Does it make sense that human morality would be a matter of rigorous deduction?

[Lilburne]

@Anarchist Cain

Could not someone who joined this ideology feel the same?

Yes, but that would run counter to the traditional “morality-via-reason” natural rights conception.

@Anarchist Cain

I’m confused these. Ethics is the study of morality.

But moral behavior doesn’t necessarily arise out of an ethical theory, just as economic behavior doesn’t necessarily arise out of an economic theory.

[wombatron]

@Anarchist Cain

It is a matter of impositionism vs. reflectionism. You are to believe that logic imposeses itself on the reality around us and therefore logic is only in our mind and nature when not viewed through our logic can perhaps be chaotic [ A Kantian argument ]. However, as reflectionists, reality imposes itself on the minds of individuals. Thus logic is out there and we can deduce how it operates. Natural law is outside of the human consciousness. Reflecting upon it gives us truths of the world.

Actually… [:P]

@Roderick T. Long

Wittgenstein’s considered position, however, is pretty clearly an attempt to transcend the reflectionist/impositionist dichotomy entirely. On this view, impositionism is rejected because it pictures logic as a constraint imposed by us on the world, while reflectionism is rejected because it pictures logic as a constraint imposed by the world on us. To think of logic as constraining something is to imagine, or try to imagine, how things would be without the constraint. Since neither talk of an illogical world nor talk of illogical thought can be made sense of, the whole question cannot be meaningfully asked and so may be dismissed in good conscience.

(from Wittgenstein, Austrian Economics, and the Logic of Action)

[Laughing_Man]

@wombatron

Actually…

@Roderick T. Long

Wittgenstein’s considered position, however, is pretty clearly an attempt to transcend the reflectionist/impositionist dichotomy entirely. On this view, impositionism is rejected because it pictures logic as a constraint imposed by us on the world, while reflectionism is rejected because it pictures logic as a constraint imposed by the world on us. To think of logic as constraining something is to imagine, or try to imagine, how things would be without the constraint. Since neither talk of an illogical world nor talk of illogical thought can be made sense of, the whole question cannot be meaningfully asked and so may be dismissed in good conscience.

(from Wittgenstein, Austrian Economics, and the Logic of Action)

Shhhh I wanted to lead them into a trap! See if anyone was capable of deducing what Long stated. [:P]

[Amanojack]

Lilburne, thanks for your reply - everything made sense and I basically agree, so I have nothing to directly respond to.

However, if you agree that morality for others is essentially a persuasion technique (unless it is purely consequentialist), don’t most of the points being debated here regarding logic become moot?

[zefreak]

@AJ

Lilburne, thanks for your reply - everything made sense and I basically agree, so I have nothing to directly respond to.

However, if you agree that morality for others is essentially a persuasion technique (unless it is purely consequentialist), don’t most of the points being debated here regarding logic become moot?

Yes.

[Lilburne]

@Juan

@Lilburne

Are people who are incapable of proper syllogisms incapable of knowing right from wrong?

No they aren’t.

Juan, in another thread, you just had this exchange with Spidey.

@Juan

@Spideynw

Parents should be able to legally torture their children.

Why ?

Why challenge it, Juan? Does the notion disgust you? But morality has nothing to do with an inner sense of right and wrong, right? If that’s the conclusion the moral syllogism arrives at, you’re bound to it, aren’t you?

[Juan]

@Lilburne

Why challenge it, Juan?

I’m not only challenging him. I’m challenging him by rational means. I asked for a reason, not for information about his feelings.

Does the notion disgust you ?

I think torture is wrong … both intuition and reason tell me so.

But morality has nothing to do with an inner sense of right and wrong, right?

Not quite right. I never dismissed moral sense completely. I pointed out its limitations - limitations which you seem to be ignoring.

If that’s the conclusion the moral syllogism arrives at, you’re bound to it, aren’t you ?

I’m bound by logic, yes. But notice that I already said that there’s no way to logically prove that A has authority over B, which in this case translates to “parents have no authority to torture ‘their’ children”.

I don’t think there’s a conflict between sound reasoning and morals.

[Lilburne]

Wow, you actually tried to meaningfully address my points; I must have struck a chord. Since you posted a bit more like me, I’ll respond “Juan-style”…

@Juan

I’m not only challenging him. I’m challenging him by rational means.

How can you challenge rationally when you’re rationally challenged ? …

@Juan

I think torture is wrong … both intuition and reason tell me so.

Maybe you should admit your hybrid moral philosophy is self contradictory trash ?

@Juan

Not quite right. I never dismissed moral sense completely. I pointed out its limitations - limitations which you seem to be ignoring.

Your nonsense it is boring …

@Juan

'm bound by logic, yes. But notice that I already said that there’s no way to logically prove that A has authority over B, which in this case translates to “parents have no authority to torture ‘their’ children”.

Sorry I don’t understand ? Maybe because you don’t make sense ?

