Free Will and Libertarianism.

This; a million times, this. If it’s not defined, then the result is a circle jerk. Almost 40 posts and we have yet to even ATTEMPT to establish that we’re all talking about the same thing.

WHAT IS WILL ALLEGED TO BE?

WHAT IS THAT ALLEGED TO BE FREE OF?

We also won’t get anywhere unless we agree on whether the brain functions on several levels, which I expect is a given at this point in science. There is conscious brain activity, and unconscious brain activity. A person identifies with his conscious brain activity. The rest of it is neither controllable by nor accessable to him—it operates automatically, that is, without requiring conscious activity.

So we need to establish what is willing: the conscious brain activity, or the unconscious brain activity.

I think everything can only be predetermined IF a deity exists, and can plot the future course of time. To suppose that everything is predetermined now assumes there is a tangible future. There is not. Thus, the future is essentially a random design, regardless of the fact of causality.

Here’s some points that make sense to me from WIkipedia’s article on indeterminism:

“As Daniel Dennett points out in Freedom Evolves, it is possible for everything to have a necessary cause, even while indeterminism holds and the future is open, because a necessary cause does not lead to a single inevitable effect. Thus ‘everything has a cause’ is not a clear statement of determinism.”

Or as Karl Popper says, “Indeterminism — or, more precisely physical indeterminism — is merely the doctrine that not all events in the physical world are predetermined with absolute precision.”

I personal would NOT agree with “physical determinism,” while I definitely agree with the philosophical statement of causality.

Physiocrat, knowledge of what “really is” means nothing to an agent at any given time until it is interpreted into a signal to act - that is, interpreted as a relevant guide for your actions. You will interpret the very same knowledge into different signals to act, at different times in your life (or your day).

For example, the knowledge that “there’s a McDonald’s around the corner” used to have relevance for me because I used to eat junk food, but now I want to eat healthier so that same knowledge has a different relevance (or no relevance) to my actions now. Whereas before I interpreted that knowledge as a guidepost saying “turn left for pleasure,” I now interpret it as a signal not to turn left (or else bad things will happen).

Hence what is important to us at any given moment is not knowledge per se - not what something “really is” - but what actions we should take to be happier, better off, or however you phrase it. We only use the knowledge/epistemic phrasing to communicate across utility functions, either to other people or to our future selves. That is, while I in this moment only care about whether I’d be better off turning left or heading straight on, telling other people (or my future self) to “TURN LEFT TO EXPERIENCE PLEASURE” is not necessarily as helpful as just noting that there’s a McD’s to the left.

The point is that the saying someone “really is” an agent is no different than saying “it is useful to model that person as an agent.” Since all knowledge is only relevant in its “guidepost” form as interpreted by a given person at a given time, these expressions are equivalent. The words refer to the exact same thing. So we can call the former unelucidating or the latter overlong, but either way we are just referring to the everyday phenomenon of perceiving the world in the way that is most to your own benefit in guiding your actions toward an improvement in your state of affairs.

Clayton,

It is not necessary for ominiscient being to have exhaustive foreknowledge. It/he can under either one of the conditions: all time exists concurrently as such all time has an identity and as such can be known; or the omniscient being brings everything to pass and doesn’t change it/his plans.

I think it perfectly possible for a being to be omnsicent without creation but with creation, since agents possess real free will as I have defined above, he knows things when they happen, thus his omniscience is dynamic. At all points with and without time the being knows all the things that can be known it is just that the future is not a thing.

I’ll take a shot at hashem’s question.

(1). Will is man’s ability to consciously choose actions.[1]

(2). Man’s conscious choices (and actions) are free from being predetermined, “because a necessary cause does not lead to a single inevitable effect.”

[1] “the faculty of conscious and especially of deliberate action.”

+1 on Physiocrat’s point. Yes, physical determinism assumes (1) that a deity exists who has planned/pre-programmed everything or (2) that all time exists concurrently.

I think Physiocrat and I agree that (2) is certainly not the case. And, personally, I think (1) could be true or untrue, as an agnostic.

