Mises ill-definition of Natural Law, why?

Lilburne,

No. We haven’t even gotten to any deductions yet. Again (1) you don’t know what deductions mean (2) don’t know what axioms mean (3) are simply avoiding this on purpose. I am using “Intro. to Logic” books. This is all very basic 101 logic. That quote isn’t even close to discussing what an ‘axiom’ is. All Rothbard would be saying in that quote is Hoppe by using axioms then uses a deductive method to come to certain conclusions. But Hoppe’s argumentation ethics starts with the axioms that are pre-supposed by each person in the argument before any deduction need be even made. Plenty of literature on this at the Mises Institute.

I do not think that Hume and Mises are irreconcilable, of which I tried to lay the groundwork in one of my recent threads.

For maybe nearly a year Lilburne has attacked life, liberty, and private property in this forum. People have left and some people Lilburne has banned because they all saw the same thing!!

Lilburne may have not done this on purpose. I’m not saying he did. But this is exactly what some of those people thought.

I have never banned anyone for ideological reasons. If that were my modus operandi, how do you explain my deliberately letting you, the most vocal proponent of natural rights here, back into the forums when I absolutely didn’t have to?

I still want the answer to this:

Mises’s writings are peppered with glowing statements about Hume’s work. It was Rothbard who had such a problem with Hume.

I know. I want to make this very clear. YOU ARE RIGHT. I am not saying you did.

I said ‘that’s what they thought you were doing’. I have thought that’s what you are doing. All natural law theorists that I know of have been thinking you are philosophically attacking ‘life, liberty, and private property’. It’s why they became so feverish, agitated, and down-right ‘mad as hell’.

Do you get it now? This is EXACTLY what is going on in the forum with everybody confronting you that are natural law theorists. We are trying to protect life, liberty, and private property and you have been perceived as a threat to the very life, liberty, and private property of some people. This is the truth.

Lilburne,

Not only Rothbard but Kant, Karl Popper, (possibly Feynman too), and many, many others have a problem with Hume’s skeptisism. It would mean the end to science if Hume’s way was fully followed.

Does Mises ever understand natural law in the Aristotle-Thomist tradition?

He probably didn’t understand the Dharmic process either. And he’s no worse for it. Mystical clap-trap, the lot of it.

Hume’s skepticism is irrelevant to the problem of morality. The problem with morality is that it is logically incoherent or meaningless.

Only individual values exist, and they only exist in relation to actual ideas about satisfaction individuals have. There is no ‘good’ or ‘bad’, there is no ‘irrational’ action. There is nothing in this world of purposeful action but power, will and logic and normatives have no place in any of these. They are nothing but a biological trick, evolutionarily generated delusions.

Hume did not advocate that we should not use induction. Mises echoed this plenty of times:

I. Ryan,

I answered that here.

What is your opinion of godel’s incompleteness in relation to this discussion, that any axiomatic system by definition must be either inconsistent and incomplete. Further that since we value consistency we are doomed to incompleteness, that is to say that there will always be things that are true given our axioms, but are unprovable. I think there might be some connection to that and the trouble that gets stirred up in these discussions.

Liberte,

If Mises or you don’t understand something, then neither Mises nor you wouldn’t really know if it was “Mystical clap-trap”. Both Mises and you are an invalid sources.

I answered that here:

twisted,

Godel’s Incompleteness theorem only applies to mathematics. Not axioms of human nature which are certain.

It’s perfectly possible to understand something is mystical when it is premised on the impossible. Such as moral imperatives.

I don’t have to study the doctrines of Islam to know it is supernatural nonsense. Because it posits impossible entities.

I have heard that, that it wouldn’t apply to our constitution for example. But does his proof necessitate simple math to be covered by your axioms?

No, it’s only a very vocal handful who, like you, come off the rails when natural law doctrine is questioned. Most are like nirgraham and are very capable of debating these matters without becoming “feverish, agitated, and down-right ‘mad as hell’”.

Despite all your twisting of Mises’ writings, my position on natural rights doctrine is the same as that of Ludwig von Mises. Here on the Ludwig von Mises Community Forums I would ask that you drop the intolerant, inquisitorial tone regarding my position.

That’s what Mises says, not Hume.

Source:

“The Friesian theories of deduction and of non-intuitive immediate knowledge make it possible to preserve the advances of Hume and Kant without falling back into Rationalism or heading for the Nihilism (so different from Hume’s Skepticism), relativism, scientism, pragmatism, etc., so conspicuous in the 20th century. Later, Karl Popper proposed a special solution for the Problem in that science, by using falsification, does not need to worry about a positive justification of First Principles at all. This enables scientific progress to heedlessly continue, as it has, regardless of the status of any philosophical solution.”

Hume philosophically attacked “First Principles” (axioms). Kant rebutted him. And that’s been the debate but to what extent it is still on-going I don’t know. Here’s Barry Smith in which I find his position on this favorable:

"There are, familiarly, a range of distinct and competing accounts of the methodological underpinnings of Menger’s work. These include Leibnizian, Kantian, Millian, and even Popperian readings; but they include also readings of an Aristotelian sort, and I have myself made a number of contributions in clarification and defence of the latter. Not only, I have argued, does the historical situation in which Menger found himself point to the inevitability of the Aristotelian reading; this reading fits also very naturally to the text of Menger’s works.

Indeed, great difficulties may be set in the way of our attaining knowledge of essential structures of certain sorts, and of our transforming such knowledge into the organized form of a strict theory. Above all we may (as Hume showed) mistakenly suppose that we have grasped a law or structure for psychological reasons of habit. Our knowledge of structures or laws can nevertheless be exact. For the quality of exactness or strict universality is skew to that of infallibility. Episteme may be ruled out in certain circumstances, but true doxa (which is to say, `orthodoxy’) may be nonetheless available."

Where did Hume advocate that we should not use induction, despite its expediency?