Right. This is the thing. Either you admit or deny there are some presuppositions of argumentation. I can’t see how anyone can deny there are some (if only the fact that discourse is possible).
And either you admit or deny that some of the things presupposed are norms. Again, for argumentation to have meaning and to be what it is, there have to be certain norms presupposed. This is so commonly recognized that is is a bit maddening that it needs to be argued for – but for more on this this see the insights of other thinkers, not only me and Hoppe, but also Apel and Habermas, Knight, Madison, Machan, Rasmussen-den Uyl, Hare, Narveson, Van Dun etc. and others – discussed in New Rationalist Directions in Libertarian Rights Theory, and also
[Quotes on the Logic of Liberty]
(http://www.stephankinsella.com/2009/06/22/quotes-on-the-logic-of-liberty/); see also Frank Van Dun’s “Argumentation Ethics and The Philosophy of Freedom”.
How can it be denied that participants in discourse necessarily presuppose certain norms? As I asked of Callahan and Murphy in their criticism of Hoppe’s AE:
Do they maintain that participants in discourse do not presuppose any truths? – or do they just say that none of these are normative? Or do they think that argumentation is not a conflict-free way of interacting? – in which case they would seem to think bashing someone over the head or stealing their wallet is also a form of peaceful, cooperative discourse.
… MC do not do attempt to debunk argumentation ethics in general, or, alternatively, to show just what ethics are implied in argumentation (and why these are not the ones that Hoppe proposes). Do they believe any norms are implied in argumentation? If not, they would seem to reject the entire edifice of work in this regard, including work by Jurgen Habermas, Karl-Otto Apel, Frank Van Dun, G.B. Madison, Alan Gewirth, Roger Pilon, Tibor Machan, and others discussed in my survey article “New Rationalist Directions in Libertarian Rights Theory.”
On the other hand, if they accept that argumentation implies some norms, which are they? Do these norms support libertarianism? Socialism? Or are they only non-rights-related interpersonal norms, like “be nice” or “don’t lie”? Are these argumentatively-presupposed norms at least consistent with libertarianism? MC write: "Whenever people engage in argumentation, they implicitly agree to a set of norms. For example, each participant implicitly agrees to try to persuade thethrough peaceful methods." I am not clear whether they are only paraphrasing or whether they accept this is true. If they do accept it as true, are there no implications to be drawn from this? Does it place no constraints whatsoever on the legitimacy of norms propositionally advanced in the course of (peaceful!) argument?
It seems to me that if MC accept any form of argumentation ethics as valid – that is, if there are some norms implied in discourse – then, as libertarians who believe libertarian norms are (somehow) justified, they would have to believe that the argumentative norms are at least compatible with, if not the grounding for, libertarian rights.
Note, significantly, that Murphy and Callahan do say: “Whenever people engage in argumentation, they implicitly agree to a set of norms. For example, each participant implicitly agrees to try to persuade thethrough peaceful methods.”
These are norms! Even skeptics of AE admit this.
So there ARE certain norms presupposed in argumentation.The only question, then, is what are these norms–grundnorms, you might say–and what are their implications for libertarianism. Now here to me is what is striking. The libertarian already believes and accepts the NAP and related peace-related grundnorms. if he also accepts that argumentation presupposes some peace-related norms, and he recognizes that any possible ethic has to be justified argumentatively–that all justification just is argumentative justification–then it is extremely odd that he would deny that libertarian norms are not implied by the grundnorms of argumentation. He already agrees there are norms of argumentation; he agrees that these are generally peaceful; he also agrees with the implications of a pro-peace stance, namely the non-aggression principle; and he cannot help but agree that any argument for the NAP must be done in argumentation and thus cannot hope to establish norms that are contrary to the very norms presupposed as true in argumentation. It is obvious that a libertarian who accepts the NAP, who thinks it is compatible with and indeed implied by a pro-peace position and arguably demonstrable logic and reasoning about economics and the nature of property, and who recognizes that there are also peace-related norms of argumentation and thus of any argumentative justification–has no reason to doubt that a socialist, anti-NAP ethic can never be argumentatively justified–that is to say, that it is forever unjustifiable.
In short, the advocate of AE simply says that there are norms of argumentation, and that these are peace-related. He favors peace, and he thinks that as a matter of fact anyone who engages in discourse also demonstrates a preference for peace. That this supports his endorsement of the NAP is quite obvious.
