Where?
“Wrong” can mean factually incorrect, contrary to purpose, or illicit. Which do you mean? The first would be nonsense. The second would be consequentialism, which as I explained is not properly called morality and even if called so cannot be considered universal. If the last, then how do you determine cosmic/objective illicitness?
Nice according to whom/what?
Don’t assume that zefreak, AJ, and others are amoralists either. You do a lot of assuming, as with your blithely calling Ryan a minarchist. In doing so, you risk lending truth to Giles’ depiction of the average Rothbardian as a thoughtless, reactionary purist.
You seem to conflate “really” with “objectively”.
A note regarding the accusations of “extreme skepticism”…
It would be one thing if people were asserting the existence of something for which there was clear evidence, and we were insisting on perfect proof beyond that evidence.
But with objective natural rights that derive “ought” from “is”, people are asserting something which may not even make logical sense, let alone be actually true.
Bringing what is potentially complete incoherence into the light of day is not extreme skepticism.
You know I believe in ‘objective’ morals - the answer to your question is self-evident. Also, you didn’t address any of my criticisms. Nice.
To an objective moral standard.
As far as I’m concerned you and others are no different than amoralists. Too bad if you don’t like my opinion about you. You could try suing me and claiming damages to your reputation.
You’re right, after all Ryan is a genius who has created a new amoral system he can’t even describe. Too bad.
Are you ‘labeling’ me as a rothbardian - assuming I’m a rothbardian ? Well, you couldn’t be more wrong. I’m simply stating the common sense position that there’s right and wrong, contrary to what a bunch of relativists who fancy themselves great philosophers believe.
whatever. what do you mean by really ? by conflating ?
I already addressed the ought-is strawman.
lol. Your ambivalence with respect to logic is quite charming. If you don’t like something you declare it’s potentially incoherent ? Well, have you perfectly defined your terms including the term ‘incoherent’ ?
What the hell are you talking about? When did I claim that I created a system? And, when did I imply that I am an amoralist?
Hey Ryan, would you be so kind as to tell me what your political position is ? Fascist ? Communist ? Minimal ‘libertarian’ statist ? Anarchist ? Or something different, amazing and new which has no name and ‘label’ ?
Do you understand I’m asking you for information, not assuming anything ?
The terms ‘objective’, ‘subjective’, ‘is’, ‘ought’, ‘fact’, and ‘value’ are ambiguous. I suggest stating what you mean by ‘objectivism’ in your own words instead of using the term itself.
Other people have labeled me as a ‘moral subjectivist’, ‘moral relativist’, ‘moral nihilist’, ‘emotivist’, ‘amoralist’, ‘moral skeptic’, ‘post-modernist’, ‘post-structuralist’, and ‘logical positivist’. However, I, myself, do not label myself with any of the above. All of the controversies in ‘ethics’ stem from the usage of those ambiguous labels. People equivocate the different meanings of each of those terms and misinterpret what others mean by those labels. For example, I have already identified around ten different meanings for ‘moral subjectivism’. Same thing with the terms ‘moral objectivism’, ‘moral relativism’, ‘moral absolutism’, ‘moral nihilism’, etc.
Even a proponent of ‘moral subjectivism’ himself can easily equivocate his own meanings of ‘subjectivism’. He can use ‘subjectivism’ in some sense, and the next minute, he will use ‘subjectivism’ in a different sense. I have identified around ten different meanings of ‘subjectivism’ that people commonly equivocate. I will briefly list some of the meanings below:
‘Subjects’ are ‘objects’ in the sense that the human mind is itself an ‘object’. Human desires are also coded in ‘objective’ genes and nature.
‘Objects’’ are ‘subjective’ in the sense that objects require the ‘subject’ to perceive.
‘Objective’ can mean a ‘universal prescription’, in the sense that ‘ethics’ should not only apply to one person, everyone should have the same moral codes.
‘Subjective’ can mean a ‘non-universal prescription’. For example, do not punish people for your moral opinions, ‘legalize rape’, ‘legalize murder’, ‘tolerate Hitler’.
‘Objective’ can mean ‘descriptive monocentrism’ in the sense that everyone believes in the same moral code.
‘Subjective’ can mean ‘descriptive polycentrism’ in the sense that not everyone believes in the same moral code.
‘Subjective’ can mean either:
- mind-dependent
- “inside the mind”
- intrinsic
- inside ‘me’ instead of ‘out there’ in the universe.
