In Saving Government Failure from Itself, Boettke, Coyne, and Leeson present the following dilemma.
The problem as we see it is as follows:
(1) Economic theory informs us that $20 bills (unexploited opportunities) cannot persistently lay on sidewalks without being picked up;
(2) The very same economic theory that informs us about the non-persistence of inefficiencies is also what we use to identify inefficiencies (gains from trade that are currently unexploited);
(3) When we examine policy reality in light of that economic theory we see inefficient policies all the time, e.g., protectionist legislation.
How do we square propositions (1)–(3) without abandoning economic theory? We see the choice as pushing in one of two directions. On the one hand we could argue that (2) and (3) are illusions that economists must pierce through. The $20 bill is not there because it would actually cost $25 to reach down and pick it up. In other words, if a lower cost alternative were available it would be employed; and since it is not, the policy reality must reflect the political economy reality efficiently. No unexploited opportunity for mutually beneficial action remains in the political process.
That is, if unexploited opportunities cannot remain indefinitely, then allegedly “inefficient” government policies might simply be a delusion, a myopic distortion of an efficient process.
Quoting George Stigler, “Consider the following example. The United States wastes (in ordinary language) perhaps $3 billion per year producing sugar and sugar substitutes at a price two to three times the cost of importing the sugar. Yet that is the tested way in which the domestic sugar-beet, cane, and highfructose-corn producers can increase their incomes by perhaps a quarter of the $3 billion-the other three quarters being deadweight loss. The deadweight loss is the margin by which the domestic costs of sugar production exceed import prices. Lacking a cheaper way of achieving this domestic subsidy, our sugar program is efficient. This program is more than fifty years old-it has met the test of time.”
Tyler Cowen adds, “Governments often do terrible things, but the reason we observe them so frequently is because they are the predominant form that a stable equilibrium takes.”
There is a challenge presented to anti-statists of all sorts: if we presume individuals are rationally maximizing their benefits (and hence reducing their costs), then why would supposedly inefficient government policies persist over long stretches of time?
That is, if there’s a $20 bill lying on the ground, why would people continue to walk past it? If it actually takes $21 to pick up that $20, then it would inefficient to lift it up; likewise, if transition to nongovernmental social arrangements has a cost that exceeds its benefit, then our democratic government is efficient. As Cowen states, governments are ubiquitous and perhaps persist as a stable equilibrium, one whose efficiency might escape the limits of our reason.
Or so the argument goes. What do you think?