libertarian position on clones

[Juan]

Wasn’t Ethics of Liberty Rothbard’s attempt to justify or formulate libertarian ethics on praxeological grounds?

Well, if you take a look at the introduction he says that the case for liberty can’t be made on purely ‘praxeological’, utilitarian, and value-free grounds.

The sequel to that work, Power and Market (1970), carried the analysis of Man, Economy, and State further in several ways: (a) a systematic analysis of the types of government intervention in the economy…

…(c) a praxeological and therefore still value-free critique was conducted of the lack of meaningfulness and consistency of various types of ethical attacks on the free market. The latter section moved from pure economics to ethical criticism, but it remained within the bounds of value-freedom, and thus did not attempt a positive ethical theory of individual liberty. Yet, I was conscious that the latter task needed almost desperately to be done, for, as will be seen further in this work, I at no time believed that value-free analysis or economics or utilitarianism (the standard social philosophy of economists) can ever suffice to establish the case for liberty. Economics can help supply much of the data for a libertarian position, but it cannot establish that political philosophy itself. Political judgments are necessarily value judgments, political philosophy is therefore necessarily ethical, and hence a positive ethical system must be set forth to establish the case for individual liberty.

[wilderness]

@abskebabs

I guess it’s just that a lot of this stuff is epistemologically fuzzy, even though I agree with it in the sense that it is inescapable. Maybe it’s the ghost of the old positivist I used to be clawing back at me.

Who’s epistemology isn’t fuzzy? I don’t know when learning will ever stop.

@abskebabs

For example, we may deduce we act, since we any attempt to demonstrate we do not is a performative contradiction. Then upon reflection we may argue the scale and universality of what may be considered Human Action. Mises does this in HA. Then, accepting this as a general principle in accord with the laws of logic in the sense it is already implied whenever we perceive others and interact with them, and analyse their actions, we may pragmatically extend the sphere in which our analysis is valid. But it still depends on these judgements what we consider human actors and the realm to which property rights are recognised. For instance, blacks in the past were not considered humans by European colonisers, and hence not granted the same rights. The changes to this were made ideologically, and we may perceive or guess that similiar considerations may occur should we encounter aliens or perhaps machine sentients; that is if the rules of logic and action would be universal to such “creatures.” At the moment this is metaphysical speculation.

I don’t know what you’re trying to say. Sure we can learn logic and extend logic to however far and then consider, or theorize about a number of different things. That’s what some people do and those that do, if such knowledge diffuses out into civil society, then society in general gets racheted out of a state of ignorance. Thus, the individual may learn, but also a society which is full of individual minds may learn too. Isn’t this how life is for humans? Or are you trying to say something else?

@abskebabs

My point I guess, is that beyond the aprioristic notion of how action and its rules for us can be deduced for ourselves for our own actions and thoughts of action; the epistemological grounds on which these principles can be applied in a more general sense rests on empirical considerations of understanding for lack of a better word.

yes. that is being rational.

@abskebabs

it doesn’t seem to me, or at least by the responses to question 3 that a clear cut distinction can be made, between an actor in a human sense and that which may be considered property apart from that which may be considered the already existing social norms. You can contrast this with definite stages in biological development etc, with puberty, menopause etc.

I’ll have to see what question 3 is before i make a comment here.

[z1235]

@abskebabs

the epistemological grounds on which these principles can be applied in a more general sense rests on empirical considerations of understanding for lack of a better word.

You may find this essay (thread about it here ) helpful. It was for me.

Z.

[wilderness]

@abskebabs

Does it conform with libertarian ethics to take a stem cell that has the potentiality to become a full human being, but to perturb its development hormonally such that it only becomes a liver let’s say?

I don’t know enough about stem cells. If they are zygotes, as that one recent thread heavily discussed, then I would say they are potentially human and therefore have the intellect in potential - to know what rights are. They have the intellect in potential as any other human being does - to know what rights are.

