As per my previous post..
—used to express obligation <ought to pay our debts>, advisability <ought to take care of yourself>, natural expectation <ought to be here by now>, or logical consequence <the result ought to be infinity>
The first one is the one relevant to the discussion. This is a topic regarding morality, after all. The second one is what you are referring to, and, as advice or opinion, does not require bridging the is-ought gap.
Excellent clarification.
Do you mean this one?
I very much agree with AM’s two responses to it, and I’m not sure I would add too much to them. I don’t think you’ve established that god exists, that goodness is objective, or that to harmonize with nature is objectively good.
Thank you for reminding me.
It does show that this conception of morality is basically consequentialism. And like I said before, I don’t think consequentialism is properly called morality, because then it is simply a technical matter of optimization. What then would distinguish “moral action” from “action in general”?
I contend that statements like “one ought to not commit aggression” as a moral statement is an issue of inherent revulsion against aggression and not a utilitarian “for the good of humanity in general” position. The latter such position is not an instance of true morality, but is instead an attempt at an elegent solution to the problems of social engineering. People are not moral agents to the extent that they are social engineers. Social engineering is not fundamental to the human psyche; it is relatively new project of the philosophical set.
And how exactly is this problem? You and others haven’t clarified the real implications of said conclusion about consequentialism.
Actually, I have…
Also, it would seem like a highly unuseful redefinition of a word. When people talk about morality, they don’t mean matters of technical optimization like using the appropriate screwdriver or making the best move in chess. If there were no difference between “moral action” and “action” then people should stop using the word “morality” altogether, and just talk about action. But there is a set of motivations which is fundamentally different from the basic motivations of self-preservation and self-promotion. Those are the motivations that most people talk about when they use the word “morality”. I don’t think it makes sense to remove from that word its useful delimiting function and redefine it as a superfluous synonym of action.
Well put, this is my biggest problem with natural law philosophy. It seems to hinge on an unusual definition of the word “ought”. I mean, if natural law philosophy is indeed correct then people ought to live in a certain way, there’s no reason for that “ought” to be moral.
Well put, this is my biggest problem with natural law philosophy. It seems to hinge on an unusual definition of the word “ought”. I mean, if natural law philosophy is indeed correct then people ought to live in a certain way, there’s no reason for that “ought” to be moral.
First, consequentialism is not utilitarianism. So stop equivocating the two. It’s like what some Randroids do with Rationalism (by equivocating everything Kant wrote with that of every other Rationalist before and after him), it’s dirty pool, friend. I don’t play it. I expect you not to do the same.
Second, it’s a given fact that each intent does not always entail the same end. One may intend to save a person’s life in the act of being a doctor, but the end may be that his patient may die anyways. Intent may be a good measure of a moral proposition’s general aim (of moral or immoral), but it is not a sound measure of its functionality in terms of actual ends. To divorce ends from moral propositions (or moral intents) is to invite an anti-causalist approach to all other human affairs (including those of the purely observational/empirical). So, either you include consequence as part of the moral debate or you come up with a theory of moral intents, where it’s proven ends are overshadowed by intents in a consistent manner.
You’re the one that’s conflating the purpose of consequence in moral considerations. I’m simply stating that at the end of a moral consideration (post-intent analysis) that consequences are weighed to see if the ends match up with the intents and vice versa. If this some how an evil optmization process, guess what? Everything in terms of human action does include the pursuit of the optimal. The optimal need not be merely cardinal in quality, it’s often ordinal. It’s something we measure not in terms of summation, but how it stands as part of a system of values, as a whole. Thus, you’re confusing the pursuit of the optimal in human affairs with the pursuit of the optimal in the inanimate world (that of reaching equilibrium). Both may deal with systems, but now each deals with the function of systems is entirely different.
I’m not playing dirty pool. I didn’t equivocate the two. I characterized utilitarianism as a variant of consequentialism, not as a synonym. That is how I honestly conceive of utilitarianism. If I’m incorrect, feel free to correct me without assuming ill intent.
