I think there is something important being overlooked in the systems of thought of Hume, Mises, and other important thinkers who tend to be disparaged by the the objectivist school (objectivist school here conceived broadly as the school of thought that makes a critique of theoretical subjectivism the basis or centerpiece of its theory of man, and even of nature).
When a proposition or assertion is formulated to the effect that “it is impossible to do X,” it is easy to overlook the fact that a law (of action, or of nature) is being positively asserted.
We tend to look at assertions or propositions of this kind only with respect to their “prohibitionary” affront to our previously held belief(s) that doing X is or was, in principle, possible. When we are confronted with the proposition that doing X is, in principle, impossible, we are prone to consider it as an unjust restriction on our liberties, or as a moral proscription, rather than considering the possibility that what is asserted amounts to a positive law of action or nature.
This is how socialists reacted to the economist’s assertions that socialism wouldn’t work. They refused to see in this, reference to any law(s) of human action, but instead considered the economist’s assertions as unjust restrictions on their plans for arranging society according to their hopes.
The general proposition that socialism is impossible can be reformulated as the positive assertion that, if socialism is tried, XYZ must necessarily happen. What is being asserted by the “prohibitionary” proposition, and what is interpreted by its opponents as an unjust restriction on their hopes and plans, is an assertion of a law of action or of nature.
And this is what is being overlooked in the objectivist’s monolithic attempt to overcome the Humean and Misesian sytems of thought. What are being disparaged by objectivists as mean-spirited prohibitions and proscriptions, are the laws of action and of nature asserted by theoretical subjectivists.
Since Feynman’s name has come up recently, I will use a passage from Feynman to illustrate. Writing about Heisenberg, Feynman phrased things in the following way:
"Heisenberg noticed, when he discovered the laws of quantum mechanics, that the new laws of nature that he had discovered could only be consistent if there were some basic limitation to our experimental abilities that had not been previously recognized…Heisenberg proposed his uncertainty principle which, stated…‘It is impossible to design any apparatus whatsoever to determine through which hole the electron passes that will not at the same time disturb the electron enough to destroy the interference pattern.’ " (The Character of Physical Law, p.143)(emphasis added)
The key parts of this passage of Feynman are:
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He states that Heisenberg discovered the laws of quantum mechanics.
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As we see, Feynman states Heisenberg’s discovered laws in terms of a “basic limitation” and an “impossibility.” I.e., the law is described in terms of a limitation or “prohibition” on something that people previously believed, in principle, it was possible to do.
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We can also see that the law Feynman is discussing can easily be formulated in terms of a positive assertion as opposed to a negative limitation or prohibition, such as: If an apparatus is built such that it is possible to determine through which hole the electron passes, then the interference pattern must necessarily be destroyed."
So here we have the three elements I was mentioning before in the context of Hume and Mises. We have, 1. the assertion of a law, 2. phrased in terms of a prohibition, restriction, or limitation on what was previously believed to be an achievable end, and 3. this law is also formulable in positive terms.
New laws of action or nature, when first discovered, imply that the plans, goals, or hopes of various individuals, are, in principle, unrealizable, or that the attempt to realize those plans will have different results than believed.
This is why Mises writes in the opening pages of Human Action:
“But all were fully convinced that there was in the course of social events no such regularity and invariance of phenomena as had already been found in the operation of human reasoning and in the sequence of natural phenomena. They did not search for the laws of social cooperation because they thought man could organize society as he pleased. If social conditions did not fulfill the wishes of the reformers, if their utopias proved unrealizable, the fault was seen in the moral failure of man. Social problems were considered ethical problems. What was needed in order to construct the ideal society, they thought, were good princes and virtuous citizens. With righteous men any utopia might be realized.”
What Mises is saying in these opening pages of Human Action is that the discovery of necessary laws in the realm of societal organization implied a restriction, limitation, or “prohibition” on the plans and designs of some who believed that no laws of human action prevented their plans from being realized. The theoretical struggle over economics and praxeology is a struggle on the part of some to overcome the laws of action asserted by praxeology and economics. The laws of action, if valid, limit achievable ends, or, show how particular means cannot attain the posited ends. This constitutes to the opponents of such laws, an implied constraint on what they had previously believed was possible. It tells them that their plans are not realizable, or, the attempt to realize them won’t bring about the desired result.
Regardless of the reasons why, it seems that both in the realm of nature and in the realm of human action, resistance to the constraining, confining, or limiting quality of laws of nature and of human action, comes to be identified as the approach of “objectivism.”
This is the case with Heisenberg and quantum physics as it is with Hume and necessity and with Mises and socialism. As conveyed by Heisenberg:
“However, all the opponents of the Copenhagen interpretation do agree on one point. It would, in their view, be desirable to return to the reality concept of classical physics or, to use a more general philosophic term, to the ontology of materialism. They would prefer to come back to the idea of an objective real world whose smallest parts exist objectively in the same sense as stones or trees exist, independently of whether or not we observe them…This__, however, is impossible or at least not entirely possible because of the nature of the atomic phenomena, as has been discussed in some of the earlier chapters. It cannot be our task to formulate wishes as to how the atomic phenomena should be; our task can only be to understand them.” (Physics and Philosophy, p.129)(emphasis added)
Here, Heisenberg clearly identifies resistance to the implications of quantum theory with the objectivist school of thought, the general theoretical approach that seeks to conceive of physical and social objects as existing independently of perceiving subjects. Heisenberg also mentions that his theoretical opponents seem to be concerned with what atomic phenomena “should” or “ought” be.
As Heisenberg sees things, resistance to the limiting implications of the laws of quantum mechanics is associated with theoretical objectivism.
