Anybody seen as a threat most likely be bought out, or failing that evicted from the community. If the refused or somehow evaded the eviction they’d have to be eliminated.
It’s not profitable for providers of security to have such people hanging around, nor is it for the owners of communities.
From Konkin’s New Libertarian Manifesto:
To summarize, your objection fails to take interest and apprehension cost into account, which the aggressor would be liable for.
I think you’re conflating retributive punishment with restraint. The purpose of retributive punishment is vengeance, to inflict harm and suffering on the criminal. What you’re looking for above is a justification for restraining a standing threat, such as by means of ostracism.
That’s not an argument. Why does he have it coming? What justifies it?
Where do you get this mistaken idea? You should have finished reading my post before writing this sentence.
There are many good arguments against complete pacificism (as opposed to strategic use of non-violent resistance). But even if someone perfers not to use violence at all as a matter of moral principle, I have yet to see a good argument from pacifists against the legal legitimacy of using violence in self-defense (a right they could opt not to exercise). If you know of any that you find persuasive, let me know. But given your views on retributive punishment, I find this unlikely, so your objection is rather odd.
What do you mean “based on what?”? What are you refering to? There have been ample reasons given in this thread as to why estoppel does not succeed in justifying punishment. The same apply to AE.
Kinsella, your notion of “restitution” is unrealistic/utopian magical nonsense. A realistic conception of “restitution” does not make this mistake that all crimes can be undone completely as if they had never happened. You set up a straw man.
Why?
“I understand that the aggressor cannot claim a right to non-aggression, but I’m not sure that validates aggression against the aggressor. I am not referring to self-defense, but punishment.”
Aggression against an aggressor can only arise from disproportionate violence against him. Proportional punishment is not aggression; it is justified violence specifically because the aggressor has no logical basis on which to object to this proportional punishment. There is nothing in estoppel that distinguishes between self-defense and general retribution. The theory hinges only on an observation of what rights an aggressor voluntarily gives up and the attendent rights to object to violence against his property, when he commits aggresssion.
If you start your praxeological analysis with the assumption of a free market, you will arive at a valid conclusion faster - or at least you will have a straighter shot at it. Ignore, for now, the confusing analysis involved due to the implications of state intervention in the market, and get estoppel down in anarchy first.
So ostracism, as Giles said - eviction from the community. I see the difference now between retribution and restraining a threat. I was wondering how far retribution could go without actually killing the person, but since they are still alive I still find them a threat in the community. Eviction would take care of this, but wouldn’t this be considered off-loading a criminal onto potential other communities? Is this simple a consideration of potential at this point? Cause I understand the argument against potential is anything is potential so it’s not really an argument, but we do know this particular person in question is a criminal so not really a potential anymore.
wombatron, that article you linked me, does it discuss this?
Restitution is quite commonly held up as the ideal, and is stated to be “making the victim whole” or “putting him in the position that he was before the crime.” I agree that it is unrealistic and utopian. In fact, it is impossible, since crimes cannot be undone.
If you can give a coherent, realistic, justifiable explanation of what restitution short of this is, please share it. But as it is, restitution is just sum of money paid to the victim or his estate. If the sum of money were sufficient to make him whole, I’d agree this would be just. But as it cannot, then the award of money is utterly arbitrary and without any standards whatsoever. There are simply no boundaries to it. It’s just “some amount of money”. Fine; but why call this “restitution” then; and why assume that “paying some sum of money” is all that the victim is entitled to?
I have explained this in detail in the articles linked. It is simply because if the aggressor uses the victim’s body as a means, if he invades the borders of th victim’s body, if he uses the victim’s body or property despite the victim’s objection, he is endorsing the rule that doing this is permissible; and it is thus inconsistent of him to rely on an incompatible rule, which he must do, if he himself objects to being punished. In short, he is estopped from complaining. Because he is estopped from objecting, the victim may proceed since he is not getting any objection–the inabiltiy of the aggressor to coherently object is what satisfies the victim and the relevant civilized, justification-seeking community that the victim’s use of responsive force based on the same maxim that the aggressor himself has promulgated, is justified.
It really does not matter if it does not satisfy the aggressor, or the rest of the uncivilized outlaws–or if it does not satisfy you. It is the victim who seeks to act, and it is the civilized community to whom he seeks to demonstrate that his actions are indeed not aggression but warranted. It is my view that reflecting on the aspects of the aggressor-victim relationship as noted above will as a matter of fact satisfy justice-seeking libertarians, and that is all that one can ask of any theory–they cannot be self-enforcing, after all, and failure to persuade someone is not an indicia of falsity.
Arbitrarily inflicting physical harm on someone’s person for property crimes doesn’t even pass a proportionality test, nor is there any evidence that it decreases crime rates.
Incidentally, I go into all this in detail here: Fraud, Restitution, and Retaliation: The Libertarian Approach
in particular see this part:
Finally, let me note that just because the right to forcefully respond, including use of force for not only defensive or restitutive purposes, but also for retaliation or retribution, does not mean that we would expect a libertarian society to actually employ punishment often in practice. As I argued in Knowledge, Calculation, Conflict, and Law, a review essay of Randy Barnett’s The Structure of Liberty, “It is … more costly to seek punishment than to seek restitution. For this and other reasons, restitution would probably become the predominant mode of justice in a free society.”
