How do natural rights theories cross the is/ought divide?

I will refute this argument:

  1. Survival requires one to act in accordance to his ‘nature’.

  2. One will die if one refuses to act in accordance to his ‘nature’.

  3. It is logically contradictory for one to deny that one should act in accordance to his ‘nature’, because denying it will kill oneself.

  4. I value logical consistency, not logical contradiction. Hence, I value the third proposition.

  5. I, myself, should not deny that I should act in accordance to my ‘nature’.

  6. I value the law of the excluded third.

  7. According to the law of the excluded third, the statement “I should not deny …” implies “I should agree with …”

  8. I, myself, should agree that I should act in accordance to my ‘nature’.

  9. By definition, one who agrees to act in accordance to his ‘nature’ implies that one values ‘natural law’.

  10. I, myself, should value ‘natural law’.

The first premise is unsound because you can still survive even if you refuse to follow most of the laws of ‘nature’. You do not necessarily have to follow all of the laws of ‘nature’ to survive. So the second statement is also unsound because you will not necessarily die if you violated most, but not not all, of the laws of ‘nature’.

The neo-Aristotelian ethicists have assumed that one has to obey ‘nature’ entirely when one can just obey the necessary laws for one to survive. They have stuffed a package-deal called ‘natural law’ down our throats from this argument.