‘Objective’ can mean either:
- mind-independent
- “outside the mind”
- extrinsic
- outside ‘me’ instead of ‘in my mind’
‘Subjective’ can mean personal ‘preferences’ and ‘opinions’, opposed to ‘truths’ and ‘facts’.
However, the words ‘preferences’ and ‘opinions’ vs. ‘truth’ and’ facts’ themselves are ambiguous, and can change meaning in different contexts. For example, ‘objective’ in ‘truth’ and ‘facts’ can mean either ‘deontology’, the categorical imperative, that god prescribes it, ‘nature’ prescribes it, or human desires coded in ‘objective’ genes and ‘nature’. ‘Subjective’ can mean ‘ethical’ ‘preferences’ and ‘opinions’ (evolutionary desires) or Berkeley-ian ‘idealism’ (imperfect senses).
‘Objective’ can mean in a ‘factual’ or ‘descriptive’ point of view.
‘Subjective’ can mean an ‘opinionated’ pointed of view.
‘Objective’ can mean ethics deduced by the same methodology as the categorical imperative, argumentation ethics, or Molyneuvian UPB.
‘Subjective’ can mean ethics not deduced in the fashion as in categorical imperative, argumentation ethics, and Molyneuvian UPB.
‘Objective’ can mean ‘absolute certainty’.
‘Subjective’ can mean anything except ‘absolute certainty’.
‘Objective’ can mean in the development of stuff by reason and understanding, objective as ‘reason’ or the ‘laws of logic’. The Objectivists, Post-Objectivists, and Molyneuvians use the term ‘objectivity’ in this sense.
‘Subjective’ can mean anything opposed reason, but biased by personal interest.
Juan seems to define ‘subjective’ as ‘arbitrary whim’. This is not how Lilburne and zefreak defines it.
The common sense position regarding right and wrong is that they are value judgments. And the common sense position regarding value judgments is that they are subjective. What requires “fancy philosophy” (or religion) is the notion that moral values are objective.
But you do infer that man ought to act a certain way because of the way things “are” (which is a plural tense of “is”).
How is it a strawman position if it is one you hold?
I obviously don’t merely dislike the arguments that have been presented for objective natural rights, anymore than I simply “dislike” the statement " 2 + [C] = bear". The derivations of “ought” from “is” just don’t make sense.
Lilburne, bears you say?
Honestly, I would still stay the is-ought ‘gap’ is a non-starter, you can’t bridge what are functionally distinct ‘operators’ in the language as human language in this case is not as neatly symmetrical as say mathematical languages (which are human, but more precise). Does this mean natural law in another sense or use is impossible? No, it simply means you can’t say NAP is an irreducible “natural law”, you have to start at a simpler proposition, one probably focused on epistemology, to begin the journey to an objective moral standard.
That doesn’t say much. Yes, moral positions are value judgments - people are not machines. And yes, values are held by individuals. All that is trivial…and does not disprove moral realism.
Using your same sophistry one could say that language and meaning are subjective - of course, they are in a sense, but that doesn’t preclude the fact that real communication about facts of the real world is possible.
Unfounded assertion. Notice yet another mistake of yours. Revealed religion, which is just unproven fantasies, can in no way justify moral realism.
Of course. You, I and the rest of humans exist and so does the real world. So, any sort of philosophical inquiry must start with things that “are”. Now, morals by definition deal with things as they should be. If, as you say, you can’t make moral deductions using facts as premises, then you can’t do any sort of moral reasoning - which is of course what you want.
Well, I rewrote the problem in terms of authority : people who reject the objective fact that individuals have no moral authority over each other are required to show that fact to be false. That is, you are required to prove how A can have moral authority over B - other than at gunpoint, that is. I’m saying nothing about ‘oughts’ so don’t twist the position in order to find a ‘hidden’ ought as zefreak does - because that’s a strawman.
Again, unfounded assertion. Of course, like any good skeptic you can always say that argument X doesn’t make sense to you and reject it.
But don’t complain when I try the logical positivist game and start asking for the definition of every term you use.
Actually like I stated, the burden of proof is on you to establish why we [ natural law theorists ] are false to believe in something we think is true for it would be ridiculous to assume that we are false until we can prove to you that what we believe is true.
