Murray Rothbard on abortion

Economics Political Theory
61

“Conza, Iv’e read about evictionism.”

Great. And that doesn’t necessairly mean you’ve read his journal article. Aye? Because if so, you would understand your concerns have already been more than adequately addressed by Walter Block in his journal article.

"they have an obligation not to kill him. If I pushed you of a cliff and you are grabed my leg and hanging on to dear life, I have an obligation not to step on your fingers or otherwise remove your grip."

Already been addressed in the video linked earlier. Lake example. If you watched it, you’d have known.

As I said.. go do some actual in depth reading on the subject matter, then this discussion might actually move beyond the basics.

62

OK, I will look, thanks.

63

If we’re to get into sentience, and the metaphysics of man, then I’m assuming that the sperm is the form, the egg is the matter and so with their union the human being exists.

And so the human soul -the life principle exists at that time too.

So it cannot be denied that killing a person, a zygote, is murder.

So except in cases where one must unintentionally and with proportionate reasons (perhaps for the mother’s survival ala ectopic pregnancy), cause the death of a fetus,to terminate even the zygote is wrong.

But does this say that the fetus can be murdered at certain times? Probably not but I’m not sure why. It certainly has to do with the fact that unavoidable consequences are unintended when performing life-saving surgery.

64

I’m not sure if this demonstrates a misunderstading of Metaphysics or biology. In either case, the sperm and cell are both matter, and the embyo is the form.

That really depends on how that person dies. If you are an invited guest in my home, and I stab you in the heart with a clothes hanger, yes, that’s murder. However, if I decide you’ve worn out your welcome, for whatever arbitrary reason, and simply ask you to leave, and escort you outside in the gentlest manner possible, and you die of exposure, no, that’s not murder.

65

Questions:

(1) why am I wrong about the matter/form distinction b/t sperm and egg and why is the zygote the form and the sperm & egg matter?

(2) I suppose you are correct that murder depends on how someone dies. But in this case I’d have to argue that if all men are brothers then one should at least take care that someone isn’t going to die of exposure. Same thing applies to abortion; if you think that the zygote is a person, and if you know that evicting it would kill it, then you shouldn’t evict but sometimes it is simply an indirect and unintended consequence of other things (like having to remove a part of a diseased uterus).

66

Our form is man; our matter is flesh. The form is house; the matter is bricks. No matter how you look at it, sperm is not the form of the matter egg. Rather, the zygote is the form of the matter sperm and egg.

As a further distinction, most of the time, form and matter will fit into this sentence:

It is [a[n]] form made out of [a[n]] matter.

Examples:

  • It is a man made out of flesh and blood.
  • It is a house made out of bricks.
  • It is a statue made out of gold.
  • It is a shirt made out of silk.

“It is a sperm cell made out of an egg,” just doesn’t fit.

I agree that one ought to take care of others, but I would argue that one ought not force someone to do so. I see the latter as the greater evil.

EDIT: Added some form/matter examples.

67

I don’t it so much as a biology problem. I think defining any biological threshold would be an ad hoc justification for doing whatever one wants do.

The process through which rationality emerges is not yet completely understood, but one thing is sure: it is gradient.

But the issue here is another one.

It is a moral problem. The considerations that govern actions are simpler than what constitutes a rational thought.

The problem is whether we wanna live in a society that endorse/allow the extermination of the unborn.

If not, we may be willing to incur in the costs of establishing legal mechanisms that create sanctions to such a behavior.

My point is that if we don’t want to hang on metaphysical especulation about counsciousness, we can accept that very no-nonsense fact that the consequences of sex are well known and that people that engage on it allow for a level risk.

The act of sex is what it is understood as the consequential decision affecting parental responsiblity, at least in most societies.

DNA evidence of fatherhood is enough to convince a judge that a man should pay child support.

And that’s it.

A fetus is a human being growing, that’s all we know, the rest is psycho-babble especulation.

And I don’t want to have mankind being defined by the folks in Planned Parenthood.

68

Conza,

First, thank you for showing I was wrong to claim a positive obligation by the parents.

Block makes what I see as a big mistake here:

At what point does human life begin?