The one current way I would be open to in understanding this better, thereby the knowledge of (so therefore this isn’t about logic, it is about what is known, the episteme), could it be said that the ‘gene of intellect’ is no different than the intellect itself, simply that the intellect is in a developmental stage, when a gene, can be made distint from ‘an intellect that is in potential to learn rights’. Two things that I would need distinctions on. Is there a difference in potential between ‘gene of intellect’ and ‘potential of intellectual grasping’? Because the gene of intellect is self-evidently in potential of intellectual grasping, but would there be another absolute distinct stage of the intellect that is somehow in a differing state of potential to know rights. The whole point of being able to know rights is to be able to follow them. A deer can’t follow them so there is no point in deer adhering to human rights. Rights are something humans can know and thereby have the foresight to adhere to them because this 1) provides the ability to even know why, ie. without negative rights being adhered to no humans could ever discover the reason to adhere to rights in the first place cause we’d all be killing each other off. 2) And since to know rights involves coming to conclusions about rights by an individual that has thought of something about rights that no other person has taught him or her; and also, rights involve being taught, attaining ‘the how to think what rights are’ tools or sometimes rights are simply directly taught from one person to another person. Rights, thereby, are known by creatures that can know about the world in general. Creatures that can do philosophy, which might be simple philosophy that entails knowing that when somebody kills another person it makes them feel not good. Their mind can identify that feeling with that event. Thus humans can reason what happens in their gut or in their head, etc… and come to understand what it means. And since people can know what these things, rights, mean, and the benefits of realizing, but importantly communicating and having the foresight ahead of time of what rights are, thus, preparing the youth to know that going in the neighbors yard will make them mad, so, don’t do it. The truth of that ‘don’t do it’ can be known, so thereby people don’t get fooled into performing actions that lead to bad things, but lead to good things instead. etc, etc…

So I currently don’t see stem cell cultivating as adhering to property rights, but I am still open to new knowledge, that I have not yet seen in this forum, as to a difference in the potential of anybody, young or old, in knowing what rights are. If some kind of difference can be logically explained, then I’m all for it, but it would need to be a distinct classification.

[abskebabs]

@wilderness

@abskebabs

My point I guess, is that beyond the aprioristic notion of how action and its rules for us can be deduced for ourselves for our own actions and thoughts of action; the epistemological grounds on which these principles can be applied in a more general sense rests on empirical considerations of understanding for lack of a better word.

yes. that is being rational.

I don’t think I phrased myself clearly enough, what I meant was that I did not deem it entirely trivial a step when we generalise the notion of purposeful action to apply to other people’s actions, and though we implicitly ackowledge these elements when dealing with other people in our lives and also when making scientific arguments, appealing to the universal character of logic; there is no way to straightforwardly “prove” this. I remember clearly on this point, a girl in class at Mises University asked David Gordon how we could know anybody else was acting. He responded “Who’s asking?”[:P]

Also, with your above post on genes, I see things differently in that regard. A gene on its own, despite the fact it is a necessary component to produce a human, by itself produces no such potentiality, and is not strictly a living thing but a complicated molecule. Hence there is no dilemma about rights in that case, and with these types of things I think it does depend on whether the cell on its own could at all develop into a human being and in the state it was in when it was removed or manipulated.

z1235, thanks for the link.

[wilderness]

@abskebabs

He responded “Who’s asking?”

Well, who was asking? That can be answered honestly.

@abskebabs

…with your above post on genes, I see things differently in that regard. A gene on its own, despite the fact it is a necessary component to produce a human, by itself produces no such potentiality,

A gene is not divisible to a lower individual. Stephen Gould is one reference on ‘organism’ being the lowest common denominator in a species as he exhaustively wrote about this in “The Structure of Evolutionary Theory”. If I remember correctly, he also makes the argument that evoluntionary speaking, species is the lowest common denominator. I am not a biologist, but I have read this book and it’s coverage of this topic is way beyond my repeating here unless I source it, quote it, etc… and I’m currently not going to. But at least it shows that there is either a debate on this no more or there is a strong debate that the individual organism can’t be reduced any more or else all it’s parts would simply not exist anymore. To abstractly think that a cell is an individual separate from the organism is false. The organism exists due to it’s parts, but an organism doesn’t necessarily exist due to the parts of a species.

@abskebabs

…and is not strictly a living thing but a complicated molecule. Hence there is no dilemma about rights in that case, and with these types of things I think it does depend on whether the cell on its own could at all develop into a human being and in the state it was in when it was removed or manipulated.

DNA has an identity. Decades ago it would have been easy to say one gene or DNA couldn’t be known from the next gene. I say DNA here in reference to the organism having its identity known through the DNA. So they could have potentially be acknowledged as being barren material ready for homesteading. But DNA is already demarcated and identifable. DNA/a zygote has the identity that can be named and demarcated as a complete organism different from other individuals. A human zygote is can know rights. A tree zygote will not. And to state a zygote is to identify a person that is a continuum. This person will have the same DNA from zygote to 90 years old. They are always a human with an identity that is clearly that particular person and no other person. The stages of human development are not chopped up into separate identites of people in some kind of schizophrenic change of identity from stage to stage. No. The stages are are continual of the same person, a person simply upon different stages of growth and becoming.