Of course the notion of exact laws or a priori propositions can be ignored or left out in discussing the essential aspects of Austrian economics. But the underlying epistemological problem doesn’t therefore disappear.
The statements that economics makes are not simply of the kind “the structure of production is” or “economic calculation is.”
Instead, the economist wants to make statements of the form “doing X effects the structure of production resulting in Y” or “doing X effects economic calculation resulting in Y” or “doing X requires or assumes a,b,c knowledge which it is not possible for A to posses, and thus doing X will not lead to planned result Y.”
In other words, ultimately economic study comes down to regularities: the relationship between some planned action X, and the asserted result of that action Y.
The starting point of experimental knowledge is the cognition that an A is uniformly followed by a B. The utilization of this knowledge either for the production of B or for the avoidance of the emergence of B is called action. The primary objective of action is either to bring about B or to prevent its emergence. (Mises, The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science, p. 20)
Menger writes: The purpose of the theoretical sciences is understanding of the real world, knowledge of it extending beyond immediate experience, and control of it. We understand phenomena by means of theories as we become aware of them in each concrete case merely as exemplifications of a general regularity. We attain a knowledge of phenomena extending beyond immediate experience by drawing conclusions, in the concrete case, from certain observed facts (A) about other facts (B) not immediately perceived. We do this on the basis of the laws of coexistence and of the succession of phenomena. We control the real world in that, on the basis of our theoretical knowledge, we set the conditions of a phenomenon (A) which are within our control, and are able in such a way to produce the phenomenon (B) itself. (Investigations Into the Method of the Social Sciences, 55/56)(A’s and B’s added by AK)
Then, there are fundamentally only two kinds of regularities: empirical and exact.
The types and typical relationships (the laws) of the world of phenomena are not equally strict in all cases. A glance at the theoretical sciences teaches us rather that the regularities in the coexistence and in the succession of phenomena are in part without exception: indeed they are such that the possibility of an exception seems quite out of the question. However, some are such that they do indeed exhibit exceptions, or that in their case exceptions seem possible. The first are called laws of nature, the latter empirical laws. (Investigations into the Method of the Social Sciences, 1985, p.50)
(note that Menger refers to laws of nature as “exact laws.”)
Mises’s reasoning in this respect, or at least the implications of his reasoning, is largely overlooked. If we speak only of empirical regularities (those regularities for which we agree that it is not absolutely necessary that Y follows or is copresent with X), then what is the epistemological basis for our assertion that doing X will bring about Y or our assertion that doing X cannot result in Y? Mises argues that no numerical constants can be found in the social realm. If this is true, it means that propositions about regularities in the social realm cannot be based on a historical statistical correlations between X and Y. Historical correlations are ruled out. This situation is obviously not solved if we replace historical correlation with a survey of opinions, such as “most economists surveyed believe that doing X will result in Y.” Doing so may be politically expedient but is obviously unsatisfactory from the point of view of science. If we consider only empirical regularities, and if we rule out historical correlation and opinion surveys as insufficient scientifically, then where does this leave us regarding our propositions about regularities? I believe it leaves us with the ability to say “if we do X, Y might happen” and “if we do X, Y might not happen.” That is where we stand strictly scientifically.
However, in justifying a given policy proposal, we know it is not sufficient to make weak statements such as these. We have to find a way to make the link between X and Y stronger, or else abstain from advocating the particular policy. In cases where we do not want to abstain from making the policy proposal, we are then left with no choice but to strengthen the link between X and Y with historical correlation and opinion survey evidence.
The underlying scientific/epistemological problem is not solved, but we feel the practical need to make propositions extending beyond what our scientific framework warrants.
I believe Menger and Mises both recognize this situation, and realize that the solution is to be found in the notion of exact laws and a priori knowledge.
Strictly speaking, we cannot predict whether or not I will arrive at the location toward which I am walking. This is an empirical question. But I can be absolutely certain (as much as I can be certain of anything) that if I walk toward some location X, I will walk away from a different location Y.
Thus, both Menger and Mises see “exact” or “a priori” knowledge of this sort as the ultimate basis of economic propositions:
The aim of this orientation, which in the future we will call the exact one, an aim which research pursues in the same way in all realms of the world of phenomena, is the determination of strict laws of phenomena, of regularities in the succession of phenomena which do not present themselves to us as absolute, but which in respect to the approaches to cognition by which we attain to them simply bear within themselves the guarantee of absoluteness. It is the determination of laws of phenomena which commonly are called “laws of nature,” but more correctly should be designated by the expression “exact laws.” (Investigations, p. 59)
Much of Mises’s epistemological work is devoted to his theory that the logical necessity entailed in social regularities derives from the logical structure of the human mind (from the structure of consciousness).
When Mises writes about socialist economic calculation or about attempts to manipulate interest rates, he’s not saying that doing these things (X) might have Y consequences. He’s saying that doing X must necessarily result in Y. (or that doing X cannot possibly result in Y)
Why is there a tendency to avoid discussion of exact laws and a priori knowledge? I believe the reason is that the attainment of exact knowledge requires a complimentary diminishment in normative theorizing. As exact knowledge increases, the epistemological basis of normative theorizing is eroded. Conversely, maintaining a normative-friendly realm of social theorizing requires that exact laws not be allowed to enter. I may want and prefer that government decrease regulation and taxation and that they allow market-made money to emerge. But it is unlikely that I can provide a theoretical explanation of how doing these things (X) will have the results I claim it will (Y), which explanation does not rely (implicitly or explicitly) on an account of regularity that is scientifically insufficient. (that does not rely on historical or statistical correlations or surveys of opinion)
When we ignore mention or study of exact laws, this problem doesn’t go away. It simply means that our statements about social regularity can only be as strong as their underlying epistemology will warrant. If our statements about social regularity are not exact ones, and if statistical correlations and opinion surveys are deficient scientifically, then what is the basis for Austrian statements about social regularity?
I don’t think any important discussion about the essentials of Austrian theory can afford to ignore this question.