I anticipate your response will have to do with legitimacy of property rights. To bring attention to an earlier question I posed:
“Let’s say a man spends half of his workday pickpocketing people; the other half he spends selling bananas at a fruit stand. The fruit stand was bought with money he got from pickpocketing people. Does this mean that if I buy bananas from the fruit stand that I am being coerced [as in forced to do something against my will]?”
Okay, so the government’s property is illegitimate. Does that mean its interactions with others are against their will?
Am I a slave for having to pay a public parking meeter?
If you accept that taxation is illegitimate theft, and conscription illegitimate, and a host of other gov action illegitimate aggressions, then if you enter a territory a government claims to “own” (illegitimately), that cannot legitimate any aggression against the foreigner, regardless of circumstances. Aggression is always wrong, regardless of circumstance.
“Aggression, for the purposes of the NAP, is defined as the initiation or threatening of violence against a person or legitimately owned property of another.”
By this definition of aggression, the only thing that could legitimate aggression against a person is if that person could be owned by another person or a government. Governments cannot own people, thus aggression is never legitimate.
If that doesn’t answer your question, please explain what action by government exactly you’re wonder whether it’s aggression or not.
No. You can buy government cheese, or fruit, without being coerced to do so. But that cheese has been bought with stolen money and is not rightfully the government’s to sell. Its sale to you therefore constitutes fraud on the part of the government. Now, if someone fraudulently sells you something, that could be considered indirect coercion–in the sense that they’re obtaining value from you by lying, causing you to complete a trade you wouldn’t complete if you knew all the facts. But since the chance of your property being taken from you by a court as purchase of stolen property or the like is zero, no one worries about that :\
To the extent that you are coerced by government, you are a slave, for that is how much gov makes your decisions for you. Taking into account all aspects of your life. Most of us in the US at least are about 50% slaves, as the government decides for us how to spend ~50% of our economic product.
Suggest you check out Ethics of Liberty by Rothbard.
I think you are missing his point, Anenome, but you are still answering his question and he is not connecting the idea. Let me try to clarify.
Correct me if I am wrong, QuisCustodiet, but what I am seeing your question as is this: If, say, a Brit wants to move to the US and become a citizen, the state may grant him this citizenship on the condition that he sign some agreement claiming that he will pay taxes, never speak out against the government, abide by traffic laws, etc.. Quis argues that in this singular, isolated case, we have an instance of “truly consensual government” because the Brit has signed an agreement with the state that in exchange for citizenship, he will do these things. It would be as if the Brit signed the constitution himself, thus binding himself to its laws. He is not bound by a social contract, but a legitimate one.
The problem with this, however, is what many have already pointed out; the state does not legitimately own the land that the Brit is moving to (i.e. The lands comprising The U.S.), so, prima facie we can see that this contract between the Brit and The U.S. state is null and void, and any obligations placed on the Brit no longer exist. Why? It would be like the situation pointed out above. If a gang of armed men came and ousted the landlord/owner of the apartment building, then any contracts you sign with them regarding the use of that building are illegitimate in the first place. They do not own the building so it does not follow that they can form contracts stipulating how that building is to be used.
If we ignore this point, however, then perhaps it could be argued that the Brit is not being coerced against if he signs this contract with the state, so long as the state gives back all of the property they stole from the property owners plus restitution, and for some strange reason a few people liked the state and let them keep their land. In this case, the state would legitimately own this property and could enforce this contract but only on these lands. However, in this case the state really ceases to be a state, but rather a voluntary co-op for certain members to cull benefits through, however meager they may end up being.
Oh, and even if we ignore the property argument I just made, I see another problem
Per Rothbards Libertarian Ethics, for a contract to be legitimate there must be a transfer of title. It does not appear that the Brit’s agreement with the U.S. state satisfies this requirement. If the Brit agrees to do X, Y, and Z, and in exchange the state grants citizenship, where is the title transfer? Citizenship is an idea, a concept, but it is not property. I suppose you could make the argument that citizenship implies a transfer of title to use the infrastructure of the state (i.e. rads, bridges, damns and other such “public goods and services”.
However, we are just pissing in the wind if we make the arguments because we really cannot ignore the property argument. Even this infrastructure really just represents the stolen property of the already citizens who funded it through stolen money (i.e. taxes).
Great. Your response was very helpful, Texas Trigger.
So would you say that the pickpocket selling me bananas at the fruit stand that he was able to establish with stolen money is subjecting me to involuntary servitude by insisting that I give him money for the bananas?
And am I being subjected to involuntary servitude for having to pay a public parking meter?
If these two questions can be answered in one response, I think it’ll be clear to me.
