of his scientific attention to epistemological and methodological problems, particularly in his works Epistemological Problems in Economics, Human Action, Theory and History, and The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science.
new: For this reason, Mises devoted a significant amount of his scientific attention to epistemological and methodological problems.
old: In what follows, I will endeavor to explain Mises’ epistemological teachings.
new: In what follows, I will endeavor to systematically explain Mises’ epistemology and its bearings on his economics, drawing especially on treatises Human Action, Theory and History, and The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science.
old: One of the most controversial aspects of Mises’ methodology, was that he characterized economics as an a priori science.
new: Mises characterized economics as an "a priori" science.
old: By this he means that the conclusions of economic science are prior to and independent of experience, and it makes no sense to try to test economic laws with experiments, observations, statistics, or any other kind of empirical data.
new: By this he means that economic laws are prior to, and independent of, economic experience, and that it makes no sense to try to test economic laws with experiments, observations, statistics, or any other kind of empirical data.
old: One wonders if such critics think of geometry as a religion, being that its theorems are not based on the gathering of data.
new: One wonders if such critics think of geometry as a religion, being that the theorems of geometry are prior to, and not based on, the gathering of topographical data.
after: implied in the famous dictum of John Locke according to which the mind is a sheet of white paper upon which the external world writes its own story.
footnote: Mises, The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science (UFES), Ch. 1, Sec. 1.
old: To the contrary, wrote Mises,
new: To the contrary:
after: human mind is not a tabula rasa on which the external events write their own history.
footnote: Mises, HA, Ch. 2, Sec. 2.
after: “equipped with a set of tools for grasping reality.”
footnote: Ibid.
after: taught, provides only the raw material out of which the mind forms what is called knowledge."
footnote: UFES, Ch. 1, Sec. 1.
old: The “set of tools for grasping reality” are certain innate conceptions, which the mind must apply to raw sensations in order for those sensations to be converted into actual knowledge.
new: The “set of tools for grasping reality” are certain inbuilt conceptions, which the mind must apply to raw sensations in order for those sensations to be converted into actual knowledge. We must have these conceptions, for all sensation would be meaningless without their application. And these conceptions must be inbuilt, because they cannot be learned, since learning is the acquisition of knowledge (meaningful interpretations of external and internal sensations), and the acquisition of knowledge presupposes the capacity to apply these “reality-grasping” conceptions.
AND THEN A NEW INDEPENDENT PARAGRAPH…
My use of the term “inbuilt” refers to Mises’ characterization of the mind being already “equipped” with these conceptions prior to their use in grasping reality. It should not be taken as implying “innate” in the sense that they are present at birth. It may however be that our genetic constitution (which itself is present at birth) is such that we have the biological capacity to develop these conceptions. However, regardless of how these conceptions do form, the point is, again, that they cannot be formed from the acquisition of knowledge (meaningful interpretations of external and internal sensations), because the capacity to apply these conceptions is a prerequisite of knowledge.
AND THEN THE FOLLOWING, NOW AS ITS OWN PARAGRAPH (AND WITH THE INDICATED CHANGES):
old: Kant called these innate conceptions “categories” (a term Mises used very frequently). Mises referred to the “categories” as features of the “logical structure of the human mind,” and as the mind’s “projection into the external world of becoming and change.” Mises wrote,
new: Kant called these inbuilt conceptions “categories” (a term Mises used very frequently). Mises referred to the “categories” as necessary features of the “logical structure of the human mind,” and as the mind’s “projection into the external world of becoming and change.”
after: “biological capacity to develop these conceptions.”
footnote: “Man acquired these tools, i.e., the logical structure of his mind, in the course of his evolution from an amoeba to his present state.”, HA, Ch. 2, Sec. 2. For a meeting of Kant and Darwin in the expansive mind of Mises, see “Hypothesis about the Origin of A Priori Categories” in UFES, Ch. 1, Sec. 2.
after: “logical structure of the human mind,”
footnote: UFES, Ch. 1, Sec. 1.
after: “projection into the external world of becoming and change.”
footnote: HA, Ch. 2, Sec. 2.
old: Apply the “fundamental logical relations”
new: Application of the “fundamental logical relations”
after: The categories are a priori; they are the mental equipment of the individual that enables him to think and—we may add—to act.
footnote: UFES, Ch. 1, Sec. 1.
after: appears to the human mind nonsensical and that thinking, guided by them, has led to modes of successful acting.
footnote: Mises, Theory and History (TH), Introduction.
after: “aprioristic assumption.”
footnote: TH, Ch. 14.