I made some similar comments in the anti-state.comforum discussing this, namely:
Non aggression implies seeking for a conflict- free solution which implies assigning property rights in an objective, universalizable way. This implies that particularistic, arbitrary rules won’t work, they don’t serve as objective links. “you can say” the “oldest guy gets it” as a rule, but others could propose a million other verbal arbitrary rules that would be inconsistent, so conflict is not avoided.
Let me be clear: if you are saying you don’t think first-use is an objective link between owner and resrouce, or you don’t think it’s the only or best objective link–then let’s discuss that. Do you grant there must be an objective link? Because if you grant that, I think Hoppe’s won. Then it’s only sweeping up. Do you grant this? Is your only reservation that it is not the only objective link; or do you dispute the necessity of an objective link at all?
“Anyway, my point is that just because you believe “property rights” should be respected, doesn’t necessarily make you a Rothbardian (which is sometimes taken to mean “libertarian” I think).”
No, but if you do, you have accepted the validity of norms concerning scarce resources, in parituclar libertarian norms. Thus it seems a bit rich to feign incredulity when another libertarian actually takes seriously the notion that there IS something special and unique about the status of our rules, as opposed to others. Here you are, as a libertarian, believing (for some reason), that libertarian rights are objectively superior to other. And when this distinction is relied upon in an argument you try to argue there is no objective distinction. I don’t get you people.
“Do you believe that any person not convinced of the correctness of Hoppe’s argument is therefore obviously unreasonable and therefore need not be bothered with? (This is, by the way, the way that you are coming across to me.) If that is what you believe, then I must disagree.”
What does it matter? This is completely irrelevant as to whether or not Hoppe’s argument is valid–which was allegedly the point of Murphy-Callahan’s argument. But no, I do not believe someone who disagrees w/ Hoppe is “unreasonable” per se. I am not a Randian after all. I just think the person disagreeing with Hoppe is wrong–because he is right, and there is objective reality, and to that extent I AM a Randian.
The fundamental flaw among you people here is similar to someone pretending to be a total skeptic. They challenge you in argument to “prove” that you exist; they claim “nothing can be known”. They are obviously wrong, and stubborn to boot; they themselves have to exist, and to presuppose they exist, in order to engage in argumetn. So they know SOME THING, that is that they exist (among with other things). They may be dishonest, cynical, nihilistic, sophistic, petulant, honestly mistaken, or whatever, if they fail to acknowledge the things they themselves presuppose as true, and go on to challenge these thigns. Same is true here. You and I all already presuppose certain things as true. Yet you seem to think the burden is on ME , to prove to you things you arleady hold to be true. That is chutzpah.
Asserting a second-user rule is adopting the principle that any arbitrary rule can be asserted and adopted. (Can you really argue with a straight face that the first-user rule is arbitrary? Here is where Rothbard is right that original appropriation is the “natural” position–it does not mean necessarily that there is natural law or anything, but it does mean that first use is not just arbitrary, but it is a clear, objective link between owner and property.) If you adopt this rule, then what’s to prevent someone else from asserting the third-user rule? In fact, the “third user” IS a “second user” with respect to the (first?) “second user”. In other words, this second-user rule does not fulfill the conflict-avoidance function since it endorses any arbitrary rule (like, third, fourth etc. user).
Bob: think about this. If you ARE a libertarian, for whatever reason, you must also favor the “superiority” of the first-user rule over competing rules. Ask yourself WHY. There must be SOME reason. Whatever this reason is, doesn’t your own view that he first-use rule is “better” than others, actually support the contentions I’m making? All I’m saying is that the first-user has a better claim to property than late-comers. You actually agree with this (necessarily, as a libertarian). So what’s the problem?
Well, imagine you and I both loved the Mona Lisa; we both thought it was better than Munch’s “The Scream”. We are looking at it, and I say, “It’s better than The Scream.” Given that you also believe this, would it not be strange for you to say, “you have no basis for believing that” or “someone could assert The Scream is better”–? In a sense, it’s just self-contradictory–you are saying, “it’s better” and “it’s not better” at the same time. In fact, this should not be surprising since the nature of Hoppe’s argument it so show that you already presuppose certain norms. That’s why it’s so frustrating when people who even admit to agreeing with the norms Hoppe asserts are true, then challenge Hoppe by saying he hasn’t proved these norms to be true. That’s not the point–the point is that you yourself already accept them. The point is to simply point out that everyone in argumentation necessarily presupposes some truths. This permits us to take these truths as apodictically established.
