Free Will, Determinism, and Occam's Razor

I fail to see how assuming determinism means assuming that the brain is a black box. Can you explain?

Sure. My use of the term determinism is the billiard ball kind. To quote Wikipedia:

Determinism in the West is often associated with Newtonian physics, which depicts the physical matter of the universe as operating according to a set of fixed, knowable laws. The “billiard ball” hypothesis, a product of Newtonian physics, argues that once the initial conditions of the universe have been established, the rest of the history of the universe follows inevitably. If it were actually possible to have complete knowledge of physical matter and all of the laws governing that matter at any one time, then it would be theoretically possible to compute the time and place of every event that will ever occur (Laplace’s demon). In this sense, the basic particles of the universe operate in the same fashion as the rolling balls on a billiard table, moving and striking each other in predictable ways to produce predictable results.

But of course we don’t know the initial conditions of the universe, nor do we know the initial conditions, or the conditions at any time, of what is happening in the brain. So in practice the brain is a black box, meaning we know something is in there, but not what.

Could you provide your own definitions for “free will” and “determinism”? I ask this because it seems to me that the results of Austrian Economics are underivable if we don’t assume determinism.

“Free will” means that there sometimes exist conditions such that, no matter what happened in the past, or is happening right now, there exists a human being who is not bound by the past and present to act in a certain way, but is free to choose for himself how to behave to some extent. In other words, no matter what the information an outside observer has about the human, external or internal, he will not be able to predict with certainty what the human will do.

Determinism is the opposite assumption, that under all circs there exists a certain database of info which can inform us with certainty the behavior of an individual in the future. This is the billiard ball hypothesis above.

AE doesn’t assume determinism, quite the contrary. AE’s results are derivable because they assume that a man’s free will lead him in most cases to choose what he sees as best for himself. But it doesn’t assume he has no choice but to choose that.

The results of Austrian Economics are all we know? Can you please substantiate this?

Smile. I didn’t say that. I am saying the following:

  1. There exists a body of true knowledge [AE] which is deducible from the assumption of free will, independent of the assumption of determinism.

  2. No body of knowledge exists deducible from the assumption of determinsim. Everyone admits this, all they say is that some day, in the sci-fi future, maybe we will find something somewhere.

  3. and 2. are exactly the situation where Occams razor shaves away 2.

vive,

We are not talking about the same meaning of determinism. See my response to Autolykos about billiard balls.

Neodoxy,

In 1. I think you are saying that determinism [abbreviated to D from now] and praxeology [abbreviated from P from now] will yield results.

But P yields those results independent of D. D adds nothing to our reservoir of knowledge. Enter Occam.

In 2. I am following Mises. All I am adding to what he says is that Occam’s Razor, seeing what Mises wrote, will slice D into shreds.

Here’s the relevant argument from HA, with bracketed phrases added by me:

Materialist monism [=D] contends that human thoughts and volitions are the product of the operation of bodily organs, the cells of the brain and the nerves. Human thought, will, and action are solely brought about by material processes which one day will be completely explained by the methods of physical and chemical inquiry. This too is a metaphysical hypothesis, although its supporters consider it as an unshakable and undeniable scientific truth. [Adds Smiling Dave and Occam: since this metaphysical hypothesis adds nothing to our store of knowledge, it can be safely ignored].

Various doctrines have been advanced to explain the relation between mind and body. They are mere surmises without any reference to observed facts. All that can be said with certainty is that there are relations between mental and physiological processes. With regard to the nature and operation of this connection we know little if anything.

When I wrote that reality shows them to be true results, I was trying to summarize in a few words what Mises wrote in HA in chapter 1, section 6. Too long to quote in full here, but the interested reader can look it up and absorb it in ten minutes or so.

…it has nothing to do with how simple an explanation is, the deterministic belief is more simple.

Simle is not the criteria. Too quote our man wikipedia;

the one that makes the fewest new assumptions

To which I add, the assumption of determinism is barren. It will produce nothing new. It will not add a whit to our pile of knowledge. everything in the universe can be explained without it. Thus, out it goes.

To which I add further, assuming it destroys a body of knowledge that assumes free will. So not only does it not add to our knowledge, it detracts from it if we listen to it. Again, off with it’s head, says Occam.

At any rate, in the long run determinism is more or less impossible to disprove

O’s Razor is not meant to be a disproof.

There is a reason why Mises favored the determinist side of the debate and stated explicitly that determinism V. free will has no implication on praxeology because the ultimate cause for human values is not adressed by praxeology, it could be free will or deterministic actions which determine values, it makes no difference, from then on we know how the human brain will act.

Chapter and verse where Mises says that? I pointed to where he says the opposite, IMHO. Chapter 1, section 6 of HA.

  1. There exists a body of true knowledge [AE] which is deducible from the assumption of free will, independent of the assumption of determinism.