PLEASE MAKE THE FOLLOWING A BLOCK QUOTE:
“Experience is necessarily of past events. It can be resorted to for the prediction of future events only with the aid of the assumption that an invariable uniformity prevails in the concatenation and succession of natural phenomena.”
AND FOLLOWED BY
footnote: Ibid.
old: “from regularity observed in the past to the same regularity in future events.” (Theory and History, chapter 14)
new: REPLACE THE PARENTHETICAL WITH THE FOLLOWING FOOTNOTE
footnote: Ibid.
old: And as David Hume pointed out in his famous “problem of induction,”
new: Furthermore, as David Hume pointed out in his famous discussion of the “problem of induction,”
old: (the logical fallacy of assuming that which is to be proved)
new: (committing the logical fallacy of assuming that which is to be proved)
old: That would be assuming that a prior regularity (“prior regularity predicting subsequent regularity in the past”) predicts subsequent regularity (“prior regularity predicting subsequent regularity in the future”), which is exactly what one is trying to prove!
new: That would be assuming that (A.) a prior regularity (“prior regularity predicting subsequent regularity in the past”) predicts (B.) a subsequent regularity (“prior regularity predicting subsequent regularity in the future”), which is exactly what one is trying to prove!
footnote: David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section IV. “For all inferences from experience suppose, as their foundation, that the future will resemble the past, and that similar powers will be conjoined with similar sensible qualities. If there be any suspicion that the course of nature may change, and that the past may be no rule for the future, all experience becomes useless, and can give rise to no inference or conclusion. It is impossible, therefore, that any arguments from experience can prove this resemblance of the past to the future; since all these arguments are founded on the supposition of that resemblance.”
after: “If we were not to refer to this uniformity, all the statements of the natural sciences would appear to be hasty generalizations.”
footnote: TH, Introduction.
after: Man is not even capable of imagining the conditions of such a chaotic universe.
footnote: HA, Ch. 1, Sec. 5.
old: (the “end” always being the alleviation of felt uneasiness).
new: (the “end” always being “the relief from a felt uneasiness”).
footnote: HA, Ch. 4, Sec. 1.
old: The “unbundling” of those notions (making explicit that which is implicit about action) is what Mises referred to as the science of praxeology.
new: The “unbundling” of those notions (making explicit that which is implicit about action) is what Mises referred to as the science of praxeology (of which the science of economics is a sub-discipline).
AND footnote: Many followers of Mises have characterized praxeology as deductions from an “action axiom”. And some say that this “action axiom” is “humans act” or “action is purposeful behavior”. It is important to note that Mises never used the term “action axiom”. Mises used “human” basically as a synonym for “actor”. So saying “humans act” is tantamount to saying “acting beings are acting beings”. Furthermore, “purposeful behavior” means nothing more and nothing less than “action”. Therefore saying “action is purposeful behavior” is tantamount to saying “action is action”. Thus both “axioms” are pleonastic, and nothing useful can be deduced from them. Praxeology is the unbundling of the implications of a conception, not of a proposition. Praxeology stems from the conception we think of when we hear the single word “action” (or any of its translations or synonyms), not from the proposition “action is purposeful behavior”. When Mises wrote “action is purposeful behavior”, he introduced “purposeful behavior” as a clarifying substitute for “action”, just in case readers are thinking of another meaning of the word “action”, not as the second half of non-pleonastic proposition from which to derive theorems. Mises derived praxeology from the a priori category of action, not the “action axiom”. The propositions immediately implied by the category of action might be considered axioms (e.g., “Action always involves the passing of time.”), because they are actually propositions, and thus can be used for edifying deductions. But nouns (“action”) and pleonasms (“action is action”) cannot be so used.
after: to expound their implications and to define the universal conditions of acting as such.
footnote: HA, Ch. 2, Sec. 10.
old: So time is necessary implication of action.
new: So time is a necessary implication of action.
