I think it would be nonsense to speak of such a thing. However, I think you have touched on a long-standing deficiency in our tools for analyzing social interactions, especially interactions that involve manipulation and the use of force. Economics ignores the problem by building a very high wall around its domain called “voluntary” so that it exclusively concerns itself with interactions to which both parties clearly wanted to be party and ignores all the hobgoblins involved in interacting with government (or being a government), criminals, and so on, as lying somewhere out there in the dark forests of “Coercionland”.
The reality is that even in a Utopian, stateless society composed of normal human beings, high-status individuals would possess privileges and advantages that low-status individuals would not. The good-looking jock will get his way more of the time in interactions with the goofy-looking nerd. If we were to look at a society composed of such individuals but without being able to see the human attributes that make them into “winners” and “losers” (their looks, mannerisms, family background and social networks, and so on) it would be very tempting to say that the winners must be using force or the threat of force against the losers. This has nothing to do with coercion and it’s not something that is fixed by prices, markets, rationality. It has everything to do with human nature - our tendency to assume that good-looking people are more trustworthy and ugly people are less trustworthy, and so on.
Nevertheless, nobody accepts such primitive attributes that signal social status as a rational justification or inculpation. In other words, if a good-looking man murders someone, he cannot say in a court of law, “But I have great genes!” and, vice-versa, if an ugly man is sued at court for something he didn’t do, it is irrelevant to say, “But he’s ugly, he must be guilty!” So, there’s a limit to how far these in-built primitive social inequalities distort the social fabric and law itself acts as a negative feedback on the whole problem.
However, the statist order systematizes winners and losers by designating special individuals as exempt from legal liability for their actions, right from the outset. The Prince cannot be sued by one of his subjects even if he bulldozes their home to expand his palace (think of the story of Naboth’s vineyard). So, these primitive attributes of human nature - the signals by which our ancestors recognized high-status and low-status individuals - have been systematized. And yet there is no reason to believe that these systematized privileges actually reflect any underlying reality about the status of the Prince or the nobility in general beyond the mere fact that the privileges continue to exist.
Part of the problem is the extremely thin market in law and also the absence of analytical tools by which to study law itself, and I mean law as a service, meta-law, not specifical legal cases. I believe what is needed is a theory of arbitrated exchange.
If Peter exchanges three apples for Paul’s orange and no guns, knives, blackmail or other extortion was a factor, then we can assume that Peter values an orange more than three apples and Paul values three apples more than an orange. But what if Peter accidentally dents Paul’s car? Who benefits from any particular outcome of this situation? Paul could get mad and murder Peter, for example, but that’s clearly a bad outcome because Paul’s car is still dented and Peter is now dead. Paul might have the satisfaction of having gotten revenge but unless he’d rather have the satisfaction of revenge than an undented car (not likely, otherwise, why had he not earlier made this exchange?) he’s worse off than if Peter were still alive and the car had somehow been restored to its undented state. Less extreme, Paul could demand that Peter pay him money. Peter remains alive in this scenario and, if the sum is large enough, Paul can get his dent fixed. The best situation from Peter’s point of view is for Paul to drop it and just live with the dented car. In this scenario, Paul is worse off by a dent and Peter is no better or worse off than he was before he dented Paul’s car.
Peter and Paul could hire an arbitrator to help them sort through the possibilities but an arbitrator who does not have guns, knives, blackmail or extortion of his own cannot impose his decisions on Peter and Paul. He is merely a facilitator of discussion and agreement. My theory of arbitrated exchange is this: if the arbitrator can succeed in producing an agreement which both Peter and Paul find satisfactory, then we can say that Peter and Paul are better off than they would have been without the arbitrated agreement. This is different from a regular economic exchange because it requires two parties rather than just one party. However, if both parties can agree, then they can together make a mutually beneficial exchange, that is, exchanging one conflict between themselves (“you dented my car, now I’m going to kill you!”) for another conflict that both parties prefer (“You dented my car, pay to have it fixed plus the cost of my alternate transportation!”)
Clayton -