Well said.
I still mean that. I probably shouldn’t have edited it. oh well.
Thank you Esuric.
Esuric, I think what might be attracting you, as an economist, to a vague notion of “natural law” is a certain kernel of truth in natural law thought that unfortunately is mired in the mud of moralist nonsense. Mises thought that natural rights philosophers were dimly aware of economic law, but then dressed it up in moralist clothing:
The term “natural law” has been claimed by various schools of philosophy and jurisprudence. Many doctrines have appealed to nature in order to provide a justification for their postulates. Many manifestly spurious theses have been advanced under the label of natural law. It was not difficult to explode the fallacies common to most of these lines of thought. And it is no wonder that many thinkers become suspicious as soon as natural law is referred to.
Yet it would be a serious blunder to ignore the fact that all the varieties of the doctrine contained a sound idea which could neither be compromised by connection with untenable vagaries nor discredited by any criticism. Long before the Classical economists discovered that a regularity in the sequence of phenomena prevails in the field of human action, the champions of natural law were dimly aware of this inescapable fact. From the bewildering diversity of doctrines presented under the rubric of natural law there finally emerged a set of theorems which no caviling can ever invalidate. There is first the idea that a nature-given order of things exists to which man must adjust his actions if he wants to succeed. Second: the only means available to man for the cognizance of this order is thinking and reasoning, and no existing social institution is exempt from being examined and appraised by discursive reasoning. Third: there is no standard available for apraising any mode of acting either of individuals or of groups of individuals but that of the effects produced by such action.
Theory and History
Yeah, I found that passage problematic when I read it. My understanding of natural law is one where variables enter into a certain system which yields some sort of (flow) steady state. We can call this steady state “civilization,” but this analogy will probably cause more confusion than anything else. But let me ask you a question: what does the moralist need in order to substantiate his position?
To either show how anything besides an individual actor (like nature, a species, etc) can have ends (which, as you know, is a requisite for values), and to show how it is possible to refute a non-proposition (since that is what value judgments are).
I think it depends on what you mean by moral.
Here’s another by another poster.
And moralist needs to defined to avoid semantic quibbling.
Also, isn’t that quote of Mises only repeating that natural law is discovered by reason, which has already been established in our discussion in this thread. Aquinas and Rothbard to name two have written this. And it doesn’t conflict with my theory that natural law simply means to put it one way thinking for one self. The idea of reason discovering and thereby being used to understand the world is an old idea. This doesn’t invalidate that reason exists in nature and that it is natural for humankind to reason. Again, I’m not saying Mises is saying this, but Mises dismissal of natural law in that paragraph doesn’t appear to be addressing the natural law theory that I know and profess.
Nielsio introduced a point that off-hand I agree with. And he states “discovered” as well.
Definitions are important. In fact, unapplied praxeology is just a system of definitions.
But, if it does not solve the problem that I already mentioned, it is not an “objective system of ethics”, at least how I understand that term. How should you call it “objective” if it heeds to the fact that ultimate ends are neither correct nor incorrect, if it is not able to not say that, if my ultimate end is to kill you and your ultimate end is to raise a family, I am “wrong” and you are “right”? What makes it “objective”, exactly? By the way, do you agree with what I wrote in this post, this post, and this post?
But, if it does not solve the problem that I already mentioned, it is not an “objective system of ethics”, at least how I understand that term. How should you call it “objective” if it heeds to the fact that ultimate ends are neither correct nor incorrect, if it is not able to not say that, if my ultimate end is to kill you and your ultimate end is to raise a family, I am “wrong” and you are “right”? What makes it “objective”, exactly?
There are ultimate ends more “ultimate” than the ones you’ve given here. For instance, all humans share the ultimate end of “not going hungry.” Not all ends are subjective or above analysis.
I’m not going to repeat myself over and over again. I already addressed this (more then once):
Also, the real ultimate end is always satisfaction. There may be some individuals (lunatics) who want to go to jail, and who want to get killed in a fight, but there may also be businessmen who want to go out of business (charge a non market clearing price), firms who purposely setup inefficient capital combinations. In both cases, self-destructive actions will yield the results they desire; but they are only self-destructive because there is this objective check on their actions. The argument “what about the lunatics?” isn’t convincing.
He’s saying that economic laws are discovered by reason. He’s saying that natural rights champions were dimly perceiving economic laws, but misconceived them as normative laws.
Probably most do. But what about people who are trying to starve themselves? Do you think that no one like that exists or has ever existed?
I did not say that.
That’s not a shared end. That’s a shorthand way of expressing a multitude of similar ends. Human A almost certainly has the end of “Human A not going hungry”. Human B almost certainly has the end of "Human B not going hungry. And so on. The human instinct to feed implies nothing more than that.
Probably most do. But what about people who are trying to starve themselves? Do you think that no one like that exists or has ever existed?
Not at all. But on a very basic level, they cannot contradict the physical laws of reality and their nature as a human being. You can tell yourself that you don’t want food, but your body will very quickly prove you wrong.
I did not say that.
I know, but (from my understanding) Mises conclusion is the opposite, and Mises has been a big influence on many subjective ethicists here.
That’s not a shared end. That’s a shorthand way of expressing a multitude of similar ends. Human A almost certainly has the end of “Human A not going hungry”. Human B almost certainly has the end of "Human B not going hungry. And so on.
Agreed. I didn’t mean for it to be read as a shared end. But if we can say, for instance, that every individual person has the objective end of “not going hungry,” and capitalism is objectively more effective at preventing hunger for each individual (which is a simplification, of course), then I assert that capitalism can be objectively good.
My example was of a guy trying to starve himself. If he dies, he succeeds. Of course, you might say that people like that are not relevant. But that would not alter the epistemology or whatever of it.
No way. He was just often ambiguous about whether he was talking about ends or ultimate ends.
You may conclude that it is good from the perspective of all of the people, sure.
How does that address what I was saying at all? Both of those examples are of people applying means to attain ends but failing at it. Clearly that is not what I am talking about.
Why do they have to be self-destructive? What about a murderer good at what he does?
I’m sorry, but (a) you’re not saying anything, and (b) you’re ignoring what I’m saying.
Stop attacking a straw man. I’m not saying that an objective system of ethics prevents any and all coercive actions or short-term Pareto inefficient outcomes.
Even if each person in the world did have the end of himself not going hungry (which is not actually true, given hunger strikes), that would not qualify the end as objective. What if, during a nuclear winter, only a handful of people were left on earth, and they all happened to prefer Coke to Pepsi. Would that make Coke’s superiority to Pepsi an objective fact? No.