So physical determinism seems unlikely to me.

Hashem,

This is what the will is free of (at least in my understanding of free will)

As an addenum, with causality there must be a first cause otherwise the chain would never come into existence. Now since that is the case there could be other similar causes to this ultimate first cause which start the chain of causality, not caused by it. This is how I understand real, metaphysical free will- it begins a chain of causality, it does not begin one. It however does not follow from this that it is random since that precludes meaningful choice. Free will is necessary but mysterious since it is basic- it cannot be explained in other terms since it is in fact basic to human existence.

I don’t grok the sentence structure there. It begins but it doesn’t? And what is causality exactly? Also, need to define “predetermined” if we’ll use it.

You are making a parsing mistake here. “Free will” is a single term; its origins in English are actually in theology and refer to the freedom of the will from sinister manipulation by spiritual beings, such as devils or even God Himself. But as far as its use in philosophy goes, “free will” is a human category of knowledge and stands in contrast not to something so heady as “determinism” but in contrast to incompetency. There are morally incompetent people and these people are generally agreed to not be morally responsible for their actions, insomuch as they can even be called actions. Therefore, we hold that the individual may not stand at law and, thus, can neither form agreements nor be held liable for them (lawful retaliation).

Metaphysical arguments regarding determinism as an escape-clause from free will responsibility is just a transparent cop-out if used to renege on a contract. “You can’t hold me responsible for the terms of this contract, after all, none of us have free will!” The free will that is sufficient to form a contract is sufficient to be held to its terms.

Clayton -

Of course that latter question can only be answered by attaining that level of mastery of physics, if that turns out to be possible.

Lets deal with consciousness and qualia first and then worry about free will.

I wasn’t opening a theological debate, I was making a philosophical point. When I say “omniscient being” I mean “as commonly understood, having exhaustive knowledge of past, present and future.”

Process theology?

Clayton -

Causality, reason and determinism are a single unit. They must be accepted or rejected together. This says nothing about whether the world is or is not deterministic, only that the universe of rational discourse is limited to that portion of the world that is deterministic.

Clayton -

There are two answers to this. The short answer is that causality is a category of human knowledge - causality is when we may be said to “understand the cause of a thing.” Of course, this only pushes back the problem one step: what does it mean to understand (the causes of a thing)?

The long answer is more circuitous and goes right to induction. When we say “A causes B” we mean that whenever the condition A is satisfied, the result B must then be the case, as well. In this sense, causality is a lot like logical implication: “If A, then B” except that there is some kind of implied “time ordering” where we mean that “If A at the moment prior, then B at the moment subsequent.” The only way to reduce the latter, klunkier expression to the more elegant logical implication is if information (world state) propagates at infinite speed through the world, something that appears to be obviously false.

The long-standing problem of induction asks how we know the laws that will govern future state of the world from observing the laws that governed the past state of the world. That billiard balls have always been observed to collide instead of passing through one another says nothing about whether billiard balls must always collide instead of passing through one another. Unfortunately, many philosophers have given up on the induction problem and simply adopted a kind of “inductive nihilism”… we really don’t know the future will be like the past!

However, this view is nowadays untenable. Ray Solomonoff’s theory of induction - even though it has its origins in advanced mathematics, rather than the more traditional metaphysics - shows the way out. I’ll state the theory in slightly incorrect layman’s terms to get the idea across. I leave further research to those interested.

Consider a digital image.

The image contains information about relative levels of colors to be displayed on a digital monitor or to be printed on paper. Compression allows us to represent the image with less “storage space”… that is, we can represent the same information in less space by removing redundancies. It turns out that there are foundational connections between this fairly mundane task of data-compression and the laws of logic. Basically, removing redundancy is the same thing as “giving a reason” for something. If there is a reason for something to be this way rather than that way, then this reason manifests itself as a pattern and every pattern entails redundancies! Hence, the process of removing redundancies is like “reasoning backwards.”

