I think the debate is getting sidetracked. The question is not formulated in the proper way.
Does cost of inputs mean out puts are valuable? No. But that not the question. Neither is monopoly the question, although legalistic interpretations often confuse the question into: copyright holder has monopoly; it is violated; pay damages. There was a case where a company I know produced a good, but a couple years later a larger company applied to patent and patented the good. They don’t produce it; first company, however, lost lawsuit. Now nobody produces good. But this is miscarriage of justice. It is not that the knowledge wasn’t valuable: the first company sued the second company, to get back its right.
Let’s begin with a different perspective.
Common knowledge is not valuable. No one ever has to choose between a scarce object and a known formula, says Mises. But what about a formula that is not common knowledge?
Suppose A owns land, on which A own factory B. Suppose private provision of security. A has a formula that is not common knowledge. Assume C physically trespasses into B.
If A catches C in the act, B is punished. But what if A never catches C in the act, however, B physically trespasses into C repeatedly. Does B escape punishment? No. This is violation of property; private or public provision of security will see to C.Or A will see to C, whenever he meets C.
Now, assume there was a formula in A’s factory B, that is not common knowledge. C trespasses into B, then leaves, and reveals the formula.
A has lost something valuable.
In other words, if we privately or publicly don’t treat knowledge as property, then corporate spying is punished just as trespassing, when it, in fact, causes greater loss of wealth to A then trespassing of A’s property.
If I am threatened with a knife to reveal my business knowledge, does the knife-wielder go unpunished if he doesn’t, pardon the language, stick me?
We must follow Menger and Mises , in ascribing value to anything that is scarce. Anything valuable is property. Its just a mechanism for economic calculation. Property is a question of calculation given division of labour.
For instance, interest is result of time-preference. Temporal disposal of goods is valuable; it is property, but it is not a physical quantity. Bohm-Bawerk denied temporal disposal is valuable, however, Mises showed Menger was right.
If someone takes my computer for a time, then gives it back; and all this without permission, don’t I get interest for time I lost computer? Don’t I get damages? Is interest not physical, hence not property?
In conclusion, we are entering a variant of the debate for and against interest. Except instead of interest, we are talking about another not-physical but valuable thing: knowledge of physical quantities. As that was solved, so we should solve this. Mises’ and Hayek’s whole case for calculation rests, for instance, of value of knowledge of time and space. As there, so here.
After all, remember what Gossen, and then Bohm-Bawerk wrote, all people do control orderings of physical forces when they are producing goods. Is not knowledge of how to produce a good?