False. Lilburne has spent over 50 posts attacking my values. What do you think this thread and the countless others are about? In the other thread he has just said paraphrasing: he doesn’t think some people can cooperate to even form a society at all.
That’s a blatant unfounded assertion. I live in a society right now where some people manage to cooperate.
Who said this was about agreement? I never did. Respect ok. Honor yes. But for a person to actually question my existence because I don’t need to be told over and over again by Lilburne that my existence is an error and is wrong. I never said nobody’s existence matter’s more than anybody else’s. I’m a natural law theorists that desires justice, truth, economic action, peace, and the establishment of a cooperative society that maintains private property for Christ’s sake.
I’m done. See ya. This forum has gone bunk with people trying to philosophically attack that some people don’t even exist in this world and quote Hobbes and Machivelli to get their violent might v. right to dominate the values of some people like myself that maintain peace and civility.
Perhaps this will make the distinction you’re missing clear.
Let’s use the rope-snake scenario from Indian philosophy.
A man walking with a companion sees a rope on the road and thinks it’s a snake.
He has the belief, “That is a snake,” and makes the proposition to his companion, “That is a snake.”
The existence of his belief is a fact. The belief’s being, once it is recognized that it’s there, can neither be correct nor incorrect. But the content of his belief can be correct/incorrect. And in fact it is incorrect.
The man then decides between turning around and walking back from whence he came or taking a closer look to see if it’s dead or not. He forms the preference in his mind that he would prefer to take a closer look. He expresses his preference to his companion by saying, “We should take a closer look rather than walking away.”
The existence of his preference is a fact. The preference’s existence, once it is recognized that it’s there, can neither be correct nor incorrect. But a preference is different from a belief in that its content also can neither be correct nor incorrect, even though the beliefs that informed his preference can be.
His companion then says, “No, snakes are unclean. It is morally wrong to approach a snake. Therefore, I will use physical force to prevent you from approaching the snake.” (Please note, this is not an aspect of any Indian belief afaik, I’m just making this part up to demonstrate a concept.)
The existence of the companion’s moral preference is a fact. The preference’s existence, once it is recognized that it’s there, can neither be correct nor incorrect. But a moral preference, just like any other preference, is different from a belief in that its content also can neither be correct nor incorrect, even though the beliefs that informed his preference (like belief in the existence of some snake-hating god) can be.
False. Lilburne has spent over 50 posts attacking my values
No, Lilburne has spent this time attacking your beliefs, not your values. In fact, if you’d been willing to take your fingers off the keyboard for more than a few seconds, you’d understand that to Lilburne the entire notion of attacking values is incoherent. Seriously, focus on saying more and speaking less.
I don’t see what that has to do with what I’m saying Lilburne. I have absolutely no interest in and there is no need to prove the correctness of my personal preferences. Mises and Rothbard are both wrong on some things. It seems like people are constantly conflating forward-looking ethics (economics is also forward-looking) with backward-looking legal theory.
An instance of where I have improved libertarian theory by using Austrian methodology to investigate law is in regards to children’s rights. This analysis can be extended to the infirm, elderly, prisoners, etc. Rothbard was half right on this subject for recognizing the importance of potential, but the focus on consent is flawed when we instead look at the interplay of humans’ actions and, moreover, that there exists intermediate periods of inaction. As Mises has distinguished between economics categories and ideal types, we can see that legal theory has it’s own sort of categories.
The only reason that libertarianism is a “spurious political doctrine” or whatever it is you said exactly, is because you are confused what is going on.
I didn’t say libertarianism itself is spurious. I myself am a libertarian (an anarcho-capitalist, actually). It is doctrines like natural law and argumentation ethics that I regard as spurious.
Lilburne, I think what you are doing is kind of the reverse of “thick libertarians”, who try to make libertarianism into more than it really is by conflating political philosophy with legal philosophy. Instead, you refuse to see the whole picture. There is more to praxeology than economics, and there is more to law than praxeology. By doing this, you stoke these pointless conversations that remain on the outside of solving problems and forming theory.
There is more to praxeology than economics, but all human action is guided solely, entirely and apodictically by subjective value within perceived means-end frameworks.
There is more to law than praxeology, in fact as law is a practiced art and not a philosophical category, praxeology only has indirect bearing on it.
I guess, but there’s thought behind the practice. I’ve seen you and another guy stress customary law. Obviously cultural mores are a factor, but it is a secondary factor.
I guess, but there’s thought behind the practice. I’ve seen you and another guy stress customary law.
There’s thought behind any practice. But there’s no ‘wrong way’ to do law, any more than there’s a ‘wrong way’ to do engineering. It all depends on who’s doing it and for what end.
Not sure where I said anything about wrong ways of doing law, but legislation would be one. I’ve posted a paper on this numerous times, but neither of you two are here to learn anything so whatever.
Not sure where I said anything about wrong ways of doing law, but legislation would be one. I’ve posted a paper on this numerous times, but neither of you two are here to learn anything so whatever.
Legislation and statuatory law tend to create chaos and promote conflicts rather than resolve them. But resolving disputes and creating order (while things I would like out of jurisprudence) are not automatically ‘right’ ways to do things. As I’ve said, it depends on who is doing it and what they get out of it. For some people (especially those in command of a theological State) creating disorder and failing to protect property is precisely what they aim to get out of jurisprudence. The reason for this difference is that jurisprudence reflects the interests of those involved in creating it, in a customary legal system it is the disputant parties and those affected by their externalities; in a statuatory legal system it is the State elite whose interest and views it promotes.
But just because you don’t like this arrangment doesn’t mean they are doing it wrong, any more than an engineer is doing his job ‘wrong’ because he designs a bomb that will be used to kill you.