Auto,
That does make sense to me in that I follow the reasoning. But then with this wording that you’re using, I would just ask how does one “legtimately” or “illegitimately” own something? The response, I assume, would be something like “Well, if a resource is previously unowned, a legitimate owner comes along when he mixes his labor with it!” And then I am back to square one.
I’ll give a stab.
‘Natural law’ is the concept that there are objective different subjects in the world, i.e. different people. We can objectively analyze these differences. It doesn’t mean it’s always clear - doubt can happen - but it is clear that you and I are different actors in a scarce world.
There are only 2 ways of analyzing law as far as I see. Either a natural law concept or a positive law concept, i.e. where it’s necessary to define the differences between actors. (And than ‘a’ entity is the one that defines the differences. That’s the underlying idea of legal positivism: the state defines the differences between people and what they can and cannot do.)
Based upon the idea of objective differences between people, the concept of a natural law - the law of differences between subjects - we can start furthering our analysis. How can we know what tangible objects belong to what person?
Well; what does it mean to be an actor in a world with scarce resources? Well; you act in it. You use resources. That means that goods receive a meaning - they become means. (Things are just things untill they are means, i.e. imbedded by an actor with meaning.) The first person that puts meaning in an object, is the first one that makes a good/thing a means. His means, to be precise.
The question is than: does it ‘legitimately’ belong to him? Well, given he was the first actor, he was the first to give it meaning. Given moral equality, why should anyones reasons to use a certain means, be any better than anyone else? If a second actor tries to use a means belonging to a first actor, he’s aggressing the actor, because he’s aggressing against that actors means - i.e. his conception of the world and how it ought to be. The praxeological body - the actor and it’s means - is a unity. There is no relevant difference from a praxeological way of thinking. If you try to take his means, you are ignoring his actions and thus disrespecting him.
That’s why ‘first ownership’ is morally relevant: it’s the first person to turn a ‘thing’ into a ‘means’ and to control it.
I hope this is clear as a general idea? 
mikachusetts,
Here is a bit from Hoppe from that link:
This ownership of “originally appropriated” places and goods by a person implies his right to use and transform these places and goods in any way he sees fit, provided only that he does not thereby uninvitedly change the physical integrity of places and goods originally appropriated by another person. In particular, once a place or good has been first appropriated by (in John Locke’s phrase) “mixing one’s labor” with it, ownership in such places and goods can be acquired only by means of a voluntary contractual transfer of its property title from a previous to a later owner.
Nice sounding, no doubt, but still no arguing as to why. Immediately following that,
Isn’t it simply absurd to claim that a person should not be the proper owner of his body and the places and goods that he originally, i.e., prior to anyone else, appropriates, uses and/or produces by means of his body? Who else, if not he, should be their owner? Isn’t it also obvious that the overwhelming majority of people, including children and primitives, act according to these rules, and do so unquestioningly and as a matter of course?
Quite absurd, indeed, Mr. Hoppe. (Wouldn’t it being absurd or not be a subjective valuation?) But some do. Also, saying that we ought to do something because “children and primitives” do it unthinkingly is not helping your cause.
But now Hoppe, after saying we don’t need proof because “children and primitives” act in accordance with this, offers twofold proof:
If a person A were not the owner of his own body and the places and goods originally appropriated and/or produced with this body as well as of the goods voluntarily (contractually) acquired from another previous owner, then only two alternatives exist. Either another person B must be recognized as the owner of A’s body as well as the places and goods appropriated, produced or acquired by A, or else all persons, A and B, must be considered equal co-owners of all bodies, places and goods.
First objection: After A mixes with resource X, it could just be said that still no one owns resource X. A, indeed, owns himself, but we still haven’t shown how self-ownership leads to owning other resources. Second objection: no one, either A or B, would own it, since as of yet there is no reason to think mixing one’s labor with a resource gives one ownership of that resource.