Solomonoff induction is like asking: what happens if the picture is being given to us bit-by-bit over time? Can we compress the picture as we are receiving it? The answer is, yes you can! And as you compress the bits of the picture as you are receiving it over time, you are “reasoning backwards” about the patterns in the picture. Hence, you can now assign meaningful probabilities to the portions of the picture that have not been yet received!

The “inductive nihilist” on the other hand, believes that half way through receiving the digital image, we are just as likely to see randomness for the remainder of the image as we are to see the image we “inuitively” expect to see:

The problem of induction is basically like asking: “If we have received half the digital image so far, which total image is more probable, the former or the latter?” The inductive-nihilist view is that they are equally likely… after all, in a radom lottery, each picture is equally probable along with every possible picture of the same size. But when you specify certain conditions (one of which being the existence of a Universal Turing Machine), then the rules of Solomonoff induction apply and we are no longer facing an “agnostic” probability distribution… the past does, indeed, tell us something about the future.

And this is the essence of causality. If the past tells us about the future, then of course the prior moment is related to the present moment which is related to the subsequent future moment.

Final note: when we ask “why is there time, why is there an unfolding of events?” what we are really asking is why information propagates at a finite speed. This is a separate question from causality/induction and should not be confused with it.

Clayton -

Good progress. We’ve acknowledged that none of us is talking about the same thing. Since this will, by definition (no double pun intended, in fact by lack of definition of will) get us nowhere, let’s begin to establish what the heck we’re talking about.

Man is a being composed of many parts, the vast majority of which are neither consciously aware nor dependent on conscious brain activity to function. So “man” doesn’t choose. What you’re probably trying to convey is “Will is the ability of man’s consiousness to choose”. To this I would say the consciousness doesn’t choose. “Choice” is merely a fraction of the unconscious brain’s automatically-calculated-output.

@ Clayton,

We needn’t assume positive law. It has utterly no bearing to the extent we decide not to posit it. And of course free will is generally not meant in any regard whatsoever to hinge on social norms.

Moving forward, we can see that usually it seems:

WILL is the capacity of a human to choose—as I’ve pointed out, a human is mostly not conscious, and most of it doesn’t require the consciousness to function. So can we all agree that WILL is that capacity for the consciousness to orchestrate choice?

FREE refers to freedom from determination—as far as I’m concerned, any relevance this has doesn’t matter until AFTER we agree on what we mean by WILL.

Willpower is the ability to make choices independent of other people or other circumstances. Thus to deny the existence of free will is to imply that making decisions independent of other people or circumstances in impossible.

Does anybody in this thread truly believe that he or she cannot make independent decisions?

That’s a grossly manipulative, malformed question.

Anyone interested in truth accepts that one’s beliefs have no bearing on reality. So I don’t even know how you can respect yourself asking that question.

Regardless, you’ve still failed to acknowledge that a person identifies with his consciousness. I don’t know how many times I have to point this out before we can begin to make progress instead of reverting to an incoherent default.

And a person identifies with his consciousness. Thus what you’re trying to convey is “Does anybody in this thread truly believe that his conscious brain doesn’t orchestrate choice”. Well yes, that’s sort of the basis of my whole contention. The unconscious brain is responsible for storing input, processing it, and calculating output a fraction of which is choice experienced by “you” aka your consciousness.

Hashem, I’m not promoting a loaded scenario in the least bit. I’m asking something that I’ll phrase differently:

Do you believe that you are in complete control of your behavior except for completely involuntary movements such as salivation, flinching and jumping when startled?

hashem won’t be able to resist typing a response. Of course, it won’t be hashem’s choice. His fingers will type and his consciousness will experience it.

It’s a malformed question! “You” are your consciousness. Of course your consciousness isn’t in complete control of the entire body, no less the entire brain! Conscious brain activity accounts for a mere fraction of brain activity. As I’ve pointed out several times most of the brain and indeed the entire body is neither consciously aware nor reliant for function on the consciousness.

And…gotlucky wins the thread and shows why physical determinism is incorrect =)