Your use of the word “end” here is confusing. Usually, in questions of human action, the word “end” is defined as what you are calling “intent”, not as what you are calling “consequence”.
I contend that intention is everything, and actual consequences are immaterial, when discussing morality. The morality of a surgery is dependent on whether the doctor had consent to operate and whether he intended to help or harm: not on the ultimate success. I don’t know what school of ethics argues otherwise or how this pertains to the “is/ought” question.
So are you saying what distinguishes “moral action” from “action in general” is whether it involves human affairs?
End for me means the end of a set of actions based on a set of intents.
So if a mother saws off her first born’s arms, which results in bleeding, because she thought it would be good for her child, then it’s good? The same for honor killings/suicides (like those practiced in India), are they good because the intent was to do good? Oops, so much for intent, when the consequences can lead to shitty ends.
All that that seems to matter for your theoretical framework is what is conceived as ‘good’ intent, and then by what standard is the intent is ‘measured’ (not cardinally, mind you or as some cognitive psychological theories would suppose)?
More or less, basically, if humans didn’t direct it, then it has its own operational parameters that are separate (not necessarily exclusive) from that of human affairs. An example would be the random fluke of a meteor striking someone on the head, or a support beam in a building breaking due to random percularities of the composition (that couldn’t have been known to the makers). Or some such events.
For me, intent guides or drives to ends (results), thus the pursuit of optimality is part of the pursuit of intent in morality. They’re reflective to one and other.
consequentialism is moral theory that is obsessed with consequences, and other moral theories stake their claim by distancing themselves from it. but its a question of emhpasis or degree, every moral theory has an eye on ‘consequence’ broadly speaking. even supposing your intentionalism you must concede that if your intentions never caused or informed your actions and did not lead to led judgeable outcomes they would hardly be worth discussing. indeed, the kind of intentions you have in mind are consequence orientated. the doctor who intends helpful surgery, intends so with the consequences of such an intention in mind, i.e. he has the intention to bring about the consequence of healing, (whhether or not that is what is obtained by his acting)
Let me put it another way, if I intend for X, then how by Y is the factor that defines the ‘consequence.’ Therefore, if my intention to do good by a finite means to achieve it (the how) I must consider each means own end in respect to the intent (and the end in respect to the intent). Whether there’s any metaphysical basis for tying one end to one intent is beside the point, it’s a matter of whether one is trying to make their ethical or moral judgments sound. As the old saying goes, “The road to Hell is paved with Good Intentions.”
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WAT
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That usage is likely to lead to a lot of confusion in discussion with other Misesians… (emphasis added)
The result sought by an action is called its end, goal, or aim. One uses these terms in ordinary speech also to signify intermediate ends, goals, or aims; these are points which acting man wants to attain only because he believes that he will reach his ultimate end, goal or aim in passing beyond them. Strictly speaking the end, goal, or aim of any action is always the relief from a felt uneasiness.
-Human Action, Chapter 4
I am a subjectivist, in economics as well as ethics. So to me the question is “good according to whom”? The arm-sawing is not good according to me, or according to the preponderance of humanity. If the woman is mad, however, it may very well be good according to her.
No, what I mean is: Do you distinguish moral human action from human action in general according to whether it involves other humans or whether it involves inanimate objects?
Subjectivity always is yielded by the decoupling of goal and action (of end and mean [as you prefer to use the terms]). If you deny that means can indeed alter the end, or the end can alter the means, then you deny all causality at some level. That even physics is merely a ‘metanarrative’ or some such construct. Turtles all the way down, yet again.
The former.
The categories means and ends are analogous to the categories causes and effects. Therefore, the “end” of an action is the effect of that action. And, therefore, in order to describe the intended effect of an action, one may say the “intended end”.
I think that that removes any possible ambiguity. Also, I think that, in that quote, Mises erred because he did indeed, at some point, say that the categories means and ends are analagous to the categories causes and effects.
Pretty much this video sums up my views on this thread entirely… For now.