A correspondent points me at an old piece by Murray Rothbard criticizing me for my failure to hate the state, and asks for comment.
Rothbard’s basic point is correct.
End commentary on his arguments, commence commentary on him as a person.
I do not regard support for government as an act of willful evil but as an intellectual mistake; my arguments (and his) could be wrong, and some sort of government might be the least bad alternative among available human institutions.
Yeah, that’s great and neither did Rothbard.
"George writes as if citizen voting is constitutive, that is, that everytime we vote in an election this creates and constitutes the State. It is almost as if the State would not exist if we didn’t go out and vote. Nonsense! The State is there, and it gives us this area of partial choice with which to work. Even is everyone (except those running for office to work and their retainers) failed to vote, the State would keep rolling on.
There is one case, I believe, where a vote was constitutive in the United States: the vote for or against the Constitution. (Unfortunately, of course, the vote was not on the Constitution itself–it would have been beaten–but on delegates to state ratifying conventions.) Even though we did not have anarchism before, we had a much milder State, and anyone voting for the Constitution participated in the criminal act of setting up, instituting, a stronger government. Those who voted against the Constitution, on the other hand, were great." - Rothbard on morality of voting
Apart from that, I maintain that there have been no constitutive votes by citizens which should be considered criminal or illicit.
His response was that that was all right; because Reagan was responsible for the inflation, it was appropriate to use it to make his performance look worse.
“Since the beginning of the Reagan administration, the much heralded “cuts” in the officially dubbed “income-tax” segment of our payroll taxes have been more than offset by the rise in the “Social-Security” portion. But since the public has been conditioned into thinking that the Social Security tax is somehow not a tax, the Reagan-Bush administrations have been able to get away with their pose as heroic champions of tax cuts and resisters against the tax-raising inclinations of the evil Democrats.”
Think that through and he was saying that it was all right to misrepresent the evidence to his fellow libertarians as long as the result was to make them think badly of someone they should think badly of, to lead them to the correct conclusion for the wrong reason. I don’t regard that as a desirable approach to political (or other discussion). Or, for that matter, a libertarian one—we are generally opposed to fraud as well as force.
Well it doesn’t really come as a suprise you don’t know what fraud is / define it differently that Rothbard does - considering he actually has a theory of property, no?
“Under our proposed theory would fraud be actionable at law? Yes, because fraud is failure to fulfill a voluntarily agreed upon transfer of property, and is therefore implicit theft. If, for example, A sells to B a package which A says contains a radio, and it contains only a pile of scrap metal, then A has taken B’s money and not fulfilled the agreed upon conditions for such a transfer-the delivery of a radio. A has therefore stolen B’s property. The same applies to a failure to fulfill any product warranty. If, for example, the seller asserts that the contents of a certain package include 5 ounces of product X, and they do not do so, then the seller has taken money without fulfilling the terms of the contract; he has in effect stolen the buyer’s money. Once again, warranties of products would be legally enforceable, not because they are “promises,” but because they describe one of the entities of the agreed-upon contract. If the entity is not as the seller describes, then fraud and hence implicit theft have taken place.” - TEOL, Chapter 19 (Property Rights and the Theory of Contracts)
If you don’t subscribe to the property title transfer theory of property, I’d be interested in what theory of contracts you do hold to. And as a result, what you constitute / how you define fraud.
Your claim about "Or, for that matter, a libertarian one—we are generally opposed to fraud as well as force" imo, simply highlights your confusion about what libertarianism actually is. If you meant “intellectual fraud”, well rightio - well whoop di do - that has nothing directly to do with libertarianism, so why make the claim?
Really what I think it comes down, in terms of your approach - like father like son? - I think the below is fitting?
And states Hoppe (1997, 23):
To maintain that no such thing as a rational ethic exists does not imply “tolerance” and “pluralism,” as champions of positivism such as Milton Friedman falsely claim, and moral absolutism does not imply “intolerance” and “dictatorship.” To the contrary, without absolute values “tolerance” and “pluralism” are just other arbitrary ideologies, and there is no reason to accept them rather than any others such as cannibalism and slavery. Only if absolute values, such as a human right of self-ownership exist, that is, only if “pluralism” or “tolerance” are not merely among a multitude of tolerable values, can pluralism and tolerance in fact be safeguarded.
- “The Western State as a Paradigm: Learning from History.” in Paul Gottfried, ed., Politics and Regimes: Religion & Public Life, Vol. 30, Edison, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
And: "I came across an exchange between Mr. Halliday, Walter Block and an editors note by Murray. The Libertarian Forum pdf from 1973_06. I agree with Blocks rebuttal, and Murray’s note:
“How about Professor Block’s second premise, that evil is only the initiation of violence? Here I think it is possible to partially reconcile the Block and Halliday positions. It is a question of what context we are dealing with. I would agree with Block that within the context of libertarian theory, evil must be confined to the initiation of violence. On the other hand, when we proceed from libertarianism to the question of wider social and personal ethics, then I would agree with Halliday that there are many other actions which should be considered as evil: lying, for example or deliberately failing to fulfill one’s best potential. But these are not matters about which liberty - the problem of the proper scope of violence - has anything to say. In short, qua libertarian there is nothing wrong or evil about breaking dates, being gratuitously nasty to one’s associates, or generally behaving like a cad: here not only do I join Professor Block, but I would expect Mr. Halliday and all other libertarians to do the same. On the other hand, qua general ethicist, I would join Mr. Halliday in denouncing such behavior, while Professor Block would not.”
Recently; “Block: I’m shocked that I ever wrote it. I don’t think I meant it. I agree, fully, with Murray.”