There are really only two reasonable possibilities: at conception or at birth;

all other points of development in between are merely points along a continuum

which begins and ends with these two options

This in my view is a misunderstanding of the source of rights. Block refers to the concept of “life”, but whatever that definition scientifically means; it has no bearing on the question of rights. Animals are also alive, scientifically. Being a Hoppean I believe morality must be grounded in the argumentation axiom (and I completely reject a “right to life” approache), I see no justification to grant a fetus the categorical status of a moral agent. This in my view is not only wrong, but can be shown to lead to absurdity (quote below).

The argumentatively justified categorical distinction is not based on any physical event such as conception or birth, but rather on the symmetrical cognitive ability of the agent to respect the rights of others (implied in that, to resolve conflicts via discourse).

Over expanding the moral category of rights-entitled entities is the same as over narrowing it via slavery norms:

However, what about the removal of moral distinctions, that is, broadening the category of moral agents to include animals, for instance? It can be shown that this is not the removal of a moral categorical distinction, but in fact the introduction of one. It is because animals are cognitively “blind” to the notion of rights and the rights of others; they cannot then be logically held accountable for committing rights violations any more than a blind man can logically be punished for bumping into someone, after taking all possible precautions. Therefore, to claim that the rights of animals should be respected by man is not to claim that animals are equal to man, but rather that animals are superior to man. Man will be punished for spitting in the face of a lama, but the lama will not be punished for spitting at his*. (*Again, to argue the lama should be punished is a clear reductio ad-absurdum)

And so to claim a fetus is a moral agent at all seems to me highly unjustified.

69

Also I will quote this relevant paragraph:

I will also note that a child does not go from having no rights to being a full moral agent in an instant. As a baby grows older and develops some cognitive ability to respect the rights of others, he also gradually gains rights for himself. Once the child has shown he is able to fully respect the rights of others and maturely resolve disputes, he must be considered full moral agent, and has all the rights of a grownup himself.

70

“And so to claim a fetus is a moral agent at all seems to me highly unjustified”

The same should hold for small children.

Children cannot sustain moral arguments nor they are in a symetrical situation with respect to other agents, at least not before they learn to talk and reason.

They are not moral agents before they learn it. Before that everything is potential, and there is potential even in a fetus.

We all assume that child abuse of any sort is a crime, and a much more serious one than the abuse of non-human animals or even the abuse of adult humans.

So you either withdraw from allowing basic rights to babies and small children (Rothbard position seem to be just that) or you’ll have to establish some arbitrary threshold for responsibility.

What I say is that since any threshold will be necesseraly arbitrary, the prerrogative should be to preserve the rights whenever the individual is identifiable.

I see no libertarian principle being damaged by coercing people to assume the responsibilities for their actions when those are understood to bear a consequential effects over other people and to infringe their presumptive rights.

And I believe, as almost everyone, that children have the right to be taken care by their families.

71

I addressed this in the second quote. It’s not all or nothing, rights are gradualy aquired. Once you can say “no” (or express it) you have certain rights.

72

I agree that rights are gradually acquired. That’s common sense. You can’t drive a car if you’re 11 yr old.

Rights can also be temporalily suspended. You can’t drive under the influence even if you are 21.

The right not to be exterminated on the other hand seem to be more of an absolute.

Very small children can’t say “no”. The same for some mentally retarded people.

Yet we still think they posess some right and that their family should be responsible for them.

Not only that, but it is thought that abuse or negligence by the family in such cases is subject to judicial prosecution.

That’s because there is an element of human dignity that we understand is being violated by those acts.

That’s because a human being is not only his current physical body and his actual capabilities.

It exists as a notion in everyone, and it represents not only an actuality but also a potentiality, over time.

It’s not because a woman is not in physical or mental condition to say “no” to an rapist that it is not a crime to rape her.

We assume that she will eventually be able to, and that in hindsight she would have said “no” to the assault.

The same way we can assume that a fetus would eventually be able to say “no” to its own destruction.

Killing fetuses is not only imoral, it is a crime because it violates that very notion.

You murder a part of the world as you advance an ideology of irresponsibility and materialism.

