Why should it matter what the N*zis spend your specific contibution on? Even if they did spend the money on defensive artillery, it would free up more money for them to buy more offensive artillery, build more ovens, etc.
What if you specifically gave them offensive artillery?
But they do want to kill because they are coerced and it is the only way to save their own skin. Murder is murder. The coercion doesn’t change that fact.
Either this weapon is of a nature that it can only be used offensively or it can be used for both offense and defense. In the first case, it should be considered criminal. In the second case, it should depend on the mutual understanding between the doner and the NS of the purpose of the weapons.
How is that any different from being forced to pay money to fund an evil organization that collects taxes, fights wars, forcibly sets wages and prices, etc.? Government wouldn’t be able to do that stuff if half of the country stopped paying! Really, what’s different about that?
As a side question, let’s say that a man pinned you down, held a spinning chainsaw next to your genitals, and coerced you into throwing a rock through a neighbor’s window. Who should pay for the window, you or him?
For anyone who stumbles across this post, I believe that the coerced in these examples should not be punished!
In both cases, the coerced party wishes to avoid harm. In the case of the murderer, he has the same intent as the extortionist, the death or injury of a third party. In the case of the taxpayer, he does not have the same intent as state agents, causing injury or death to third parties. The extortionist and murderer act in concert to achieve a goal. The taxpayer and state agent do not. The extortionist and murderer have an agreement to commit a crime. The taxpayer and state agent do not.
You keeping asking the same question. I don’t know what else you could want in an answer. I think the question is settled, unless you can find a problem in the standard of judgement.
Both owe restitution collectively (half and half if both can pay). And the window owner has a right to retribution against each individually. The extortionist owes restitution to the coerced party, and the coerced party has a right to retribution against the extortionist.
I honestly don’t understand what you’re trying to say. Could you rephrase that? Who is who?
Obviously neither of us can prove the other wrong, but it’s incredibly cruel to charge a man who was coerced into breaking a window by a man holding a chainsaw to his genitals. Why not make the true coercer pay for everything? What do you gain by punishing the victim?
Case 1: Your standard threatening genitals with chainsaw unless you kill innocent third party. The person with the chainsaw is the extortionist. He wants the innocent third party to die. The person who is threatened also wants the third party to die, so he can avoid parting with his genitals. They both have the same goal in mind, the death of the innocent third party. In this case, the coerced party is also doing something that would ordinarily be a crime.
Case 2: State and Subject. The state collects its revenue by threatening the taxpayer with injury. The state also uses those funds to occasionally kill some innocent third parties. The taxpayer does not intend the death of of the innocent third party. The taxpayer is also not doing anything that would ordinarily be a crime (giving money to a criminal organization is not a crime).
The proof is simple. Victims have a right to retribution because their aggressor cannot coherently argue against proportional punishment because they’ve already demonstrated with their action that they think it is an acceptable interpersonal norm.
The examples you are inplicitly referencing in your question all have three parties: An aggressor (A), an aggressor/victim (B), and a victim (C).
What you are suggesting is that B be resolved of his crime toward C because of A’s crime towards B. What I am suggesting is that B be held responsible for his crime toward C, and A be held responsible for his crimes toward B and C. This is because I think that any objective definition of a crime/aggression can’t allow for discrimination on the basis of the present state of the criminal party. Also I think that the justification for retribution implies that B doesn’t get off the hook.
You can skip to the bold text at the end of this post for my main point.
Let’s say that two evil men loved to kidnap and waterboard women until the women drowned. They the same brutal routine each time:
The first man tied the woman down, ensured that she couldn’t escape, and poured water over her face. The scond man handed the first man buckets full of water and looked out for police. Once the woman had drowned, the first man would take away body while the second man would take away the buckets. After several dozen women had been tortured/killed this way, the two men finally were caught. Would you let the second man go free? What if you couldn’t tell which of the men was actually the second man? The second man is perfectly analogous to knowingly and voluntarily funding a torturous Nazi regime.