such a good line of statements. In the Aristotlean sense, they attack what they maintain. Again, either logical inconsistency, a flaw in their knowledge, or maybe some form of psyche turmoil. Then get lazy and ask others to maintain it for them. At least in this forum I see some pop in every once in a while and say, ‘Nobody is being persuasive enough here.’ And then leave without trying to persuade anything themselves. And then attack those that are on their side - for chr-st sake. It’s somebody sitting on the couch, then getting hungry, and when somebody comes home after working all day, the couch-sitter yells at them for not getting them something to eat when they were at work. yeah, it doesn’t make sense, but do they!
Yes, and please stop with your idiotic and childish strawman about " It’s not “proven” by performative contradiction, nor by anything else." Now then, what do you think you are doing when you deny that something is what it is?
No, it doesn’t. But thanks for not understanding the nature of argumentation. What you’re proposing is no different from the post-modernist morons who decry logic as a “tool of western male oppression”. And yes: I’ve actually witnessed that. We’re not proposing something circular; we’re looking at the nature of the thing.
Stephan, you keep avoiding to address my refutation of AE’s proof and you keep moving the goal-posts. Claims of proofs have now turned into jingoistic pleadings of unity in belief and support of fellow advocates. There were plenty of opportunities for anyone to take a stab at refuting me over the last half dozen pages. Sadly, no one has even come close (including the content in your links). My mind is made up: AE proves NOTHING. Of course, everyone else is free to draw whatever conclusion they want. I join AJ in resting my case, as well, as I can’t see a productive avenue for this discussion going forward.
…I also wanted to thank AJ, Stephan, Nir, Knight, wilderness, liberty student, twistedbydesign, and everyone else that participated with insightful comments. No hard feelings here against anyone, and I hope that the feeling is mutual.
Thanks, and I’m afraid it is my sad duty to inform you that this very attitude–agreeing to disagree–is further support of Hoppe’s argumentation ethics.
Don’t be sad. Support for AE was never denied. But proofs don’t need support. They either exist or they don’t. Lacking a proof for anything, AE could certainly use all the support it can muster.
Whew, I am glad that is done. Hopefully this shift in the topic is a little more interesting.
@nskinsella, I started reading over your paper again in order to understand some of the differences between your take and Dr. Block’s on proportionality. There’s some clear differences which I don’t understand, but I really need more time to think it through. If you could explain, I think it would be wonderful.
Did you consider a possible reducio of the whole “compensation ratio” thing? In terms of elegance, I think we would prefer to not have to depend on some arbitrary “detection ratio”, or at least depend as little as possible, right?
Could a criminal argue that he owes at most 1/10th of the cost of the rare and valuable artifact which was under heavy security, because he had surely less than a 5% chance of succeeding? I’ve thought that maybe the nature of such and such crime belongs in the “scaring” “bucket”, (like if a man stole a cowboy’s horse, it meant imminent death to be stranded), if that makes any sense.
Also, I think that I found something wrong in the estoppel paper. This is really just a nitpick anyhow, and I’m not even sure if I am right.
Your footnote 19 references the very last line of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, “Wherof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.”
This is an alternate translation of “Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muß man schweigen.” to “What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.”
My complaint doesn’t say anything about estoppel. The words still make sense. I think that you’ve taken Wittgenstein out of context though. I will draw some really fun diagram if needed. I think that Wittgenstein is talking about the limit between phenomena and noumena, not beyond “[logic’s] halo of purest crystal”, Bizarro-land, or whatever we might call it.
I think he is talking about Tolstoyan or Kierkegaardian “indirect communication”, something which we can think of but must pass over in silence, rather than something which is not even conceivable.
Your objections are nothing new. In fact they have already been covered.
There is an enormous body of literature on this topic which covers everything. Negative demonstration is nothing new. I don’t understand why people have such a negative reaction when it is applied to ethics.
But we intuitively understand that interpersonal argumentation is propositional exchange between two independent decision making units. There is no coherent concept of argumentation without this. It’s not just an arbitrarily chosen definition. It’s a reflection of reality.
Also, the validity of any norms which are the practical precondition of forming an argument does not depend on the beliefs of those engaging in argumentation. It rests precisey on the fact that it could not be undone one wised to undo it.