With that line of thinking you could construe any position to be consequentalist.
His positon can still be deontological as hes choosing a peaceful life over one of thievery and violence simply because thievery and violence is wrong. In other words, its the acts of thievery and violence hes against, not necessarily the consequence.
That is merely because every position is consequentialistic. Any position that seems to be deontological is merely indirectly consequentialistic.
That argument is illusory because it implies that peace is a positive concept. Instead, it is a negative concept because peace is merely the absence of coercion. Therefore, one who wishes to experience no coercion wishes to experience peace.
Also, if I were to accept that peace is a positive concept, then you would need to (1) define peace and (2) prove that peace is the only alternative of coercion. Also, you would need to define the term “wrong” and thereby explain why “thievery and violence is wrong”.
EDITED FOR CONSISTENCY
Ha. I noticed that error and then fixed it.
Well then you are confused because government has never been separate from the people it seeks to rule.
honestly, what difference does it make if its a positive or negative ‘concept’ ?the fact that it is a concept capable of classing differing scenarios is all that would be needed to make it a rival consequentialist theory. if thats your project.
He claimed that one who wishes to avoid coercion does not necessarily wish to seek peace. However, I proved that “to avoid coercion” equals “to seek peace” and therefore that one who wishes to avoid coercion does necessarily wish to seek peace.
I do not understand the point of the above quote. Can you elaborate or rephrase it?
Sure, at least they all can be, it really all depends on if where one derives the rightness or wrongness (or good/bad, smart/stupid, etc…). Unless you are saying deontology doesn’t exist.
I think you’ve assumed too much. No where, in my argument at least, did I imply that peace was a positive, rather I blatantly said that one could choose X over Y because one views Y as “wrong.” In contrast to viewing merely the outcome of X or Y as a positive or negative outcome. It has nothing to do with whether it actually is a positive or negative, its just how one may view it.
I agree, but thats irrelevant. You’ve taken the question from whether his position is consequentialist one to challenging anyones deontological ethics.
to explain the last qoute: consequentialist theories use a classifying concept to compare hypothetical future scenarios that obtain after the acts which is under consideration has been done, or hasn’t been done, but rather something else has been done (possibly no action)
the classifying concepts are traditionally …pleasure/plain,… but you could imagine other stuff.
The classifying concepts are employed so as to judge the consequences of an action. they are judged in light of the concept. and thus show what is right or wrong.
I did not mean to imply that deontological reasoning does not exist. Instead, I meant to imply that deontological reasoning is merely indirect and intuitive consequentialistic reasoning.
I claimed that his argument is consequentialistic because he implied that he seeks anarchy because he seeks a consequence (viz., peace). And then, you claimed that his position can be non-consequentialistic and deontological if his position implies that he does not seek peace but instead seeks the avoidance of coercion. However, I showed that “to seek peace” absolutely equals “to seek the avoidance of coercion” and that therefore your restatement of his position is equal to my restatement of his position and therefore that my argument is still valid.
And, I think that you misunderstood my usage of the terms “positive” and “negative”. I never claimed that you implied that peace is a positive outcome; instead, I claimed that you implied that peace is a positive term. In linguistics and logic et cetera, a positive term is a term that describes a specific situation and a negative term is a term that describes the absence of that specific situation.
I don’t know if that applies to all deontological reasoning, peoples views on what is good and evil have been drastically different from consequentialist reasoning.
If he meant he wanted anarchy because he merely seeks the consequences (peace), then you are correct. However, if he meant it because he views violence and theft as “wrong” then it is a deontological position. So his position could be that of deontology and not of consequentalism. Its why he seeks the avoidance of coercion that is the crux, if he finds it “wrong” - deontology - if he finds the outcome to be bad - consequentialsim.
Thats fair. But I didn’t mean to imply peaceful life as being anything more than his preference though, what that preference may be classified in the field of linguistics doesn’t seem relevant.
Have you gotten around to reading Hoppes book yet? Because the people certainly saw it differently in that age.
I think that I understand now. If he seeks anarchy because he seeks peace because he seeks non-coercion because he believes that coercion is morally “incorrect”, his position is indeed deontological. And, thus, in that case and as you implied, the remaining question is why he believes that coercion is morally “incorrect”.
Sounds right. (At least, I think its right)
Thanks for the explanation on “negative” and “positive” linguistics, my English could stand to be better.
it can’t be justified in argument. a performative contradiction arises in any such attempt. (Hoppe’s position that I’m gooving to)
aside from that; It does not upset me if people believe coercion is bad because of their intuitions, or through a blind faith in that position. or for any other reason you might imagine. I can’t take seriously anyone that is positively upset by the idea that 'some people are for non-violence against innocents’
Can you substantiate that claim?
Your post implies that one must object to the conclusion of an argument in order to object to the reasoning of an argument. And, obviously, that is incorrect.
I do not object to that conclusion; and, therefore, “it does not upset me if people believe coercion is bad”, either. However, I do object to intuitive or blind-faith reasoning merely because such reasoning is very weak and, therefore, not apt to convince very many of our ideological enemies. Instead, rampant appeal to such reasoning causes our movement to appear to be ideologically weak and argumentatively dogmatic.
What would you suggest?
my intention wasnt to imply anything. forgive any implications. my intention was to tell you how i think some people are silly.
My hope is that you arent positively upset by the idea that some people are for non-violence against innocents. so you shouldnt think i was calling you silly.
I dont know how people that believe that ‘violence against innocents’ is a defensible position can have any stake to a highground of ideological strength, or argumentative openness. the very opposite.
Do you think consequentialist reasoning is not intuitive whereas its deontological counterpart is?
That implies that that conclusions of deontological reasoning and the conclusions of consequentialist reasoning are correct because such a difference could be explained via the assumption that one of those sides have reasoned incorrectly.
All deontological reasoning is merely indirect consequentialistic reasoning because evolutionary processes (which are inherently consequentialistic) imputed to the human mind the “moral code” that all deontological reasoning appeals to.