old: To make this distinction clear, I will henceforth use the term “subsidiary category of action” when referring to the second meaning.
new: The best way of distinguishing between the two meanings is to keep in mind that “the category of action” refers to the former definition and “a category of action” refers to the latter.
after: opportunity cost: the second-highest ranked action that is forgone when the highest ranked action is chosen
new: Very importantly, the causality category itself is a category of human action, because, again, as Mises noted action would be unthinkable without the assumption of regularity in the natural world.
footnote: David Hume himself seemed to imply that causality was a necessary implication of action, when he wrote that without the presumption of regularity, "we should never have been able to adjust means to end, or employ our natural powers, either to the producing of good, or avoiding of evil.” (An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section V.) In fact, far from being the “pre-positivist” that he is often portrayed as, Hume posited that our very notion of cause-and-effect is derived from our understanding of will and action: “An act of volition produces motion in our limbs, or raises a new idea in our imagination. This influence of the will we know by consciousness. Hence we acquire the idea of power or energy; and are certain, that we ourselves and all other beings are possessed of power. This idea, then, is an idea of reflection, since it arises from reflecting on the operations of our own mind, and on the command which is exercised by will, both over the organs of the body and faculties of the soul.” (An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section VII.)
old: The above are subsidiary categories of all action.
new: The above are subsidiary categories of all action.
after: Having shown what conditions are required by any action, one must go further and define–of course, in a categorial and formal sense–the less general conditions required for special modes of acting.
footnote: HA, Ch. 2, Sec. 10.
after: inquiries to the study of acting under those conditions and presuppositions which are given in reality.
footnote: Ibid.
after: For example, Mises does not consider the “disutility of labor” to be a category of action.
footnote: Ibid.
after: It tells us what we should explore, but it does not tell us how we could proceed in our search for knowledge.
footnote: Ibid.
after: “the analysis of those actions which are conducted on the basis of monetary calculation.”
footnote: HA, Ch. 14, Sec. 1
old: It is easier to accept broader propositions as true, as they seem to be “verified” all the time in life, since the conditions they are concerned with are so broad.
new: It is easier to accept broader economic laws as true, as they seem to be “verified” all the time in life, since the conditions they are concerned with are so broad.
old: The geometric principle that all 3-4-5 triangles form right angles might have been discovered by the Egyptians simply through experience: simply noticing the constantly perpendicular legs of such triangles by eyeballing multiple instances of them.
new: The geometric principle that all 3-4-5 triangles form right angles might have been discovered by the Egyptians through experience, by simply noticing that such triangles generally have perpendicular legs by eyeballing multiple instances of them.
old: (FOOTNOTE on the important differences between geometry and praxeology)
footnote: While the similarities between geometry and economics are instructive, there are important differences between the a priori natures of the two, discussed by Mises in UFES, “Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Praxeology Instead of an Introduction”, Section 4. Another important discussion of the apriorism of geometry is in UFES, Ch 1. Sec. 1.
old: Now the deductive method for geometry is universally embraced.
new: In present times the deductive method for geometry is universally embraced.
old: An economic analogy to this situation is when a theoretical economist a vicious formulations
new: An economic analogy to this situation is when a theoretical economist introduces vicious formulations
old: to formulate a false economic theorem.
new: to build a false economic theorem.
old: If economic data does not seem to demonstrate the playing out of a certain market mechanism described by economic theory, (assuming the data is correct) that would indicate that circumstances must have been dominated by another market mechanism (also described by pure economic theory), another set of factors, or the interplay of several market mechanisms/sets of factors.
new (REPLACING “MECHANISM” WITH “PROCESS”): If economic data does not seem to demonstrate the playing out of a certain market process described by economic theory, (assuming the data is correct) that would indicate that circumstances must have been dominated by another market porcess (also described by pure economic theory), another set of factors, or the interplay of several market processes/sets of factors.
old: publish his new theorem
new: publish a new theorem
old: The most history can for an economist is to provide (1) an example with which to illustrate (not prove) an economic theorem to help students grasp the concept by giving them a concrete manifestation of it, or (2) a clue that perhaps he has performed fallacious reasoning in deriving the economic theorems he has been operating with.
new: The most historical data can do is give an economist a clue that perhaps he has performed fallacious reasoning in deriving the economic theorems he has been operating with.