I think it would be non-aggressive force only if the tenant explicitly agreed to it beforehand - that is, if he explicitly gave the landlord the right to put him in a cage in the event that he didn’t comply with one or more of the rules. I don’t think the landlord had any prima facie right to do this, either by virtue of the tenant being on his property or for any other reason.
I would say that they are because I consider the state’s territorial control to be illegitimate. Again, it’s like someone invading an apartment complex, kicking out the legitimate landlord, and setting his own terms for new residents. The invader has no right to set any such terms IMO.
I disagree with this. I think agreements do create new rights between people. A rental agreement itself does that. Under such an agreement, the tenant acquires the right to use the landlord’s property (in certain ways and/or under certain conditions), which is a right he didn’t have beforehand. Likewise, the landlord could acquire the right to imprison the tenant (in certain ways and/or under certain conditions).
I think an individual can legitimately assign rights to others to do things to him, either under certain conditions or universally. However, I don’t think that’s something to be taken lightly.
You seem to be tacitly defining (redefining?) “aggression” as “the majority forcing laws on the minority”. But I think the minority forcing laws on the majority is equally aggressive and therefore wrong.
If someone stole something and then violently resisted someone else trying to take it from him, I’d say his violent resistance was illegitimate because his possession of the thing in question was illegitimate. That means I don’t think it’s wrong for anyone to take the stolen property away from him (which is the same as saying anyone has the right to do so).
Taking this a step further, and using your fruit-stand example, I’d say I’m under no obligation to pay you for the bananas I want from your fruit stand, because you stole the fruit stand to begin with. However, if I simply take the bananas from you, that doesn’t mean my possession of those bananas is legitimate. IMO it isn’t, because they’re already owned by someone else, namely the person who you stole the fruit stand from. So whether I pay you for the bananas or I just take them, I’m on the hook for giving them back or otherwise compensating you for them. However, if I did pay you for the bananas, then you owe me that money back (or an equivalent amount), because you had no right to obtain it.
I’ve seen you bring this question up a lot, but I don’t think you are being very clear. Here is where I need clarification. (1) Was the stolen money that was used to start the thief’s fruit stand stolen from you or some other person? (2) Are you claiming that not only the thief stole money to start the fruit stand, but he is now coercing you to buy his bananas at his fruit stand? (3) When you say “insisting that I give him money for the bananas”, do you mean that he stole money from you which he then used to start his fruit stand?
I’ll try to answer this anyway because I think I know what you’re asking. If a thief steals money from you, starts a banana stand, and sells bananas got by using your stolen money, he has aggressed against you for the thievery. In this instance, he has, in essence, subjected you to involuntary servitude in so far as you labored for that money (and by extension the scarce goods and services it can buy you) but now cannot reap the benefits of your labor to the degree he stole from you. If he stole $100 from you, and it takes you 10 hours to make that, the man has effectively made you his slave for 10 hours.
The man has also aggressed against any of the people who buy the bananas at his stand, because he has committed fraud. Just as was the case with the gang who ousted the owner of the apartment building, the thief has no legitimate right to make contracts regarding property that is not rightfully his (the bananas) and this includes a contract of exchange, implicit or explicit alike. When the thief sells these illegitimately earned bananas, he is now stealing from the buyer of the banana because he has taken money that they presumably earned legitimately and given them property that is yours to begin with. Thus, this property is not his and thus cannot be the purchaser’s either because the banana never ceased to be yours in the first place. Because the purchaser was lied to, having been under the impression that by giving their money to the thief they became the rightful owners of the banana, they have been the victims of fraud and theft, for if/when the theft is realized, they would have to return the banana to you, its rightful owner, and now they are in your shoes, left out to dry. They now take recourse with the thief who committed fraud, just as you took recourse with the thief for committing theft.
That depends. Is the parking meter privately enforced as a condition upon your parking in the owner’s parking space? If so, no.
If it is a public parking meter, I see where you are going. “You don’t have to park there” you might say. That may be true but, again, the public parking space is already illegitimately owned in the first place.
But lets ignore that. If public land is, in fact, owned by the public, i.e. you, i.e. the taxpayer, then you have every right to park here, because you helped pay for the parking space, at least in theory, but this is a whole other argument. Suffice it to say that the government wants it both ways: it denies the liability of owning land and the responsibility to pay for its upkeep, yet claims to have the right to control it, as evidenced by its placing a meter there. This meter is inconsequential really; it’s just salt in the already gaping wound.
I agree with both your def of coercion and your caveat to the various types, some of which are indeed ethical: involving justice, and the kinds which aren’t: aggression and fraud.
