“Mises never claimed that values do not point at something outside the subject.”
And therefore he was mistaken to claim they are purely subjective. I’ve pointed out that Mises was a much better social theorist than “methodologist” before, and it is true here too – his condemnation of socialism clearly shows that he understood that value judgments are NOT “merely” personal, since he thought he was giving us good reasons not to make that choice!
“I’m still not clear how calling something cowardly can be anything more than an expression of one’s own value judgments”
Of course they are expressions of one’s value judgments. But certainly they are also something “more” than that, or they would not be even that! (Nothing whatsoever could be “nothing more” than an expression of a value judgment, since there is an evaluation of something as actually good or actually bad involved in a value judgment.)
“value judgments which can neither be verified nor refuted, and thus are of no use in questions of truth and falsity.”
Just so – practical reasoning is NOT about verification or refutation, and practical judgments are neither true nor false. This is the very point I keep trying to make in this thread. That does not mean such judgments can’t be judged as good or bad, and recognized as so intersubjectively, e.g., “You were an idiot to try to drive home drunk like that!” Judgments like deciding to drive home drunk can’t possibly be refuted or verified, since they aren’t truth claims, but actions.
PS – I’m gonna have to run folds. Good discussion – it’s helped me clarify some things I’ve been saying.