old: But even then, he must use discursive reasoning to catch the fallacy, and then to adjust his theory according to corrected reasoning.
new: But even in the latter case, he must use discursive reasoning to catch the fallacy, and then to adjust his theory according to corrected reasoning.
after: Without theory, the general aprioristic science of human action, there is no comprehension of the reality of human action.
footnote: HA, Ch. 2, Sec. 3
old: The latter kind of tautology is indeed barren
new: The latter pleonastic kind of tautology is indeed barren (see my discussion of the “action axiom” in footnote __)
after: Every attempt to reflect upon the problems raised by human action is necessarily bound to aprioristic reasoning.
footnote: Ibid.
after: concerned to an analysis of fundamental principles, and imperceptibly abandons any reference to the factual happenings which evoked the argument.
footnote: Ibid.
after: Experience concerning money requires familiarity with the praxeological category medium of exchange.
footnote: Ibid.
after: Change can be conceived as the outcome either of the operation of mechanistic causality or of purposeful behavior; for the human mind there is no third way available.
footnote: HA, Ch. 1, Sec. 6.
old: And again, these categories are prior to all experience, because they are prerequisite to the meaningfulness of any experience.
new: And again, these categories are prior to all experience, because they are prerequisite to the meaningfulness of any experience. For sensation to make sense, it must be refracted through the dual lenses of “cause” and “purpose”.
BEGIN DELETE: The human animal naturally develops a mind with a built-in capacity to filter raw, meaningless sensations through the innate conceptions of “cause” and “purpose” to create meaningful knowledge. This capacity is part of our zoological patrimony.
Again, Mises:
The human mind is not a tabula rasa on which the external events write their own history. It is equipped with a set of tools for grasping reality. Man acquired these tools, i.e., the logical structure of his mind, in the course of his evolution from an amoeba to his present state. But these tools are logically prior to any experience.
Thus does Kant meet Darwin in the crystalline mind of Mises.
Mises wrote:
END DELETE
after: The natural sciences do not know anything about final causes; inquiry and theorizing are entirely guided by the category of causality.
footnote: TH, Ch. 11.
old: How do we know when we are dealing with the nature and when we are dealing with human action?
new: How do we know when we are dealing with nature and when we are dealing with the realm of human action?
after: it is beyond doubt that the principle according to which an Ego deals with every human being as if the other were a thinking and acting being like himself has evidenced its usefulness both in mundane life and in scientific research. It cannot be denied that it works.
footnote: HA, Ch. 1, Sec. 6.
after: They believe that animals, plants, mountains, rivers, and fountains, even stones and celestial bodies, are, like themselves, feeling, willing, and acting beings.
footnote: Ibid.
old: Here Mises described “animism,” in which objects that more-experienced minds describe as inanimate, are ascribed intelligence (which is an originally Aristotelean term meaning "in-dwelling purpose).
new: Here Mises described “animism,” in which objects that more-experienced minds describe as inanimate, are ascribed intelligence and will.
after: Another god, angry about some acts of men, killed the offenders by shooting arrows.
footnote: TH, Ch. 11.
after: The most simple skills and techniques imply knowledge gathered by rudimentary research into causality.
footnote: Ibid.
after: Just as, in the example given earlier in this essay, a man devoid of the category of causality could never learn to avoid fire, a society devoid of the category of causality could never learn to make fire.
footnote: Just as, in the example given earlier in this paper, a man devoid of the category of causality could never learn to avoid fire, a people devoid of the category of causality could never learn to make fire.
old: As culture and technology progresses, the ambit of causality tends to expand, as the ambit of teleology tends to shrink.
new: As culture and technology progresses, the ambit of causality tends to expand at the expense of the ambit of teleology.
after: Only at a later stage of cultural development does man renounce these animistic ideas and substitute the mechanistic world view for them.
footnote: HA, Ch. 1, Sec. 6.
after: Slowly people came to learn that meteorological events, disease, and the spread of plagues are natural phenomena and that lightning rods and antiseptic agents provide effective protection while magic rites are useless.
footnote: TH, Ch. 11.