It was not meant to be exclusionary to other forms of state, only in the modern world we’re most concerned with democracy, and because it’s harder to understand on first glance why democracy is coercive whereas it’s fairly easy to understand why a kingship or any autocracy is coercive. Furthermore, democracy as a concept still has unearned prestige that the other forms do not. Many people would criticize, say, communism for its coercive actions without realizing democracies aren’t fundamentally different.
No. But it’s still true of democracies. So, you’d rather I used the broader language of ‘state’ rather than the specific form of ‘democracy’? I see. It’s a fair point. I’ll try to keep that in mind and incorporate it in the future.
At least in part of my comment I was specifically trying to show why democracies are innately coercive, and I’ll keep your comment in mind generally going forward.
I think the word ‘right’ is not the best word for such an arrangement and is likely to confuse the issue and people’s thinking on it. I think the proper term is ‘license.’ Unless the tenant has taken full ownership of the territory, he does not have a right to it. He has it licensed to him on certain terms and conditions by its rightful owner.
Well, we disagree there then I think. Can you give me an example? What comes to mind is questions of assissted suicide and considerations of power of attorney and making medical decisions for someone, acting as someone’s agent perhaps? I don’t think that literally involving a right transfer but sounds more like an agency relationship. The individual retains their right but delegates the choice, the decision, to another.
In a democracy it should be impossible in theory for the minority to force laws on the majority. We know they get around that in practice but nonetheless.
I’m not redefining aggression that way, only saying that forcing laws on the minority is one kind of aggression.
As for what I mean by laws, which I think you ask in the context of the last sentence, you’re right that that’s a bit of a weasel word the way I used it. I used it that way for easy comprehension, whereas in actual practice they wouldn’t be actual laws but simply self-disciplinary rules, malum prohibitum.
One example is a person deciding that he wants to live such that there’s no loud music after 10pm. So he adopts this rule, and freely groups together into neighborhoods that follow the same rule and only accept clients that accept the same rule. By this everyone can choose the lifestyle they want without the coercive use of force generally, where there is no victim, and without a need for legislatures or politicians.
That’s a bingo! Fraud – I believe that’s a new word in this thread. It seems so clear now. I see why my brain wasn’t connecting aggression with illegitimate property rights. Wow. Thanks to everyone for their patience on this.
Illegitimate property, thus no property rights, thus fraud in claiming property rights (which give the landlord the right to set the conditions he wants for living on his property), thus theft, thus coercion.
Aside from knowingly omitting the antecedents to the first point of illigetimate property, which I understand as Rothbard explains in Ethics of Liberty and were not discussed in this thread, am I missing anything there?
I agree with this. And it’s a good example of how looking at ethical questions through a propertarian lens can bring clarity to the issue. I think all ethical questions can be resolved with a propertarian rubric.
Awesome I think of fraud as indirect coercion and thus a form of aggression. It is coercion by trickery rather than coercion by threat of force. In either case, property is obtained from a mark illegitimately and against their will. Against the will of the guy who trades property to the thief on threat of harm, and against the will of the guy who trades property to the thief because the thief created false pretenses which, if the truth were known, the mark would not trade that property to the thief.
I would have to concur with Anenome’s position. I haven’t given this much thought as I’d like, but I think either party should be able to cancel a contract. There could be damages, but normally for rental contracts, money renumeration or eviction would be the remedy.
Locking up someone in a cage for violating a rental agreement seems somewhat excessive, and beyond the typical bounds of what one would normally expect from a landlord.
That said, I like what Autolykos says most of time, and can agree with his other points.
It sounds to me like you’re defining “right” to be synonymous with your definition of “ownership”. Is that accurate?
I think rights are fundamentally about coercion (which I define as “the use or threat of force”). If a person says he has a right to do something, I take that to mean he’s willing to employ any amount of coercion necessary in order to do it.
With that in mind, if I rent something, I take that to mean I acquire the right to use it, at least in one or more certain ways and for a certain period of time. And that means I’m willing to employ any amount of coercion necessary in order to use it. That includes the owner(s) of the rental property - I don’t think they have the right to violate the rental agreement they established with me. If nothing in the rental agreement stipulates that the owner(s) can change their mind at any time about allowing me to use the rental property, then to me that means my right to use it never supersedes theirs. Does that make sense?
I think assisted suicide is a good example. Here’s how I see it working out in a voluntaryist society: A contracts with B such that B is now obligated to kill A in a certain way and within a certain timeframe, etc. For B to be obligated to do this, he must first have the right to do it, which I think can only be granted to him by A or someone who A has appointed as his legal agent (this is where power of attorney comes in). Also, I’d only consider B to be obligated to kill A, as opposed to simply having the right to do so, if there’s a penalty stipulated against B for non-performance of the terms of the contract. Having the right to do something doesn’t mean one must do it, either within a certain period of time or at all. An obligation is then a relationship where one person (the obligee) has the right to do something to the other person (the obligor) once the latter does something to the former.
