Lilburne:
Again, universal does not mean objective. The dictionary definition of objective is “Not dependent on the mind for existence”. By very definition, there is no such thing as a desire that is not dependent on the mind for existence. Therefore there can be no such thing as an “objective desire.”
That’s not necessarily true. I suggest people drop the objective/subjective false dichotomy. It makes some people argue in circles. Objective about desires is absolutely possible because I know my desires exist for a fact.
Here’s a extant philosopher that is more dependable than a dictionary to provide the depth in which some people are talking past each other:
Not only are social objects mind-dependent in general, they are also representation-dependent. They are dependent on representations in general for the trivial reason that people are animals active in producing and using representations as an integral feature of human action. Moreover, and more strongly, many – but surely not all - social things are dependent on representations about them: the existence of X is dependent on representations of X – on being represented as X. Many contracts between economic actors only exist when linguistically represented. Take away the representation, and the contract ceases to exist. Likewise, Euro, the currency in use in most members of the European Union, is partly constituted by representations, among them certain Treaties of the European Council. In contrast, the existence of DNA molecules is not dependent on any particular representations of them: supposing they exist at all, they existed both before and after Watson and Crick’s double helix representation, and independently of it…
Indeed, society itself is socially constructed: social objects, properties, states, and processes are outcomes of social processes. Since this is a general fact about social reality, ontological realism about society grants it…
It is enough for a realist to hold the view that X might exist and T might be true about X, that it is possible for X to be the case and T to be true. Such a view will reveal a realist attitude: there is a fact of the matter concerning whether or not X exists and whether or not T is true. It is an attitude that will give real existence and objective truth a chance, but one that at the same time is prepared for concluding that X does not exist or T is not true,
after all. This is an advisable attitude for epistemically insecure and self-critical scientific practice based on consistent fallibilism.
source
This is real philosophy.