Not necessarily. Free will. Take the axiom “people act.” It doesn’t require free will. It only requires that people do indeed act, which they do. Why do people act? Because it is evolutionarily more favorable to reproduction if we act to replace less-favorable states with more-favorable states. The things which didn’t do this simply didn’t multiply.

Okay, thanks. This is actually the same thing that I mean by “determinism”. I’m glad we’re on the same page here, at least.

We certainly don’t know the conditions of the universe as a whole or even the conditions of a given person’s brain, initially or at any other time - with complete precision. I think that last part is the most important. Assuming determinism (if only arguendo for the moment), “[knowing] the conditions of the universe as a whole” would literally mean knowing everything about the universe, down to every fundamental particle. Indeed, with this assumption, in order to know the conditions of any part of the universe one would still have to know the conditions of the entire universe.

As I allude to above, however, just because we don’t know literally everything there is to know about the universe doesn’t mean we therefore must have no idea whatsoever about the universe. Likewise, it doesn’t mean we have no idea whatsoever about the human brain. Despite what you say above, we certainly do have some idea about what’s in there. It seems to me that your argument embodies a false dilemma.

Given our innate abilities, it’s de facto impossible for anyone to predict with certainty what anyone else will do at a future point in time. Indeed, that impossibility even applies to oneself! But why is this impossible? I say it’s because of the incredible complexity of the human mind. We’re motivated by much more complex phenomena than the simple forces of gravity and electromagnetism - even though they’re ultimately dependent on those forces. Regardless, it’s this impossibility of (certain) prediction that I call “free will”.

Yes, and I agree that such a database could exist theoretically. But it would be so massive - and massively complicated - that one would essentially have to be God to be able to make sense of it. I fail to see how this diminishes the concept of “free will”, at least as I define it.

If you start talking in terms of “choosing whether to choose (period)” and so forth, you’ll end up with an infinite regress.

It certainly did seem to me like you said that. First you said that assuming free will alone (i.e. without determinism) leads to the derivation of all the results of Austrian Economics. Then you said - and I quote - “Thus, all we know is derivable from assuming free will [emphasis added].” If you didn’t mean to imply that the results of Austrian Economics are all that we know, then I suggest you re-word your earlier post.

What you’re saying now certainly seems different from what you said before. Can you please support these points?

Despite what you say above, we certainly do have some idea about what’s in there. It seems to me that your argument embodies a false dilemma.

We are ignorant enough that we cannot get results that we would not have anyway from assuming free will. thus determinism is an uneccesassry assumption.

In fact, think about it for a second. What field of scientific inquiry actually uses the assumption of determinism to get anywhere? Has anyone ever written the following line, “Since we know man’s actions are predetermined, we can conclude that such and such will happen in situation X?” Of course not. just as no scientist has ever written "Since we know the Angel Gabriel was watching, we can deduce event X will happen.’ The Angel Gabriel and the theory of determinism occcupy the same place in scientific inquiry.

“choosing whether to choose (period)” and so forth, you’ll end up with an infinite regress.

Replace the use of the phrase ‘no choice’ with “it is scientifically impossible”

Thus, all we know is derivable from assuming free will [emphasis added].” If you didn’t mean to imply that the results of Austrian Economics are all that we know, then I suggest you re-word your earlier post.

OK, here it is “Thus there exists a body of knowledge derivable in toto from assuming free will”

I’m not quite sure what this means, sorry. Can you please clarify it?

Physics.

So apparently your real issue with determinism is that it means man’s actions are predetermined. But so what if they are? That doesn’t mean they can be predetermined by people themselves.

Can you show me how to do the replacement? Because I’m not quite sure. Are you saying it’s scientifically impossible for someone to only choose what he sees as best for himself? Or what?

Okay, but you also claimed that assuming determinism derives no knowledge whatsoever. So what else besides the results of Austrian Economics would you say is part of the “body of knowledge derivable in toto from assuming free will”?


Did you have any thoughts on the rest of my last post? Or are you implicitly letting my points stand?

I forgot about this post.

With all due respect, this seems to be a straw man of the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. Even before the advent of modern quantum physics, measurements were understood to be imprecise to some degree. The Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle apparently embodies an inherent physical limitation on quantum-level measurements.

To assume that fundamental particles don’t have particular velocities and positions at any given instant causes far more unnecessary complications, from what I see.

Humans are vastly more complex than billiard balls. Surely you see that. Do you think that people are made of more than just (ultimately) fundamental particles?

“But P yields those results independent of D. D adds nothing to our reservoir of knowledge. Enter Occam.”

Except that D is more complicated than P. I can construct a truly elaborate theory which states why X occurs, but Z has just as much evidence and is simpler, therefore Z should win out according to the razor, it has nothing to do with adding to knowledge, it’s simply stating that what is simpler, if equal in explanatory power and in evidence, is most likely to be correct.