Let’s see: flip answers, thoughtless insults, oddly placed spacing and punctuation, bizarre phrasing, declarative statements with question marks… Did I miss anything?

[Juan]

lol. Kick and scream all you want Lilburne. The flaws in your position won’t go away, though.

[Stephen_Forde]

@Anarchist Cain

It is a matter of impositionism vs. reflectionism. You are to believe that logic imposeses itself on the reality around us and therefore logic is only in our mind and nature when not viewed through our logic can perhaps be chaotic [ A Kantian argument ]. However, as reflectionists, reality imposes itself on the minds of individuals. Thus logic is out there and we can deduce how it operates. Natural law is outside of the human consciousness. Reflecting upon it gives us truths of the world.

@Hans-Hermann Hoppe

While such recognition of the praxeological constraints on the structure of knowledge might not immediately strike one as in itself of great significance, it does have some highly important implications. For one thing, in light of this insight one recurring difficulty of rationalist philosophy finds its answer. It has been a common quarrel with rationalism in the Leibniz-Kant tradition that it seemed to imply some sort of idealism. Realizing that a priori true propositions could not possibly be derived from observations, rationalism answered the question how a priori knowledge could then be possible by adopting the model of an active mind, as opposed to the empiricist model of a passive, mirror-like mind in the tradition of Locke and Hume. According to rationalist philosophy, a priori true propositions had their foundation in the operation of principles of thinking which one could not possibly conceive of as operating otherwise; they were grounded in categories of an active mind. Now, as empiricists were only too eager to point out, the obvious critique of such a position is, that if this were indeed the case, it could not be explained why such mental categories should fit reality. Rather, one would be forced to accept the absurd idealistic assumption that reality would have to be conceived of as a creation of the mind, in order to claim that a priori knowledge could incorporate any information about the structure of reality. And clearly, such an assertion seemed to be justified when faced with programmatic statements of rationalist philosophers such as the following by Kant: “So far it has been assumed that our knowledge had to conform to reality,” instead it should be assumed “that observational reality should conform to our mind.”

Recognizing knowledge as being structurally constrained by its role in the framework of action categories provides the solution to such a complaint. For as soon as this is realized, all idealistic suggestions of rationalist philosophy disappear, and an epistemology claiming that a priori true propositions exist becomes a realistic epistemology instead. Understood as constrained by action categories, the seemingly unbridgeable gulf between the mental on the one hand and the real, outside physical world on the other is bridged. So constrained, a priori knowledge must be as much a mental thing as a reflection of the structure of reality, since it is only through actions that the mind comes into contact with reality, so to speak. Acting is a cognitively guided adjustment of a physical body in physical reality. And thus, there can be no doubt that a priori knowledge, conceived of as an insight into the structural constraints imposed on knowledge qua knowledge of actors, must indeed correspond to the nature of things. The realistic character of such knowledge would manifest itself not only in the fact that one could not think it to be otherwise, but in the fact that one could not undo its truth.

[Stephen_Forde]

Let’s see: flip answers, thoughtless insults, oddly placed spacing and punctuation, bizarre phrasing, declarative statements with question marks… Did I miss anything?

He has you exact, Juan.

[Juan]

I don’t think so Stephen.

[Stephen_Forde]

@wilderness

Without induction there is no deduction.

Can you explain this? I’m pretty sure it’s possible to derive specific cases from general cases without deriving general cases from specific cases.

[Stephen_Forde]

@Juan

I don’t think so Stephen.

I think you forgot to put the question mark at the end of your sentence?

[Stephen_Forde]

@Lilburne

For me, the answer to this question is no, and that is one of my chief problems with most natural rights theories, and which is why I’m trying to construct my own. Are people who are incapable of proper syllogisms incapable of knowing right from wrong?

Could a Rothbardian natural rights proponent please enlighten me on this?

@"[Hans-Hermann

(http://www.lewrockwell.com/hoppe/hoppe7.html)"]

From the undeniable acceptance – the axiomatic status – of this a priori of argumentation in turn two equally necessary conclusions follow. The first follows from the a priori of argumentation when there is no rational solution to the problem of conflict arising from the existence of scarcity. Suppose in my earlier scenario of Crusoe and Friday, that Friday was not the name of a man but of a gorilla. Obviously, just as Crusoe can run into conflict regarding his body and its standing room with Friday the man, so he might do so with Friday the gorilla. The gorilla might want to occupy the same space that Crusoe is already occupying. In this case, at least if the gorilla is the sort of entity that we know gorillas to be, there is in fact no rational solution to their conflict. Either the gorilla wins, and devours, crushes, or pushes Crusoe aside – that is the gorilla’s solution to the problem – or Crusoe wins, and kills, beats, chases away, or tames the gorilla – that is Crusoe’s solution. In this situation, one may indeed speak of moral relativism. With Alasdair MacIntyre, a prominent philosopher of the relativist persuasion, one may concur asking as the title of one of his books, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? – Crusoe’s or the gorilla’s. Depending on whose side one chooses, the answer will be different. However, it is more appropriate to refer to this situation as one where the question of justice and rationality simply does not arise: that is, as an extra-moral situation. The existence of Friday the gorilla poses for Crusoe merely a technical problem, not a moral one. Crusoe has no other choice but to learn how to successfully manage and control the movements of the gorilla just as he must learn to manage and control the inanimate objects of his environment.