old: This transition was brilliantly typified by the ancient Greek doctor Hippocrates, in his essay on epilepsy, which was before his time called the “sacred disease” http://classics.mit.edu/Hippocrates/sacred.html:
new: This transition in thought was brilliantly exemplified by the ancient Greek doctor Hippocrates, in writing on epilepsy, which had, before his time, been called the “sacred disease”.
after: But if it is reckoned divine because it is wonderful, instead of one there are many diseases which would be sacred; for, as I will show, there are others no less wonderful and prodigious, which nobody imagines to be sacred."
footnote: Hippocrates, On the Sacred Disease.
old: Abandoning teleology for causality had such satisfactory results in pragmatic affairs, that thinkers began to make the same shift regarding matters over which they had no control.
new: Abandoning teleology for causality had such satisfactory results in pragmatic affairs, that thinkers began to make the same shift even regarding matters far removed from day-to-day life, and over which they had no control.
old: And in the television series upon which the book Cosmos was based, Sagan said:
new: And in the television series upon which the book Cosmos was based, Sagan said:
before: Radical Anti-Teleology
new section: “Mises on “Free Will””
According too Mises, man’s will is not free in the metaphysical sense (that is, free from causation):
“The content of human action, i.e., the ends aimed at and the means chosen and applied for the attainment of these ends, is determined by the personal qualities of every acting man. Individual man is the product of a long line of zoological evolution which has shaped his physiological inheritance. He is born the offspring and the heir of his ancestors, and the precipitate and sediment of all that his forefathers experienced are his biological patrimony. When he is born, he does not enter the world in general as such, but a definite environment. The innate and inherited biological qualities and all that life has worked upon him make a man what he is at any instant of his pilgrimage. They are his fate and destiny. His will is not “free” in the metaphysical sense of this term. It is determined by his background and all the influences to which he himself and his ancestors were exposed.” [FOOTNOTE: HA, Ch. 2, Sec. 6]
Furthermore, man is not a wholly independent “god” outside of the “machine” of the universe.
Freedom of the will does not mean that the decisions that guide a man’s action fall, as it were, from outside into the fabric of the universe and add to it something that had no relation to and was independent of the elements which had formed the universe before. Actions are directed by ideas, and ideas are products of the human mind, which is definitely a part of the universe and of which the power is strictly determined by the whole structure of the universe.[FOOTNOTE: UFES, Ch. 3, Sec. 4.]
However, accroding to Mises, man’s will is free in the moral sense: that is, he is free to suppress his impulses. [FOOTNOTE: Although I would argue that all acts of suppressing certain impulses are themselves impelled by still other impulses, and that “impulse” is, praxeologically speaking, identical with “felt uneasiness”]:
“Man is not, like the animals, an obsequious puppet of instincts and sensual impulses. Man has the power to suppress instinctive desires, he has a will of his own, he chooses between incompatible ends. In this sense he is a moral person; in this sense he is free.”[FOOTNOTE: UFES, Ch. 3, Sec. 4.]
Yet, the notion of “will” is but a facet of the notion of “action”.
“Action is will put into operation…” [FOOTNOTE: HA, Ch. 1, Sec. 1]
So, for all the reasons listed herein that action is a necessary reality for man, will too is a necessary reality. Whether it is called “free” or not, man (as far as man himself is concerned) does have a will.
“Some philosophers are prepared to explode the notion of man’s will as an illusion and self-deception because man must unwittingly behave according to the inevitable laws of causality. They may be right or wrong from the point of view of the prime mover or the cause of itself. However, from the human point of view action is the ultimate thing. We do not assert that man is “free” in choosing and acting. We merely establish the fact that he chooses and acts…” [FOOTNOTE: HA, Ch. 6, Sec. 1.]