73

Personal/Cultural intuition is not a substitute for reason. A zygote or fetus cannot be considered a self-owner without contradiction. Sometimes conclusions are non-intuitive to some, than social sanctions replace direct violence. (I adress this in my post above)

74

“This in my view is a misunderstanding of the source of rights. Block refers to the concept of “life”, but whatever that definition scientifically means; it has no bearing on the question of rights. Animals are also alive, scientifically. Being a Hoppean I believe morality must be grounded in the argumentation axiom (and I completely reject a “right to life” approache), I see no justification to grant a fetus the categorical status of a moral agent. This in my view is not only wrong, but can be shown to lead to absurdity (quote below).”

lmao. What? /facepalm. Block understands this and he explicitly says as such in the video. Jeezus, did you just start readin the article to find things to nitpick, without reading on in an open minded intellectual honest manner? Certainly doesn’t look like it given your misguided objection above.

Yeah, I’m a Hoppean as well.. as you know. And there is NO contradiction between evictionism and his position.

“I don’t think there’s any conflict between Hoppe’s position -he is simply giving the private law framework- and Block’s, where he is specifically giving what he considers to be the ‘libertarian law code’ response. Here’s a great diagram that encapsulates what is meant. There need not be just one ‘law code’ that individuals voluntarily sign up to adhere by, but the libertarian principles of ‘self-ownership’ and ‘original appropriation’ naturally lay the foundation.”

“And so to claim a fetus is a moral agent at all seems to me highly unjustified.”

That isn’t what is being claimed.

Regarding the ability to engage in argumentation:

[1] “none” (dead, inanimate object)

[2] “potential” (babies; part of their nature), (coma patient, knocked unconscious, mentally handicapped - those that have shown at least once to be able to engage in argumentation once, and may be able to do so once again)

[3] “always” (children, adults etc.)

So therefore; [1] No Rights, [2] “Guardianship” or “Trustee” Rights, [3] Full self-ownership.

This is logically rigorous and accurate. Thus with a fetus still requires gentlest means possible.

75

You might want to wait with the facepalm, as you completely misunderstood me.

"
[2] “potential” (babies; part of their nature), (coma patient, knocked unconscious, mentally handicapped - those that have shown at least once to be able to engage in argumentation once, and may be able to do so once again)

A baby has never engaged in argumentation and so to claim that he is a self-owner is illogical, because the ownership claim cannot be traced to a moral agent. And I address this in my post.

The classification of fetuses to [2] cannot be a valid rule of ownership.

76

No, I completely understand you.

I’m not claiming he is a self-owner, I’m claiming he has the potential to be. Which, just like coma patients etc. warrants ‘guardianship status’.

It’s a logically valid ‘rule of ownership’. You haven’t shown otherwise.

77

Conza, let me quote from my original post:

A fetus has been claimed to be comparable to a sleeping man. Of course a sleeping man does not lose ownership of his body during sleep. This is of nothing special; as a person similarly does not lose ownership of his house while he’s away. Ownership claims must be grounded in past events, which can be known, not in future events. The future is inherently uncertain. A valid AE ownership claim must of course also be traceable to a moral agent. So, given that a fetus will most likely become a moral agent, can he be considered a sleeping man?

Since a fetus lacks the cognitive ability to respect rights, he is most certainly not currently a moral agent. However, unlike ownership over the body of a sleeping man, the body-ownership of a fetus cannot be traced to a moral agent other than his mother (and maybe father, to a lesser extent). The moral agent the fetus will presumably become, and has yet to come to existence is a late-comer with regards to the mother. Such a hypothetical moral agent never showed himself to be capable of argumentation, nor has appropriated anything. No valid rule of ownership can assign ownership to a moral agent who has yet to come into existence.

78

“Personal/Cultural intuition is not a substitute for reason. A zygote or fetus cannot be considered a self-owner without contradiction. Sometimes conclusions are non-intuitive to some, than social sanctions replace direct violence. (I adress this in my post above)”

Of course, we are at completely different ends in the spectrum here.

What you are saying that you can formulate statements carrying meaningful content about the world applying pure logics, without using some intuition or cultural background.

I say that’s nuts.

I stand by the notion that any thing we can say about the way the real world works need to be mapped from the sensorial experience into language. This process is not governed by logical reasoning, and it is strongly determined by cultural backgrounds.

We can use pure formal reason to express relationships between thought structures that are embedded into an abstract mindspace, but when those are used to model reality, the mapping process mentioned above takes place and some “personal/cultural intuition” cannot be avoided.

You can’t make categorical distinctions about things in the real world using pure reason. It is absurd to think that.

To apply any categorical treatment of self-ownership you need first to specify what do you understand as human beings. You can define human being as creatures featuring some biological structure, such as a distinctive brain, or even as organisms capable of saying “no” (and being understood by other human beings on that, which is another big can of worms).