Now in our case free will and determinism don’t even have equal explanatory power, free will has more explanatory power, however this does not in this instance matter, a belief in god has more explanatory power than a belief in science. Free will can explain things precisely because it supposes the impossible, that the human mind is independent from causality itself. It is as if I didn’t want to explain the paths of planets and instead stated that the reason that the planets moved as they did was because they had been convinced long ago to do so, it’s not to do with forces of action, but instead forces of will, the foolish idea that planets can think. THE HUMAN MIND AND THAT WHICH IT DOES IS THE RESULT OF CAUSAL FORCES, ANYTHING ELSE GOES AGAINST THE LAWS OF SCIENCE AND MOTION AS WE KNOW THEM.

This once again gets into why I say that Occam’s razor doesn’t really play a role in this. If you said that both have equal explanatory power (which technically speaking they do) then the burden of proof is shifted to the free will side of the table. In this instance free will has more explanatory capabilities, but determinism actually has evidence.

As to Mises’ quote, none of that implies that he didn’t believe that determinism was correct, merely that it was a hypothesis and that it held no importance to praxeology. Later he states:

In the face of this state of affairs we cannot help withholding judgment
on the essential statements of monism and materialism. We may or may
not believe that the natural sciences will succeed one day in explaining
the production of definite ideas, judgments of value, and actions in the
same way in which they explain the production of a chemical compound
as the necessary and unavoidable outcome of a certain combination of
elements. In the meantime we are bound to acquiesce in a methodological
dualism. - HA page 18

Mises is stating that it is irrelevant to the praxeological debate and that nothing can currently be stated on the matter, not that it is necessarily wrong or hold anything contrary to praxeology. He states several times that what causes human action is irrelevant for praxeology, what matters is that it is caused.
In Theory and History Mises critiqued both determinism and the doctrine of free will. His criticisms of determinism revolved around the idea that anything definitive could be said about human action through determinism and that one could fall into idiotic ideologies such as deterministic fatalism. He indicated that the only things that the idea of free will really contributed was to fight these latter doctrines, not determinism in and of itself.

The offshoots of human mental efforts, the ideas and
the judgments of value that direct the individuals’ actions,
cannot be traced back to their causes, and are in
this sense ultimate data. In dealing with them we refer
to the concept of individuality. But in resorting to this
notion we by no means imply that ideas and judgments
of value spring out of nothing by a sort of spontaneous
generation and are in no way connected and related to
what was already in the universe before their appearance.
We merely establish the fact that we do not know
anything about the mental process which produces
within a human being the thoughts that respond to the
state of his physical and ideological environment.
This cognition is the grain of truth in the free-will
doctrine. However, the passionate attempts to refute determinism
and to salvage the notion of free will did
not concern the problem of individuality. They were
prompted by the practical consequences to which, as
people believed, determinism inevitably leads: fatalist
quietism and absolution from moral responsibility.

-Theory and History 78

“everything in the universe can be explained without it. Thus, out it goes.”

… What??? Nothing in the universe can be explained without the deterministic assumption, name me one thing that can be explained without the law of cause and effect??

In this sense determinism is the epistemological basis
of the human search for knowledge. Man cannot even
conceive the image of an undetermined universe. In
such a world there could not be any awareness of material
things and their changes. It would appear a senseless
chaos. Nothing could be identified and distinguished
from anything else. Nothing could be expected
and predicted. In the midst of such an environment
man would be as helpless as if spoken to in an unknown
language. No action could be designed, still less put
into execution. Man is what he is because he lives in
a world of regularity and has the mental power to conceive
the relation of cause and effect.
Any epistemological speculation must lead toward
determinism. But the acceptance of determinism raises
some theoretical difficulties that have seemed to be in-soluble. While no philosophy has disproved determinism,
there are some ideas that people have not been
able to bring into agreement with it. Passionate attacks
have been directed against it because people believed
that it must ultimately result in absurdity.
-Theory and History 74-5

Please think this through very carefully Dave, I believe that your’e confused about this matter, and that’s fine, I’ve been there before, but to sum up:

  1. Occam’s razor has nothing to do with this issue, insofar as it adds anything it is on the side of determinism because determinism is simpler
  2. Simply because something has explanatory power doesn’t mean it’s correct, it must also have a reson to it, free will lacks one as it goes against everything we know.
  3. Mises tries to disprove fallacious ideologies propped up by the guise of determinism, he seems to be quite in favor of determinism itself.
  4. Determinism is in no way contrary to praxeology, as praxeology says nothing about, as Mises puts it, the Genesis of values.

Wheylous,

You are essentially arguing that evolution, presumably of the naturalistic type, solves the probelm but it doesn’t on two counts: if it is true then it only allows fallible determinsim, clearly not infallible for obvious reasons, which can provide no foundation for truth since we can never know whether we are determined to be correct or incorrect- we cannot step out of the system and independently verify the truth value of a particular proposition; secondly, evolution only produces survivors not philosophers which is essentially Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism.

If you are interested in these arguments I have an extensive debate on the matter which can be found here.