The last two sentences seems consonant with the dictum of Arthur Schopenhauer that, “Man can do what he wills, but he cannot will what he wills.”
after: Radical Anti-Teleology
delete: As Mises wrote:
after: The experimental methods of the natural sciences are the only appropriate methods for any kind of investigation.
footnote: TH, Ch. 11.
old: (B.F. Skinner, About Behaviorism Ch. 1)
footnote: B.F. Skinner, About Behaviorism, Ch. 1.
after: “Let me see if I understand your thesis. You think we shouldn’t anthropomorphize people?”
footnote: Wikipedia, “Sidney_Morgenbesser”
after: Mises denied this. He argued that what he called “methodological dualism” (applying causality to nature and teleology human affairs) does not necessarily imply “ghost in the shell” dualism.
footnote: In fact, Mises provides a good reason why it is natural to reject “ghost in the shell” dualism, when he points out that, “our impotence to ascertain an absolute beginning out of nothing forces us to assume that also this invisible and intangible something—the human mind—is an inherent part of the universe, a product of its whole history.” (UFES, Ch. 3, Sec. 4.)
after: But as long as we do not know how external facts–physical and physiological–produce in a human mind definite thoughts and volitions resulting in concrete acts, we have to face an insurmountable methodological dualism.
footnote: HA, Ch. 1, Sec. 3.
old: I would also add that the reason we study human action in the first place is that we have certain questions which have are inextricably bound up with the human purposes that anti-teleologists dismiss as ‘mentalist fictions.’ For example, people are vitally interested in economics largely in order to discover the legal and institutional arrangements by which humans can prosper. How can one explain “how humans prosper” when the teleological, “mental fiction” of ‘prospering’ is dismissed as nonsense at the outset? I would challenge any anti-teleological economist to even define (let alone explain) “goods,” “money,” “profit,” “loss,” “income” without using the teleological, “mentalist” language they deride as “folk psychology.”
new: Some claim that “methodological dualism” is a provisional stance, resorted to only because we do not yet have the technology to fully explain the complexity of the human brain, and that this stance can eventually be dropped once we do achieve that level of technology. However, to add an argument of my own, complementary to Mises’, humans are not special for science just because they are complex. They are not basically on the same scientific grounds as weather patterns. They are special for science because the very questions we want answered about them are teleological in nature. The reason we study human action in the first place is that we have certain questions which have are inextricably bound up with the human purposes that anti-teleologists dismiss as ‘mentalist fictions.’
For example, people are vitally interested in economics largely in order to discover the legal and institutional arrangements by which humans can prosper. How can one explain “how humans prosper” when the teleological, “mental fiction” of ‘prospering’ is dismissed as nonsense at the outset? I would challenge any anti-teleological economist to even define (let alone explain) “goods,” “money,” “profit,” “loss,” “income” without using the teleological, “mentalist” language they deride as “folk psychology.”
Inquiries into the causes and nature of the wealth of nations are fundamentally different from inquiries into the causes and nature of the humidity of trade winds. If we had precise enough instruments and powerful enough computers, we could explain every single thing about a trade wind. But no matter how precise your instruments, no matter how powerful your computers, all you will find in the brain are chemical, electrical, subatomic and other physical patterns and processes. You will never find preferences, purposes, costs or proceeds.
This is not to say the former does not cause the latter. It is rather that the terms in which our minds grasp causality and teleology are fundamentally different, and simply do not translate into each other.
The most thorough-going radical anti-teleologists are actually right insofar as, in the language of causality, there is no such thing as teleology. That is why they don’t want to explain teleology in terms of causality; instead they want to abandon teleology altogether. Their position is ridiculous, because it would involve the abandonment of all economic, sociological, ethnographic, and historical questions, but at least it is more logical than that of people who think they can answer teleological questions with causality answers.
We have many causality-related questions about our bodies (including our brains), because our bodies are useful to us. But we also have many teleological questions about choice, success, failure, prosperity, and poverty. Once you abandon teleological language, you’ve effectively changed the question. So, as long as we are still asking teleological questions, we need to continue providing teleological answers.
after: Where there is something to explain, the human mind has never been at a loss to invent ad hoc some imaginary theories, lacking any logical justification.
footnote: HA, Ch. 2, Sec. 1.
after: It is impossible to group men into classes whose members always react in the same way.
footnote: TA, Introduction.
after: Those economists who want to substitute “quantitative economics” for what they call “qualitative economics” are utterly mistaken. There are, in the field of economics, no constant relations, and consequently no measurement is possible.
footnote:HA, Ch 2, Sec. 8.
after: The equations formulated by mathematical economics remain a useless piece of mental gymnastics and would remain so even it they were to express much more than they really do.
footnote: HA, Ch 16, Sec. 5.
old: As this is monograph on epistemology, and not economics proper
new: As this is a paper on epistemology, and not economics proper