I say that’s arbitrary non-sense. Worse, it is evil non-sense. It is pure scientificist garbage that has been passed on as indoctrination over generations to desensitize people to the monstrosity of abortion.

Human dignity is not conditioned to any specific structure or capability, but only to its potentiality. And the potentiality of a fetus is to grow into a baby, a toddler, a child and then into an adult human being.

And it is understood that such human dignity shall be preserved whenever it is possible to affect individual responsibility over it. In the case of a fetus, such responsibility is almost always very clear.

Responsible individuals, past reproduction age, have engaged in activities that bear reproduction risks. Those risks have manifested and affected someone else. Now they are responsible.

That’s the timeless understanding of the issue. Trying to deny it compromises our whole notion of personal responsibility and without personal responsibility we are left with collective tyranny. It frightens me that so many libertarians cannot see this.

79

Toxic Assets,

I think you are too quick to denounce things without asking for clarifications. When referring to by reason, I’m referring to Hoppe’s Argumentation Ethics. If what counts for you is a cultural value-judgment, no sense in arguing about that. We just make different value-judgments. I think reason based arguments most-certainly can be made (not saying everything is based on reason). If you feel good with using violence solely based on what you feel like- again, all the best.

80

Gumdy,

Part IV Application : Rights for other species?:

Part I defined “interaction,” as it concerns praxeology, as those aspects of the broader concept of interrelating that can uniquely transpire among
actors as opposed to mere behavers, such as animals. Certain animals might be said to interrelate in a sense, but not in a praxeological one. Propositional justification, which is the foundation of the APoA and its justification of the NAP, is a type of communication that humans do not share with animals. It is distinct from other communicative functions found in certain social animals, such as the signaling of threat and subservience in social power relationships. Propositional truth-claiming is the specific realm that, so far as we know, is unique to human beings, and this is the realm from which the APoA springs and to which it applies.

Humans remain capable of communications that are not grounded in truth claims, but in acts of social influence and social signaling. This distinction between influence-focused versus truth-focused communication is a critical one and is transmitted through culture. As Van Dun warns, “teaching children and young adults that they should not ask “Is it true?” but only “What is in it for me?” is abandoning their education in favor of preparing them for recruitment by demagogues” (2009, 5, fn14).

Consent is among the forms of proposition that is invalidated under conditions of aggression. In other words, consent is distinct from acquiescence or surrender. Force may include various “communications” (“Hands up!”), but this type of communication functions as exposed fangs do for wolves, as a threat, not as a statement in the distinctly human sense of words that are to be judged by their truth, internal consistency (lack of performative contradiction) and authenticity.

The classical ad hominem fallacy reminds us of the logical need in discourse to judge statements primarily on their content rather than on the identity of their speaker. From there, it is a short, though perhaps surprising, extension to conjecture that if some as-yet unknown animal or alien species were encountered that proved to be capable of, and actually engaged with humans in, propositional communication, such propositions would likewise logically have to be given priority in judgment over the identity of their speakers. Such a shared foundation could logically form the basis of a cross-species rights framework. This should follow if our foundation for rights does indeed rest in discourse principles and in the sphere of restrictive conditions that the nature of propositional justification entails.

In this context, the idea of a presumption of rationality could also be helpful in considering an expanded definition of personhood: “If a man
proves himself an animal rationis capax [animal capable of reason] by engaging others in argumentation, then he is a person and ought to be regarded and treated as such by other persons” (Van Dun 2009, 9). Members of some newly encountered race may thus at first have to establish through actions their propensity to engage in discourse rather than violence and thereby establish a general presumption of rationality. It is even possible that certain aliens could prove more trustworthy and reliably rational as “persons,” than some fellow humans, as the Vulcans in Star Trek famously dramatized.

The concept of the presumption of rationality also links to the justification of children’s rights. In the case of children—or others who have not actually developed or who have lost through accident propositional discourse abilities—it can be presumed that during a contingent absence of such abilities, they would want to appoint for themselves guardians to employ such abilities on their behalf in protection of their rights. The case for such a presumption is superior to the case for any alternative presumption in the absence of specific contravening evidence.[57]

Go forth and provide this specific contravening evidence that a fetus is not a potential human, and that it is not part of it’s nature.