Thanks for your replies, Geoffrey!
I’m aware that Long advocates a rapproachment of praxeology and hermeneutics. However, I think I would give praxeology less weight than Long does. To elaborate on this point, though, I’m afraid I need to better explain what I mean by the concept of reactive action.
I borrow the concept from Frederick Stoutlands paper “Reaktives Handeln und das Überzeugung/Wunsch-Modell“, which unfortunately is only available in German. I’ll try to summarize the arguments of his paper which are most important for my critique of praxeology.
Stoutland distinguishes between teleological reasons and “in reaction to something” reasons [“In-Reaktion-auf-etwas”-Gründe] (and a few more non-teleological reasons) for actions.
Teleological reasons necessitate the agent having certain beliefs and desires concerning the action in question. For example, if my eating an apple is caused by a teleological reason than this requires me, for example, having the desire to satisfy my hunger and the belief that eating an apple will to a certain degree satisfy my hunger. [The belief/desire model as advocated by Donald Davidson in “Actions, Reasons, and Causes” and by Michael Smith in “The Possibility of Philosophy of Action“ and my reading of Nationalökonomie, Human Action and Man, Economy, and State leads me to the conclusion also by Mises and Rothbard argues that such desires and beliefs actually constitute the teleological reasons. This is, according to Stoutland and for reasons that I can summarize later if you wish me to, wrong. Desires and beliefs are merely necessary conditions for something to be a teleological reason.]
“In reaction to something” reasons, on the other hand, do not necessitate the agent having any beliefs and desires concerning the action in question. Furthermore, says Stoutland, such reasons are more basic than teleological reasons. To prove the latter claim Stoutland borrows Wittgenstein’s example of the sign which reads “←” and on which Wittgenstein elaborates in §201 (and in other paragraphs) of Philosophical Investigations. Stoutland’s reading of Wittgenstein is that we don’t turn left when we see that sign because we interpret [deuten] the symbol as telling us to turn left. If that were the case we would have to ask ourselves if “turn left” also needs to be interpreted. And if it does, the question arises as to how we interpret our interpretation of “turn left”. This would lead to an infinite regress. Thus, we turn left when we see the sign because we’ve learned, in our social context, to turn left when we see a sign which reads “←”. Now, Stoutland takes this example to the level of philosophy of action and says that, when we turn left, we don’t need to have the belief that the sign means “turn left” because that would lead to the same infinite regress.
To make his point about the existence of actions which are caused by reactive reasons, Stoutland names a similar example. He asks what our reasons are for stopping our car when we see a stop sign. He admits that there are cases where we have, for example, the desire to follow traffic rules or to arrive at our destination unharmed and the belief that stopping at a given stop sign will help achieve that desire. In these cases, the reason for us to stop would be the existence of the stop sign but it is only a reason because we have said desires and beliefs. However, by appealing to our intuitions, he claims that most of the time we simply stop because there is a stop sign – that is, because we grew up in a certain social context where a stop sign indicates a certain rule.
I agree that many times when I stop my car I don’t have a belief that my stopping it is a certain means to one of my ends. I simply stop reactively.
Now, because our stopping our car, can hardly be classified as a reflex, praxeology would classify it as the only other type of behavior it allows: (purposeful) action. Thus, from a praxeological standpoint we would have to say that every time someone stops her cars at a stop sign she reveal a certain preference. However, this cannot be the case if reactive actions actually exist and if she stops her car reactively. She does not have a belief concerning that action (she still might have the desire of following traffic rules and/or arriving at her goal unharmed) and as such can’t be said to have any preference towards stopping the car.
Stoutland furthermore claims, and I agree, that many of our daily actions are reactive. I think it’s even possible for trade to be reactive. This would imply that not every “voluntary” trade is, ex ante, beneficial to all parties involved. It also wouldn’t mean, of course, that such trade is harmful to one of the parties. (I am putting “voluntary” between quotation marks because I also think that it would follow that the concept of voluntarism would become more complicated if reactive actions actually existed.)