However, as I explain there and elaborate in Inalienability and Punishment and Punishment and Proportionality,
Nevertheless, acknowledging (and justifying) the theoretical legitimacy of punishment can be useful. For example, punishment (or a theory of punishment) may be utilized to reach a more objective determination of the proper amount of restitution, because a serious aggression leads to the right to inflict more severe punishment on the aggressor, which would thus tend to be traded for a higher average amount of ransom or restitution than for comparatively minor crimes. Especially offended victims will tend to bargain for a higher ransom; and richer aggressors will tend to be willing to pay more ransom to avoid the punishment the victim has a right to inflict, thereby solving the so-called “millionaire” problem faced under a pure restitution system (where a rich man may commit crimes with impunity, since he can simply pay easily-affordable restitution after committing the crime).
Moreover, even if punishment is banned (de facto or de jure) and is not an actual option–because of the possibility of mistakenly punishing innocents, say–an award of restitution can be based on the model of punishment. To-wit: a jury could be instructed to award the victim an amount of money it believes he could bargain for, given all the circumstances, if he could threaten to proportionately punish the aggressor. This can lead to more just and objective restitution awards than would result if the jury is simply told to award the amount of damages it “feels” is “fair.”
This latter point is significant because, as noted above, restitution based on the idea of restoring the victim is, as Cowen notes, often impossible, so meaningless; for this reason, those advocating restitution usually are vague about the proper standard (since there is no proper standard), or just “punt” it to the juries or courts, much like Congress does when it uses vague terms in statutes or Constitutions such as “accommodate” in the Americans with Disabilities Act or “privileges or immunities” in the Fourteenth Amendment.
Yes. I believe the focus is more on preventative dentention, but the basic concept is the same.
I added an edit to my previous post cause now the thought occurred to me. Are we being virtuous pawning off a criminal to a potential other community. And I’m not arguing “potential” cause anything is potential. But a criminal is not potential anymore and ethically I’m now in another dilemma.
Don’t be coy. We both know you’re familiar with realistic restitution.
Ah, but see… This is why you make such a big deal of your flawed utopian conception of restitution. You use it as the standard by which to judge realistic restitution as inadequate and arbitrary. Bad argument.
Your retribution theory has no non-arbitrary standard, so what’s your point? Come on, Stephan, this argument is disingenuous. Of course there are boundaries and non-arbitrary standards. You’re familiar with legal history. For stolen, lost and damaged goods there are prevailing market prices to refer to, for instance. there will be disagreement over the exact amount that is justified in some cases but broad agreement over acceptable ranges tend to develop. Sure, some things are hard to put a monetary reward to, like a person’s life. But your retribution standard suffers from the same difficulties and adds more, even violates the legal principle that someone should not judge his own case.
As for the meaning of restitution, it includes a monetary settlement. Drop the tendentious scare quotes.
Restitution
Restitution Resti*tu"tion (r?st?*t?"sh?n), n. [F.
restitution, L. restitutio. See Restitute, v.]
The act of restoring anything to its rightful owner, or of
making good, or of giving an equivalent for any loss,
damage, or injury; indemnification.
[1913 Webster]
That which is offered or given in return for what has been
lost, injured, or destroved; compensation.
[1913 Webster]
restitution
n 1: a sum of money paid in compensation for loss or injury [syn:
damages, amends, indemnity, indemnification, redress]
2: the act of restoring something to its original state
3: getting something back again
There is nothing strange about any of these, nothing a lawyer like you should be unfamiliar with; it just needs to be understood realistically and in light of commonsense.
This is just your estoppel theory, which I have raised objections to already, objections you’ve seen explained by me in far more detail elsewhere.
I put this post of yours as a favorite to come back to this and the other links you gave for further reading. I think the whole hazy problem with any of these efforts for justice is because justice sees the blood and sees the misery and thus has the impact of the worse aspects of society banging on its doors - criminals.
Thanks. I’m not completely sure on how to handle all these situations. I have my current way of doing things, but I’m always trying to test what I know in order to be open to what could possibly be better.
I never expected a thread like this would pull NSK and GAP in, and invite such animated discussion. It’s wonderful. Just goes to show sometimes you can accidentally succeed. [:)]
Sounds like you have a double standard here. You criticize realistic restitution from the standpoint of a false utopian restitution and then criticize restitution theory for not having some apriori standard that you seem to think should provide an exhaustive table of objective monetary rewards. But then you proceed to develop a theory of retribution that includes no such standard either.
I fail to see how this added step of roleplaying is either useful or necessary. How does it make determining proper monteary settlemen easier than appeal to legal precedent and commonsense analysis of the full context of the case (including the relative wealth of criminal and victim)?
There are other ways to solve the “millionaire” problem, such as patronage and the right to sell your right to restitution. There is also the use of criminal law, to ostracize serious standing threats and repeat offenders. Your analysis above also neglects the possibility that this bargaining process, which takes place within a coercive framework, could result in disproportionate monetary settlements.
That’s not me. It should read nskinsella ^^^^^^^
Stephan and I have “debated” this stuff ad nauseum elsewhere. 
There are ways around this. In the modern age, it’s not hard to send notice to other communities about someone’s criminal history. Websites for this purpose could be put up. Maybe a business model can be devised around it even. There is also the possibility of penal cities like Heinlein’s Coventry.
It would be cheaper to just refuse them entry into the community, failing that, put a bullet in them.