The assertion “right and wrong are value-judgments” can be interpreted in many ways:
“Right and wrong are not value-judgments” in the sense that determining if an action constitutes as either ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ requires human thought and reasoning.
“Right and wrong are value-judgments” in the sense that humans feel positively if they hear the word “right” and react negatively if they hear he word “wrong.”
“Right and wrong are not value-judgments” in the sense that ‘value-judgments’ (in the sense of aesthetics) are unnecessary for the judgment whether if an action confirms or violates the anarchist moral code.
“Right and wrong are value-judgments” in the sense that it requires empathy, which you classify as a ‘value-judgment’, to determine if an action constitutes ‘right’ or ‘wrong’.
The assertion that “value-judgments are subjective” can also be interpreted in many ways:
“Value-judgments are subjective” in the sense that those judgements require human emotional perception.
“Value-judgments are not subjective” in the sense that emotional perceptions, which you identify as ‘subjective’, can be identified by ‘independently’ from the personal feelings itself, such as the assumption that humans feel empathy from evolutionary biology.
“Value-judgments are neither subjective nor objective” in the sense that they we cannot decide the epistemological properties of a judgment.
“Value-judgments are subjective” in the sense that human preferences differ at many times and differ at all contexts.
“Morality is emotive” in the sense that we experience a gut-feeling of grief when Bush had ‘murdered’ over one million Iraqis.
“Morality is not emotive” in the sense that we do not feel any ‘emotions’ when some person lied to anther.
“Morality is not emotive” in the sense that we should develop ethical systems based on human reason and science, with accurate standards and sound criteria, rather than develop it from the biased gut-feelings of some random person.
“Morality is emotive” in the sense that the basic fundamental for grounding a moral system stem from human ‘intuitions’, ‘preferences’, and ‘emotions’.
“Defining ‘aggression’ is circular” in the sense that the definition of ‘aggression’ depends on the definition of ‘property rights’, which, in turn, we define as the “absence of aggression against property.”
“Defining ‘aggression’ is not circular” in the sense that we do not need to define ‘aggression’ in every case because it takes too much time.
“Defining ‘aggression’ is not circular” in the sense that ‘natural law’ based on ‘human nature’ can deduce an adequate amount cases in which we can accurately determine if an action constitutes as ‘aggression’.
“Defining ‘aggression’ is circular” in the sense that the definition of ‘aggression’ can be interpreted in too many ways that people have different conceptions about punishment and parenting.
“In the sense that people who adhere to it do it voluntarily, no.”
"In the sense that other busyboddys out there might seek out people to convert & force the NAP unto others (physically) & thus contradicting the NAP: yes. This is less clear if the NAP being “forced” is a reaction against a violated contract by another person to adhere to the NAP, though. "
"In the sense that other busyboddys out there might seek out people to convert & “force” the NAP unto other’s socially: maybe, because social coercion does not always translate into physical coercion. "
I just have discovered that most of the controversey stem from the differences in interpretations.
What is this suppose to mean? That thinking if a action is right or wrong based on human reason is not right or wrong?
Yet human emotional perception is an objective trait.
What? Being lied to or seeing an individual lied too does not invoke an emotional response? Nonsense.
That would depend on if you believe in self-ownership.
Hence it is apriori
Actually not. If you were to ask the forum the definition of aggression they would give you something akin to Rothbard’s definition.
That is self-refuting. If people actually believe in the NAP, then they wouldn’t go out of their way to coerce others.
Explain how one can take a proactive stance in pre-emptive use of the NAP.
I’m afraid the burden of proof is on the person claiming the existence of something, not the one claiming its absence. Otherwise I could claim that the earth is ruled by little invisible men who in turn are controlled by Santa Claus, and as you would have no way of disproving this, you’d have to accept it. Obviously an absurd situation.
Well said.
Actually like I said, why should we try to prove something is true when we already believe it to be true. The proof is on you to establish that we are wrong and why we are wrong.
Actually I could. Santa Claus is a mythical representation of human empathy and giving. There is no entity called Santa Claus who is living in this world. The myth of Santa can be shown through cultural reference in various societies.
http://www.christmas-day.org/multiculturism-santas.html
Proof of his nonexistence can also be seen by impersonators and the fact that parents/family/friends actually deliever the present
AM, if I say “the cat is meowing” , there’s no way for that sentence to be interpreted as “the cat is NOT meowing”.