“But P yields those results independent of D. D adds nothing to our reservoir of knowledge. Enter Occam.”
Except that D is more complicated than P. I can construct a truly elaborate theory which states why X occurs, but Z has just as much evidence and is simpler, therefore Z should win out according to the razor, it has nothing to do with adding to knowledge, it’s simply stating that what is simpler, if equal in explanatory power and in evidence, is most likely to be correct.
Now in our case free will and determinism don’t even have equal explanatory power, free will has more explanatory power, however this does not in this instance matter, a belief in god has more explanatory power than a belief in science. Free will can explain things precisely because it supposes the impossible, that the human mind is independent from causality itself. It is as if I didn’t want to explain the paths of planets and instead stated that the reason that the planets moved as they did was because they had been convinced long ago to do so, it’s not to do with forces of action, but instead forces of will, the foolish idea that planets can think. THE HUMAN MIND AND THAT WHICH IT DOES IS THE RESULT OF CAUSAL FORCES, ANYTHING ELSE GOES AGAINST THE LAWS OF SCIENCE AND MOTION AS WE KNOW THEM.
This once again gets into why I say that Occam’s razor doesn’t really play a role in this. If you said that both have equal explanatory power (which technically speaking they do) then the burden of proof is shifted to the free will side of the table. In this instance free will has more explanatory capabilities, but determinism actually has evidence.
As to Mises’ quote, none of that implies that he didn’t believe that determinism was correct, merely that it was a hypothesis and that it held no importance to praxeology. Later he states:
In the face of this state of affairs we cannot help withholding judgment
on the essential statements of monism and materialism. We may or may
not believe that the natural sciences will succeed one day in explaining
the production of definite ideas, judgments of value, and actions in the
same way in which they explain the production of a chemical compound
as the necessary and unavoidable outcome of a certain combination of
elements. In the meantime we are bound to acquiesce in a methodological
dualism. - HA page 18
Mises is stating that it is irrelevant to the praxeological debate and that nothing can currently be stated on the matter, not that it is necessarily wrong or hold anything contrary to praxeology. He states several times that what causes human action is irrelevant for praxeology, what matters is that it is caused.
In Theory and History Mises critiqued both determinism and the doctrine of free will. His criticisms of determinism revolved around the idea that anything definitive could be said about human action through determinism and that one could fall into idiotic ideologies such as deterministic fatalism. He indicated that the only things that the idea of free will really contributed was to fight these latter doctrines, not determinism in and of itself.
The offshoots of human mental efforts, the ideas and
the judgments of value that direct the individuals’ actions,
cannot be traced back to their causes, and are in
this sense ultimate data. In dealing with them we refer
to the concept of individuality. But in resorting to this
notion we by no means imply that ideas and judgments
of value spring out of nothing by a sort of spontaneous
generation and are in no way connected and related to
what was already in the universe before their appearance.
We merely establish the fact that we do not know
anything about the mental process which produces
within a human being the thoughts that respond to the
state of his physical and ideological environment.
This cognition is the grain of truth in the free-will
doctrine. However, the passionate attempts to refute determinism
and to salvage the notion of free will did
not concern the problem of individuality. They were
prompted by the practical consequences to which, as
people believed, determinism inevitably leads: fatalist
quietism and absolution from moral responsibility.
-Theory and History 78
“everything in the universe can be explained without it. Thus, out it goes.”
… What??? Nothing in the universe can be explained without the deterministic assumption, name me one thing that can be explained without the law of cause and effect??
In this sense determinism is the epistemological basis
of the human search for knowledge. Man cannot even
conceive the image of an undetermined universe. In
such a world there could not be any awareness of material
things and their changes. It would appear a senseless
chaos. Nothing could be identified and distinguished
from anything else. Nothing could be expected
and predicted. In the midst of such an environment
man would be as helpless as if spoken to in an unknown
language. No action could be designed, still less put
into execution. Man is what he is because he lives in
a world of regularity and has the mental power to conceive
the relation of cause and effect.
Any epistemological speculation must lead toward
determinism. But the acceptance of determinism raises
some theoretical difficulties that have seemed to be in-soluble. While no philosophy has disproved determinism,
there are some ideas that people have not been
able to bring into agreement with it. Passionate attacks
have been directed against it because people believed
that it must ultimately result in absurdity.
-Theory and History 74-5
Please think this through very carefully Dave, I believe that your’e confused about this matter, and that’s fine, I’ve been there before, but to sum up:
- Occam’s razor has nothing to do with this issue, insofar as it adds anything it is on the side of determinism because determinism is simpler
- Simply because something has explanatory power doesn’t mean it’s correct, it must also have a reson to it, free will lacks one as it goes against everything we know.
- Mises tries to disprove fallacious ideologies propped up by the guise of determinism, he seems to be quite in favor of determinism itself.
- Determinism is in no way contrary to praxeology, as praxeology says nothing about, as Mises puts it, the Genesis of values.