You also apply a double-standard when dealing with your Cases 1 and 2. You say in Case 2, the taxpayers don’t really want the government to tax, set prices, kill innocent people, but funds it knowing that’s exactly what the government does in order to avoid being killed. In Case 1, the example with the man who has a coercer hold a spinning chainsaw next to his genitals, you don’t give that man the same benefit of the doubt. You say that he wants to commit a crime! No, he doesn’t! He doesn’t want a chainsaw sawing through his genitals, and, just like the taxpayers, he gives in to avoid punishment.
What’s the kicker, though?
Your moral system would prosecute an individual in a crowd for ducking if there were a brick thrown at his/her head!
Again, like I said in an earlier post, I can’t prove anything to be cruel and ridiculous, but why would anyone subscribe to that system? As a side note, I absolutely love these kinds of discussions!
They’re not analogous. The understanding between the criminals in this case is clear. The buckets of water will only be used to drown victims. The second person is participating in the crime. Also, looking out for the police in this case is an active obstruction of justice and also criminal by itself.
In case 1, the coerced party is personally commiting a murder. In case 2, they are not personally commiting a murder. That’s the difference.
Don’t see how. You’re gonna have to explain that.
Yes. They are interesting and force us to reflect.
You could remove the “look-out” part and the analogy still stands. Just as the second man knows what the first man is doing, taxpayers know what the state is doing.
We’re going in circles, but that same logic can be applied to hiring a hitman, especially if that hitman is hired in creative ways.
If you duck, you are taking an action that will result in someone else’s rights being violated instead of yours. You’ve long been stating that such an action is immoral!
I should make this clear for any individuals entering this thread late: If someone is coerced (for example, being threatened by a spinning chainsaw held next to his/her genitals), any crimes the victim commits should be attributed to the original aggressor. Stephen Forde is arguing the opposite.
The same logic cannot be applied to hiring a hitman. If I were to employ someone to build me a house, I own the house just the same as if I build it myself. In this case his labour is a means for me to build a house. If he were to dispute that the house was mine, I would have to prove that we had a contract no matter how creatively I hired him. The hitman is a similar case. If he is hired and there exists an agreement (no matter how creatively this is arrived at), than the hitman’s employer is culpable.
Given coercion, in no way can the taxpayer be considered to have a contract with state agents. They are not culpable for ‘crimes of the state’ unless they form personal agreements through favours or bribery.
This implies that when someone homesteads standing room, they homestead along with it a positive obligation on me to remain where I am if there is a hazard which will harm that person if I move. But there are no positive obligations only negative ones. In short, I have every right to duck. If the scenario were slightly different and I had only the options of deflecting the crick towards them or allowing the brick to impact me, I would be obligated to let it hit me.
If you only examine the situations in terms of harm resulting from the choices made, than the situations are analogous. But if you take property rights into consideration, they are not.
Consider the following scenario. A and B are wandering together in the desert and B is out of water. A has only enough water to sustain one of them until they reach the next oasis. If B robs A of his water, his choice results in A’s death (case 3). If A voluntarily gives B his water, his choice results in his own death (case 4).
In both cases, the resulting harm is the same. If this is the only consideration in our theory of justice, we would have to say that either a crime was committed in both cases or in neither. In fact, many consequentialists think that the normal rules of law shouldn’t apply in ‘lifeboat’ situations. But if we are considering rights (necessarily property rights), they were violated in case 1 but not in case 2.
Everyone has the right to harm themselves. No one has the right to harm anyone else (involunarily).
Imagine this scenario: I really dislike Bob. I dislike him so much that I want to kill him. I happen to be an active trader in prediction markets. I start a new contract that says Bob will not die in the next month. I put tons of money into this contract and bid up the price knowing that someone will short the contract, kill Bob, and make lots of money off of the deal. In this case there is no agreement between me and the hitman and I have never even communicated with him. Should I be prosecuted for the murder of Bob?
Did the people who predicted Saddam Husein’s execution engage in overt aggression? How about the people who are currently trading on the death/capture of Osama bin Laden?
How is there no difference? There is only no difference if we are considering a particular harm caused by a particular action only. If we are considering private property only, ducking would not be an invasion and deflecting would be.