Hoppe continues:
“In the first case, A would be reduced to the rank of B’s slave and object of exploitation. B is the owner of A’s body and all places and goods appropriated, produced, and acquired by A, but A in turn is not the owner of B’s body and the places and goods appropriated, produced and acquired by B. Hence, under this ruling two categorically distinct classes of persons are created—Untermenschen such as A and Übermenschen such as B—to whom different “laws” apply. Accordingly, such a ruling must be discarded as a human ethic equally applicable to everyone qua human being (rational animal). From the very outset, any such ruling can be recognized as not universally acceptable and thus cannot claim to represent law. For a rule to aspire to the rank of a law—a just rule—it is necessary that such a rule apply equally and universally to everyone.”
Person A would not be a slave unless it has already been established that A can own something by mixing his labor with it. And we still have not established that yet.
Hoppe also says something about owning resources works wonderfully to resolve conflicts. I have no doubt that this is true, but my question over why mixing labor with resources gives ownership over those resources has still been unanswered.
AdrianHealy,
Thank you. This makes more sense to me, and I appreciate you explaining it out thoroughly for me. The step-by-step approach is my only hope.
With that said, I’m still not sure if I buy it 100%.
As for the praxeological body, defined as “the actor and it’s means,” being a unity… I’m still lost. Unless I’m misreading or misinterpreting (highly likely), it seems like you are just stating this relationship is true, without saying why it is true.
Your question is nonsensical in the context of defining “ownership” as “legitimate control”, which is the definition I’m using. I’m sorry if I wasn’t clear there. To make things clearer, I’m distinguishing between control and ownership. Since anything can be considered legitimate or illegitimate, hence control can be so considered. The question then becomes, how can one legitimately control something?
My own take on it follows the homesteading principle. Everything starts out (as it were) as uncontrolled. Any initial establishment of control over something is legitimate, as it does not interfere with any pre-existing control. The person who initally establishes control over the thing can thus be considered its first owner. At this point, for someone else to legitimately establish control over it, the existing owner must voluntarily (without coercion) relinquish his own control. Whether he does so freely (i.e. a gift) or in exchange for something else from the other person (i.e. a trade) is immaterial.
Note that I don’t use the phrase “mix one’s labor with [something]”. I prefer to explain it in terms of exerting or establishing control. Hopefully that makes sense to you.
You might wanna read this: It’s Michael Bauwens - the president of the Belgian based Murray Rothbard Institute (where I’m a member from) - defense of natural law/natural rights and it’s basically a longer version of what I’m writing here. (I get my ideas from him.) (Link: http://www.independent.org/students/essay/essay.asp?id=2342)
Anyway, to answer your questions.
“He was the first to give the thing a meaning, so it is his. Not sure about that. Why does giving meaning to something make it yours?”
<= What does it mean to say ‘it is his?’ It means he can control it, right? Well: first of all: he was the first to take control over it. At that time, there was no one conflating use - because he was, in fact, the first one. If someone challenges his control, they have to come after him in time. And to challenge control, means to claim that you’re decision to control it is superior than his. But based on what grounds? If nobody challenges the meaning you are giving it, it means that nobody cares. There is no problem of ‘law’ at that point (imagine Robinson Crusoë on an island: he also doesn’t have the problem of what he should do, because there is no one else.) But when someone challenges the control, he’s claiming control of itself. But since he’s attacking the (prior) reasons of the other guy, he’s attacking the other guy as a praxeologogical unity. The praxeological body is a whole: there is no difference between me ‘using’ my body and me ‘using’ my property.
Edit: Because it was a ‘thing’ - a res nulius - and now it’s a means it has to belong to ‘someone’. Maybe not lawfully, but praxeologically: he was the one that first controls it. He turned a ‘thing’ into a means.
“Using the means created by another actor is aggressing against his conception of the world. Do we have a right, derived from self-ownership, to not have our conception of the world aggressed against?”
<= Well, it’s based on the previous notion. Law is the concept that differentiates between actors in a scare world. You is use and me is me. I control me and you control you. Aggressing against another actor is aggressing against a moral equal, who also gives meaning to the world. The connection is that because you give reasons, you have a moral obligation to act reasonable in the face of others. This is because the position ‘I don’t have to be reasonable’ cannot be defended. If it cannot be defended (by logic) it’s simply nonsense. There is a moral imperative in the notion ‘one ought to act reasonable’.