By implication, only if both parties to a conflict are capable of engaging in argumentation with one another, can one speak of a moral problem and is the question of whether or not there exists a solution meaningful. Only if Friday, regardless of his physical appearance (i.e., whether he looks like a man or like a gorilla), is capable of argumentation (even if he has shown himself to be so capable only once), can he be deemed rational and does the question whether or not a correct solution to the problem of social order exists make sense. No one can be expected to give an answer – indeed: any answer – to someone who has never raised a question or, more to the point, who has never stated his own relativistic viewpoint in the form of an argument. In that case, this “other” cannot but be regarded and treated like an animal or plant, i.e., as an extra-moral entity. Only if this other entity can in principle pause in his activity, whatever it might be, step back so to speak, and say “yes” or “no” to something one has said, do we owe this entity an answer and, accordingly, can we possibly claim that our answer is the correct one for both parties involved in a conflict.

Does that answer the question? I’m not sure if this is a direct enough explaination. Only rational agents are able to argue over moral propositions. And only rational agents capable of forming proper syllogisms. So while there is a connection between the two, it is not necessary to be able to form proper syllogisms to be moral and not necessary to be moral to be able to form proper syllogisms.

[Laughing_Man]

@The Hoppeinamtor

Recognizing knowledge as being structurally constrained by its role in the framework of action categories provides the solution to such a complaint. For as soon as this is realized, all idealistic suggestions of rationalist philosophy disappear, and an epistemology claiming that a priori true propositions exist becomes a realistic epistemology instead. Understood as constrained by action categories, the seemingly unbridgeable gulf between the mental on the one hand and the real, outside physical world on the other is bridged. So constrained, a priori knowledge must be as much a mental thing as a reflection of the structure of reality, since it is only through actions that the mind comes into contact with reality, so to speak. Acting is a cognitively guided adjustment of a physical body in physical reality. And thus, there can be no doubt that a priori knowledge, conceived of as an insight into the structural constraints imposed on knowledge qua knowledge of actors, must indeed correspond to the nature of things. The realistic character of such knowledge would manifest itself not only in the fact that one could not think it to be otherwise, but in the fact that one could not undo its truth.

To: Stephen Forde

http://mises.org/journals/scholar/long.pdf

I’m glad that Womb posted this link.

Here is a shorter article:

http://praxeology.net/antipsych.pdf

[Stephen_Forde]

@Anarchist Cain

http://mises.org/journals/scholar/long.pdf

I’m glad that Womb posted this link.

Here is a shorter article:

http://praxeology.net/antipsych.pdf

Thanx, I will read this and get back to you. Probably not until later on though as I have many things to do today, and only the short article. In the meantime, could you edit your post so that the quote is from professor Hoppe instead of me? Or perhaps at least double quote so that it is me quoting Hoppe?

[Jon_Irenicus]

Can you explain this? I’m pretty sure it’s possible to derive specific cases from general cases without deriving general cases from specific cases.

Deduction is inferential. Without premises from which conclusions are to be inferred, it doesn’t factor in. Premises are inductively formed. Classical induction is what you have in mind here.

[Lilburne]

@Stephen Forde

Only rational agents are able to argue over moral propositions. And only rational agents capable of forming proper syllogisms.

But implicit in Hoppe’s argumentation ethics is the notion that being fully moral involves abiding by the conclusions of argumentation ethics which are reached by deduction. If people don’t perform Hoppe’s deductions, but act in accord with Hoppe’s conclusions anyway, then they would only be acting morally by accident. Again, in Hoppe’s system as well as in Rothbard’s, it seems that to be a fully moral being necessarily involves rigorous deduction. And such a formulation of morality just seems to be a contrived product of wordplay.

I feel Hoppe’s argumentation ethics also fails to derive “ought” from “is”, but that matter is for another thread.

[Stephen_Forde]

@Jon Irenicus

Can you explain this? I’m pretty sure it’s possible to derive specific cases from general cases without deriving general cases from specific cases.

Deduction is inferential. Without premises from which conclusions are to be inferred, it doesn’t factor in. Premises are inductively formed. Classical induction is what you have in mind here.

What about premises that are negatively demonstrable? They are not inductively (I’m not sure if we mean the same thing by inductively) formed. Also, empirical induction can only provide hypothetical truths, not necessary truths.

Also, I was more interested in a response from wilderness, since he thinks I don’t know anything about epistemology and accused me of ‘fronting’.