With this in mind, I think it’s important to note that granting away rights that one is considered to possess inherently is very dangerous. For example, let’s say that I make this contract with you: “I hereby grant to Anenome the right to kill me.” I would interpret such a right as broadly as possible, which means you have the right to kill me at any time and in any manner you want. It doesn’t have to be right away, and it doesn’t have to be quick. That’s why I think one should be very careful about which rights he signs away.
QuisCustodiet originally asked if any action the state takes is necessarily coercive. In your reply to him, you replaced “the state” with “democracy”. That seems like a sleight of hand to me, which is why I brought it up. You know as well as I do that 1) democracy is only one kind of state, and 2) QuisCustodiet was asking a question about the state in general - that is, about all kinds of state. So I’m baffled as to why you’d apparently act as though he were asking only about democracy.
Now I notice that, in your earlier response to me, you said, “Listen, in a society where there is no aggression, the state nor anyone else could not even force any laws on you.” It baffles me that you seem to define “state” as something that could even exist in a society where there is no aggression. Just what definition of “state” are you using here? Whatever it is, it seems to be quite different from the one used by both QuisCustodiet and myself.
If you say they wouldn’t be actual laws, why do you call them “laws” at all? You say you used it that way for easy comprehension, but you also admit that it’s “a bit of a weasel word”. Aren’t weasel words intended to suppress accurate comprehension in favor of inaccurate or illusory comprehension? Basically I think such weasely word usage only does everyone a disservice, and I recommend that you abandon such usage in the future.
If two parties want to contract with one another, and neither of them wants to have the right to cancel it, would you coerce them into doing otherwise?
I certainly and wholeheartedly agree that it would be excessive. But that’s not my point. There are plenty of things that people voluntarily do to/with one another that I think are excessive, or otherwise wouldn’t want to be a part of myself, but I’m willing to live and let live.
In the sense that all rights are property rights, I can kinda agree with you on that.
Coercion is just the other side of the coin of property. Because it’s your property you have a right to act however regarding that property without anyone being able to legitimately use force to interfere.
Sure, but that doesn’t work as well for the human body because it contains decision-making agency and cannot be treated as pure property, evne by onesself. The same reason that invalidates slavery contracts makes alienating one’s own rights impossible. Thus, agency is possible but selling or giving away an actual right may not be.
I just don’t think you can conflate reasoning about humans and property like that.
Well, I think that’s an extreme view of what one can do with rights. Just as a slavery contract is no such thing while it’s voluntary and unenforceable at the point that it is no longer voluntary, I’d consider a kill contract such as you describe not to be murder as long as it remains voluntary and to be murder when consent is withdrawn, even during the course of the contract.
Most states are democracies… Point taken but I think it’s splitting hairs a bit. Democracy is the primary effector, or at least legitimizer, of state action in the world today.
The vast majority of states today are democracies, and you’re baffled? Point taken about states in general, and I’ll try to keep that in mind, but I was making a point about democracies that are peculiar to democracies. People understand easily why monarchies and autocratic regimes are aggressive, but somehow democracies have this veneer of legitimacy. Democracy exclusively has unearned prestige, people still generally think it’s a moral concept, and I’ll attack it every chance I get until that prestige is gone.
If we start a libertarian free society tomorrow, do all the other states in the world disappear. This is merely the least charitable reading possible. You should at least ask for clarification in such a case before jumping to a contradictory conclusion like that I would condone a state existing within a free society, two things which cannot happen.
No, it’s not. I was contrasting current state aggression against immigrants with who has the right to aggress against anyone in a free society, ie: no one, which is why the word ‘state’ is in the reply.
Because there doesn’t seem to be a right word for them right now, as with many ideas on the liminal edge. To the individual accepting them, they would have force of law, for one would accept punishments based on what one accepts. However we think of laws as generally applicable in a region and this concept is for laws that are only singularly applicable to one person.
Well, I’ll try. To not use that word would’ve meant going into more depth, which is not always appropriate, and that word is fairly correct, in fact there’s no actual perfect word for that concept as I said before. Maybe I’ll look up the Irish word for ‘law’ and use that in keeping with the Tuatha terminology. That will serve as a signal that it’s a newish concept.
I think of fraud as indirect coercion and thus a form of aggression. It is coercion by trickery rather than coercion by threat of force. In either case, property is obtained from a mark illegitimately and against their will. Against the will of the guy who trades property to the thief on threat of harm, and against the will of the guy who trades property to the thief because the thief created false pretenses which, if the truth were known, the mark would not trade that property to the thief.