A conflict between actors - 'I want to use this means of you - would be acting unreasonable, because you wouldn’t able to defend why your reasons were better than the other persons reasons and should be overriding his conception of the world. (If you can, than the other person is just agreeing with you and there is no aggression (anymore).)
“As for the praxeological body, defined as “the actor and it’s means,” being a unity… I’m still lost. Unless I’m misreading or misinterpreting (highly likely), it seems like you are just stating this relationship is true, without saying why it is true.”
<= The praxeological unity isn’t a ‘moral’ category. There is no ‘we ought to be a praxeological unity’. It’s a natural concept: we are a praxeological unity. If we understand the concept of ‘action’ - employing means in the world - than you have the concept of a praxeological unity. We act and the means we use - our body and things (that become means) in the outer world - have a logical identity. They don’t look alike, but they have the same status in our action: they are means and we control them.
Oke, I’m gonna nag here, but I don’t think you’re actually proving something here.
Yes, the first person is in fact the first owner. That is true. But why is it true that from this it follows that ‘the only way to gain legitimately establish control over it, the existing owner must voluntarily relinquish his own control’? You don’t really provide a reason, you just state the conclusion. I agree with this conclusion - as might be obvious from my own posts - but why does this follow from the fact that he’s the first owner? Why can’t we have different kind of ways to transfer property legitimately? Why does it follow ‘we have a first owner’ that ‘only voluntarism is legitimate’?
“Note that I don’t use the phrase “mix one’s labor with [something]”. I prefer to explain it in terms of exerting or establishing control. Hopefully that makes sense to you.”
Cuddoos for this. There is no reason to discriminate between different kinds of actions.
Questions about ownership are only really important (i.e. important in the real world) when there is a dispute over ownership. Say I move previously wild horses onto previously unused land and after some months someone else appears and drives me away, keeping the horses and the land. Who has a more legitimate claim to the horses? Who has a more legitimate claim to that land?
The question of self-ownership is essentially the same one. If I grab you around the wrist, do I then own your wrist? If not, why not? If I am punching the air and your face, though stationary, happens to get in the way, who has a more legitimate claim to occupying that space? Just as ‘first use’ is the ultimate conclusion for self-ownership, so it is for the ownership of anything else (The issue of abandonment is also extremely important for this). The logical conclusion of the legitimacy of ‘first use’ ownership is libertarianism, and just as humans seem to naturally subscribe to ‘first use’, so is libertarianism the natural order of humanity.
Its major rival in human thought is of course ‘greatest need’ ownership This would require some objective standard of need and value, which of course does not exist.
The question is than: does it ‘legitimately’ belong to him? Well, given he was the first actor, he was the first to give it meaning. Given moral equality, why should anyones reasons to use a certain means, be any better than anyone else? If a second actor tries to use a means belonging to a first actor, he’s aggressing the actor, because he’s aggressing against that actors means - i.e. his conception of the world and how it ought to be. The praxeological body - the actor and it’s means - is a unity. There is no relevant difference from a praxeological way of thinking. If you try to take his means, you are ignoring his actions and thus disrespecting him.
That’s a big what-if in there… very subjective
(what I mean is, A NAZI would assume it morally righteous for him to use the stick he just fashioned into a spear to kill a Jew)
Sorry, I realized that I skipped over some steps in my analysis. I think they can be inferred from what I wrote, but I agree that it’s better to be explicit here. 
The idea is that a condition or action is legitimate if and only if it does not interfere with any other legitimate condition or action. So if a person establishes first ownership over something, and someone else comes along and takes it without the owner giving his consent, then the other person’s control over it is illegitimate, as the owner retains ownership. In other words, once ownership has been established ex nihilo, the owner necessarily keeps ownership until he chooses otherwise.
Hope this helps!
It is a negative proof. If one does not own what one creates, or everyone owns what one creates, then survival is impossible and whoever is making the argument becomes extinct.
