Since doing nothing is included in the action axiom, the concept of exchange as commonly understood can’t be derived from the axiom.
I would think the commonly understood definition of exchange is to give up something for something else. In terms of the action axiom, in doing nothing, as in doing something, you are making a choice to give up all other possible state(s) of affairs in that situation for one particular state of affairs.
In other words, the choice is the exchange. As choice is derived from the action axiom, exchange is also derived from the action axiom.
Well, what I think Mises is really pointing out is that “doing nothing,” in most cases, is really doing something. If you spend all day in bed not moving, unless you are catatonic or something, you are behaving purposefully. While that might count as doing nothing in a practical sense, it is action in the praxeological sense. So yeah, its kind of about making choices. The only thing I’d be careful about with thinking in terms of choices is the difference between thinking “I’m going to choose to go for a walk later” and actually going for a walk later. Its only those choices put into operation that we are really concerned with.
Since doing “nothing” is actually doing something, then I don’t see why exchange should sit outside of the category of action. I don’t remember if Mises is explicit on this, but when you continue to lie in bed or whatever (do nothing as we say), the impetus for action isn’t really current dissatisfaction, but expected dissatisfaction from changing the current course of events. When we say in this case that I am exchanging one state of affairs for another, we mean that I am continuing to lie in bed, exchanging that state of affairs for the one where I go make breakfast or take a shower, and I do this by keeping my body in place over time, utilizing those means to achieve that end, hence, I act.
Also, in case it isn’t clear, we aren’t talking about changing states of affairs in a weird cosmic sense where you have some mystical control of the universe. Its not like you can cease to exist in some state at all, but rather that you have varying degrees of control by manipulated causal factors. You are very much in control of things like sitting, standing, and walking; you are somewhat less in control of things like earning a living, attracting beautiful women, and getting the neighbors to like you.
One problem with saying “you are happier when…” is that it is phrased in such a way that it strongly invokes this sense of psychological happiness which we are trying to avoid. Even saying “You are more satisfied when…” feels awkward for the same reason.
The real problem though is that the statement isn’t actually correct. We don’t start life with 1 million ends, and slowly work towards acheiving as many as we can, gradually filling up our satisfaction meters. Instead, as we acheive goals, new ones arise. When you finally become a lawyer you may have satisfied 100,000 ends, but relative to your current ends, you remain unsatisfied. Hapiness and satisfaction are not quantitive measurements, they are states in relation to want.
Also, Mises is pretty notorious for defining words in his own way, and then defending them (I think) too ferociously. Rationality and utilitarianism cause a lot of trouble, not to mention the coined terms like thymology. But its funny that you point out “happiness” specifically, because it has been used in an unorthodox way ever since it became the translation for “eudaimonia.” This one at least, isn’t a Misesian or Austrian issue.
I would think the commonly understood definition of exchange is to give up something for something else. In terms of the action axiom, in doing nothing, as in doing something, you are making a choice to give up all other possible state(s) of affairs in that situation for one particular state of affairs.
In other words, the choice is the exchange. As choice is derived from the action axiom, exchange is also derived from the action axiom.
I’m just not sure this use of give is the same as the use of give we are talking about in interpersonal exchanges. There are at least three differences:
In autistic “exchange” you are giving up something you don’t have.
In autistic “exchange” you are giving up a potentially infinite number of states for a single state. Its hard to conceive of any sort of equality between what is being given up and what is “received.” In interpersonal exchange, things exchanged have the same price. If a box of cereal costs $3, everyone who buys it exchanges $3 for it. It’s hard to conceive of autistic “exchanges” as being repeatable and universalizable in the same way.
In interpersonal exchange, the words give and receive refer to the relationship between two agents (i.e. beings capable of purposeful behavior). It’s hard to think of the state you choose in autistic “exchange” as something you receive. In fact, the word receive strikes me as the formal antithesis of choosing. We receive what we don’t choose. I don’t mean that it’s not something we consent to, but that it results via another agency.
Giving may involve giving up, but the concept is not deduced from giving up. It’s the other way around. The action axiom may be contained in exchange (though I also think we can speak of involuntary or unconscious exchange), but exchange is not contained in the action axiom.
If we accept any kind of choice as an exchange, then I feel like the word exchange becomes meaningless. But I’ll try to remain open minded and see what Mises does with this.
Well, what I think Mises is really pointing out is that “doing nothing,” in most cases, is really doing something. If you spend all day in bed not moving, unless you are catatonic or something, you are behaving purposefully. While that might count as doing nothing in a practical sense, it is action in the praxeological sense. So yeah, its kind of about making choices. The only thing I’d be careful about with thinking in terms of choices is the difference between thinking “I’m going to choose to go for a walk later” and actually going for a walk later. Its only those choices put into operation that we are really concerned with.
I think we’re pretty much on the same page here. But I think what you say about choice also applies to action. One could say, “I’m going to act” or refer to action in some other conditional sense. I think the term actual choice would probably convey the term better than action.
Since doing “nothing” is actually doing something, then I don’t see why exchange should sit outside of the category of action. I don’t remember if Mises is explicit on this, but when you continue to lie in bed or whatever (do nothing as we say), the impetus for action isn’t really current dissatisfaction, but expected dissatisfaction from changing the current course of events. When we say in this case that I am exchanging one state of affairs for another, we mean that I am continuing to lie in bed, exchanging that state of affairs for the one where I go make breakfast or take a shower, and I do this by keeping my body in place over time, utilizing those means to achieve that end, hence, I act.
Then it seems like what we are exchanging is different possible future states rather than changing our current state for a possible future state. So I still think the action axiom can be expressed without reference to time.
One problem with saying “you are happier when…” is that it is phrased in such a way that it strongly invokes this sense of psychological happiness which we are trying to avoid. Even saying “You are more satisfied when…” feels awkward for the same reason.
I agree. For me, the word “happiness” always invokes psychological happiness. I have a hard time associating the word happiness with something that isn’t psychological.
Also, Mises is pretty notorious for defining words in his own way, and then defending them (I think) too ferociously. Rationality and utilitarianism cause a lot of trouble, not to mention the coined terms like thymology. But its funny that you point out “happiness” specifically, because it has been used in an unorthodox way ever since it became the translation for “eudaimonia.” This one at least, isn’t a Misesian or Austrian issue.
That’s true. I was just studying Spinoza, and he defines words in all sorts of unusual ways.
I’m just not sure this use of give is the same as the use of give we are talking about in interpersonal exchanges.
With all due respect, could you pick one definition of ‘exchange’ so we may concentrate on that one definition? It becomes extremely difficult to answer a query when you make a specific argument based on one definition of a word and then extend that same argument using a different definition of that word as if it’s the same definition we started with. I hope you understand what I mean.
How do you exchange possible future states when none are in your posession? All you are doing here is choosing on end over another.
Why would you want to though? We can talk about horses without reference to space, but if a horse exists, it necessarily occupies space. Maybe we find this abstraction useful if we are talking about the temperement of horses, or some aspect of horses which has nothing to do with their extended qualities. With action and time, I’m not sure what good would come out of the same kind of abstraction, especially as we move towards the dynamic nature of markets.
Personally, I have such a difficult time imagining action seperate from time that I don’t think you can actually express the action axiom without it. I mean, you can write or say “action is using means to achieve ends,” but I don’t see how you can concieve of that proposition without introducing the element of time. You can’t achieve something if there is no time because it would have to be had already. Right?