That these moral urges are the results of an inherent tendency is what makes them natural in the Aristotelean sense. Therefore, the rights conferred in response to these urges in the minds of the people who feel these urges ar****e natural rights.
It is “binding” to those who heed the natural moral urges. It is not effectively binding to those who do not. When A says B ought not to brutalize C, of course it’s a subjective statement. Morality, like all values, arises subjectively, but can be objectively observed. The statement, “B is evil” of course is not true on a universal materialist level. He is not “evil” to a banana slug or to a lump of coal or to you. Natural rights are indeed subjective; that does not make them unnatural, non-rights, or unreal.
So, if you saw a man brutalizing a young girl in an alley, you would not think that was wrong?
Okay, then, go promote your egoist libertarianism among the Aspberger’s set, and stop claiming that the rest of us are irrational for having natural moral urges.
…among Aspberger’s sufferers. I am completely aware and completely comfortable with my grounding morality in the emotions. David Hume, to my mind, proved that morality can only have its ultimate source in primary passions, and not in reason…
“This is the second part of our argument; and if it can be made evident, we may conclude, that morality is not an object of reason. But can there be any difficulty in proving, that vice and virtue are not matters of fact, whose existence we can infer by reason? Take any action allow’d to be vicious: Wilful murder, for instance. Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call vice. In which-ever way you take it, you find only certain passions, motives, volitions and thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the case. The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. You never can find it, till you turn your reflection into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action. Here is a matter of fact; but `tis the object of feeling, not of reason. It lies in yourself, not in the object. So that when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it.”
That morality is grounded in emotion does not make it any less important, real, or natural. That is because we humans have an inborn tendency toward certain common moral urges. So I with my natural moral urges can talk meaningfully to another human who, by virtue of being human (and not having Aspberger’s), has similar urges. That is what people without neurological disorders do when they talk to each other about natural rights.