That is actually not ‘subjective’ and is explained further down the road.
If the nazi would violate another praxeological actor, he wouldn’t be able to defend his moral proposition and thus be morally wrong. I mean: anyone could do anything and could assume anything. The question is: can it be argued for - and be defended? If not, than it’s complete and utter nonsense.
Another way of approaching it is this: given that we are all natural persons - you is you and me is me - who act, it only logically follows that we are also morally equally relevant.
That is actually not ‘subjective’ and is explained further down the wrote. I’m willing to defend any criticisms you have, but I’m not going to reiterate what I said, just because you missed it.
If the nazi would violate another praxeological actor, he wouldn’t be able to defend his moral proposition and thus be morally wrong.
Good point, although I don’t think anyone has argued here that every person is ontologically (i.e. inherently) required to treat all others as moral equals.
“It is a negative proof. If one does not own what one creates, or everyone owns what one creates, then survival is impossible and whoever is making the argument becomes extinct.”
Exactly, and this is why mankind (almost) universally accepts self-ownership and homesteading - since otherwise they would exist in a Hobbesian war of all against all and live in the same way as animals. That they don’t live in this way is not due to Hobbes’ Leviathan, but due to the belief in property.
Rothbard has an interesting discussion of the alternatives to self-ownership/homesteading in chapter 8 of Ethics of Liberty. The are wholly unviable.
“Exactly, and this is why mankind (almost) universally accepts self-ownership and homesteading - since otherwise they would exist in a Hobbesian war of all against all and live in the same way as animals. That they don’t live in this way is not due to Hobbes’ Leviathan, but due to the belief in property.”
<= I would say this is (empirically) wrong. All mankind has ‘a’ notion of property - even communists - but it doesn’t follow that it’s the libertarian concept of property, nor is it true that only the absolute property concept of libertarians can sustain life. Limited property, limited homesteading and limited self-ownership has been the norm allthroughout history, as far as I see. (Even the concept of ’ self ownership’ is relatively new.)
If the nazi would violate another praxeological actor, he wouldn’t be able to defend his moral proposition and thus be morally wrong.
And if he had to defend his actions in a NAZI court, his would be found righteous, and the Jews defence of himself would not. It’s all subjective… or at the very least inter-subjective.
Otherwise you are claiming objective morals…
maybe I missed something in your argument.
<= I’m sorry, but I don’t think ‘well, if the states backs the nazi up, he won’t be convicted’ to be a relevant argument.
‘Obama isn’t doing anything right, because he doesn’t get prosecuted’. That’s basically you’re counterargument. If you are aware of that, I’ll respond to it, but I first need to check wether or not you’re aware of it. If I missed your point, please elaborate further, because this is how I would construct your argument.
<= I’m sorry, but I don’t think ‘well, if the states backs the nazi up, he won’t be convicted’ to be a relevant argument.
First, it doesn’t have to be a court. Whoever he is trying to justify calling his spear his property to, will still base whether or not he accepts that justification on his own moral subjective values.
You don’t consider real world politics to be a relevant argument? I would say, I stand on the other side of that fence. I don’t consider Crusoe’s Island arguments very relevant either. To each his own…
‘Obama isn’t doing anything wrong, because he doesn’t get prosecuted’. That’s basically you’re counterargument. If you are aware of that, I’ll respond to it, but I first need to check wether or not you’re aware of it. If I missed your point, please elaborate further, because this is how I would construct your argument.
I guess I would agree that is a crude way of expressing my argument. What I was getting at was that property is a social construct (as opposed to a personal construct), so… I guess I don’t disagree with what you think my stance is.
I have my own moral judgements about Obama, or the NAZi spear fashioner, but society tends to be pretty amoral over time, with very hard convictions on trivial moral questions in a snapshot. I just don’t assume my value judgements on Obama really matter to anyone else, unless I have the power/standing in society to back it up.
IOW, this is why I’m an anti-cap
I thought we stopped believing in ‘might makes right’ like a few hundred years ago?
And just because you’re able to defend your position, doesn’t mean all positions can’t be defended.