Dispute Resolution System in a Libertarian Society

[Truth_and_Liberty]

@Clayton

We should expect that, in a natural order society, security services would emerge that would put most people most of the time on a fairly equal footing, in terms of their ability to fight (my PDA vs. your PDA … they’re much more likely to be well-matched than you vs. me).

While it may ultimately come down to their “ability to fight”, I think there is much more to say here. If we assume the two PDAs are both large and have powerful weapons, they are obviously not going to have a war over a simple dispute like a petty theft. Which PDA has greater ability to fight is irrelevant in this case; war is not on the table, and that is fully understood by both sides. This conflict will be resolved by one PDA paying off the other. In this case, what is comes down to is “ability to pay”, or who has the greatest bargaining power in negotiations.

@Clayton

I believe, for example, that this makes it impossible that arbitrators could “impose” the death penalty, since no one would ever accept certain death versus any other alternative.

I think this is incorrect. I think you’ve reached this incorrect conclusion by focussing solely on “ability to fight” rather than “ability to pay” as well. Also, you appear to not consider that negotiations could (and probably will) happen between PDAs prior to any specific conflict. If I may quote David Friedman:

@David Friedman

We can each have our preferences reflected in the bargaining demands of our respective agencies. If the opponents of capital punishment feel more strongly than the proponents, the agencies will agree to no capital punishment; in exchange, the agencies that want capital punishment will get something else. Perhaps it will be agreed that they will not pay court costs or that some other disputed policy will go their way.

One can imagine an idealized bargaining process, for this or any other dispute, as follows: Two agencies are negotiating whether to recognize a pro- or anti-capital-punishment court. The pro agency calculates that getting a pro-capital-punishment court will be worth $20,000 a year to its customers; that is the additional amount it can get for its services if they include a guarantee of capital punishment in case of disputes with the other agency. The anti-capital-punishment agency calculates a corresponding figure of $40,000. It offers the pro agency $30,000 a year in exchange for accepting an anti-capital-punishment court. The pro agency accepts. Now the anti-capital-punishment agency can raise its rates enough to bring in an extra $35,000. Its customers are happy, since the guarantee of no capital punishment is worth more than that. The agency is happy; it is getting an extra $5,000 a year profit. The pro agency cuts its rates by an amount that costs it $25,000 a year. This lets it keep its customers and even get more, since the savings is more than enough to make up to them for not getting the court of their choice. It, too, is making a $5,000 a year profit on the transaction. As in any good trade, everyone gains.

I think this is an extremely important idea.

Taking a step back for a moment, we know that what gets produced in any free market is ultimately determined by public opinion. The relative amount of capital, land and labor devoted to the production of one type of food relative to another type of food is dependent on relatively how much each type of food is demanded, for example. So we can expect the same thing with regard to what laws will be produced in anarchy.

The kinds of laws that get produced will be the kinds of laws that people demand. Public opinion will be reflected in the laws that are produced. The barganing process described by Friedman is the mechanism through which this will take place. This is how individuals’ opinions on ethics and justice are translated into laws in anarchy.

@Clayton

Hence, the most severe punishment an arbitrator could suggest is outlawing/ostracism (which I would expect would result in the wronged party - and his family - visiting vigilante justice on the party in the wrong).

I don’t see how that follows at all. But anyway it contradicts what you said earlier about restitution / retribution being enforced.