The two points are, 1. that the newly asserted law of nature or of action implies a limitation on what was previously believed or hoped was possible, and, 2. resistance to the implications of the newly discovered law seems to be associated with what we identify as theoretical objectivism.
With regard to Hume, I believe the same situation exists.
The the problem of the is-ought gap is attributed to Hume, and has been referred to as “Hume’s Law.” (see Patrick M. O’Neil: http://mises.org/journals/jls/7_1/7_1_4.pdf ) This alone makes Hume one of the most influential and important thinkers in the history of the moral sciences (science of human action). One could argue that all ethics theory goes through Hume. But there is another law of Hume which may go unrecognized. As W. T. Jones explained:
“What are the logical grounds for men’s belief in the uniformity of nature?..Before Hume, the usual answer to this question was in terms of “causal necessity”: Everyone agreed that every event that occurs has some cause that necessarily produces it. The new scientific method rested on this belief, and the success of the method seemed to substantiate the belief. Accordingly, Hume set himself to examine the notion that a necessary connection can exist between two events, a connection such that if one of the events occurs, the other must inevitably also occur.” (A History of Western Philosophy, vol. III, Hobbes to Hume, p.315)
I’m not a historian of philosophy, so I can’t say whether Hume is the sole philosopher responsible for the law which holds that it is impossible to demonstrate a necessary connection between two events. I have previously referred to this notion as “Hume’s Law,” believing it to be just as important as the “is-ought” gap.
The important points are that these two notions proposed by Hume can be conceived as laws of human action. Both claim essentially that it will be impossible for us as theorists to do something which we previously may have believed it was possible to do (in one instance, derive an ought from an is, and in the other instance, demonstrate a necessary connection between two events). Both these notions express the idea that, while we previously believed it was possible to achieve X end, achieving X end is not possible. These two laws of Hume express a limitation or “prohibition” on ends it was widely believed were achievable.
Given what I wrote above, it should also be possible to formulate both laws as in positive terms. Here, I’ll sketch one suggestion for each:
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If the attempt is made to derive an ought from an is, a reference must be made to a wanting or desiring subject who “wants” or “desires” the thing that “ought to be” or “ought to happen.”
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If the attempt is made to demonstrate a necessary connection between two events, reference must be made to a power or substance which is not observable. (the idea here is that an arbitrary, “subjective” substance would have to be supposed)
(I’m not claiming these are final or rigorous formulations. I’m sketching them for illustrative purposes to show that Hume’s limiting or prohibitionary laws may be expressed in positive form, just as physical laws and praxeological economic laws)
The main point here is to demonstrate that what Hume has essentially done is to uncover laws of human action. These are laws that demonstrate that when the attempt is made to do X, the result will not be Y as had been previously assumed or believed, but instead Z.
In other words, Hume’s laws, which are generally conceived as prohibitions stating that “you cannot do X,” may be more correctly and more importantly conceived as laws of action stating that “if you attempt X, Z must necessarily happen, and not X.”
I think all sides to the debate can agree that Hume’s laws restrict the realm of what was previously believed possible, and that in modern times, the school of thought that is intent on overcoming the laws of action discovered or elaborated by Hume is the objectivist school of thought. This doesn’t seem controversial.
I would argue that, far from being the end of science, when the essential teachings of Hume and Mises are fully appreciated for what they are, we eventually come to see in their teachings not only prohibitions and limitations on our previous plans, hopes, and dreams, but also laws of human action. The things which Hume and Mises assert are impossible to do, are also, importantly, assertions of a necessary relationship between our attempt at something, and what must necessarily be the result of that attempt. These laws of human action, while constraining the realm of the possible, also give us control over our lives by showing us what must be the necessary result of various forms of action. We now know that if we do X, Z must be the result. We are thus empowered to either bring about Z by means of bringing about X, or avoid Z by means of avoiding X.
As Menger writes:
“The theoretical sciences are supposed to provide us with understanding of phenomena, a knowledge of them extending beyond immediate experience, and a certain ability to foresee them.”
By showing us not only what ends are not achievable, but what must be the result of our attempt to achieve various ends, both Hume and Mises provide us with knowledge extending beyond immediate experience and a certain ability to foresee the results of our actions.
Hume and Mises assert laws of human action. Laws of human action limit the realm of what was previously believed possible, and this implies that some of our plans are not realizable as we had previously thought. This has resulted in a theoretical struggle against the theories of Hume and Mises and associated thinkers waged by those who want to maintain or resurrect the possibility of their plans’ realizability (socialism, deriving an ought from an is, etc…)
Since the theories of Hume and Mises are theories of human action, and since action is a phenomenon that implies an acting subject, those that seek to overturn or overthrow Hume and Mises have felt that it was necessary to overcome or overthrow subjectivism—the idea that all social phenomena imply and refer to an acting subject and that subject’s wants and desires. These thinkers have felt it necessary to counter theoretical subjectivism with an opposed theory of objectivism—the idea that there exist standards of social conduct that are independent of individual subjects and those subject’s wants and desires.
As Heisenberg wrote:
“If one follows the great difficulty which even eminent scientists like Einstein had in understanding and accepting the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory, one can trace the roots of this difficulty to the Cartesian partition. This partition has penetrated deeply into the human mind during the three centuries following Descartes and it will take a long time for it to be replaced by a really different attitude toward the problem of reality.”
"The position to which the Cartesian partition has led with respect to the “res extensa” was what one may call metaphysical realism. The world, i.e., the extended things, “exist.”
(Physics and Philosophy, p.81)
What Rothbard and others have problems with is not Hume’s skepticism, but rather the fact that the laws discovered by Hume prevent their plans from being realized.