Such as? Care to contribute at the request of the OP?
Not really.
But then again what could a “further explanation” even be?
Brainpolice - Could you point me towards these serious criticisms please?
Smiling Dave:
Yoiu might want to sink your teeth into this: http://socialdemocracy21stcentury.blogspot.com/2010/10/mises-praxeology-critique.html
Having never read anything by Mises and being a total Austrian economics noob, I think this article does point out the weaknesses pretty well (assuming the quotes by Mises haven’t been taken out of context). Summed up:
“[sc. there is a] the fundamental flaw in Ludwig von Mises’ ‘praxeology’: [sc. it is] the notion that purposive choice as a Kantian ‘a priori synthetic proposition’ is more than sufficient to account for negatively inclined demand curves. This ignores the fact that a number of a posteriori auxiliary propositions are also required, such as transitivity or consistency of choices … To this day, this failure to recognize the limited power of a priori synthetic propositions to generate substantive implications for economic behaviour characterises neo-Austrian writings in defence of Mises” (Blaug 1994: 132–133, n. 14; see also Blaug 1997: 332ff.).
[…]
Another problem for Misesian economics is that it is not the only praxeological system. The fact is that there are a number of other systems of thought that are (allegedly) derived by deduction from universally true axioms. How do we choose between such systems? (Prychitko 1998: 81). For example, Marxists like M. Hollis and E. J. Nell have propounded a system using deduction from (allegedly) universally true axioms in their book Rational Economic Man (1975). Their system is the antithesis of Mises’ Austrian economics, but supposedly arrives at laws which are universally true. In other words, when competing praxeological systems are encountered, what method is available to the Austrian praxeologist to choose between them?
I’d love to read some criticisms of the points being raised.
I don’t know what precisely Blaug is referring to but perhaps he is confusing applying praxeology to concrete cases and formal praxeological analysis. (and my guess is that ‘consistency of choices’ is some fallacy related to time)
You are supposed to investigate the systems… just like if two mathematicians claim to have correctly reasoned through to a positive proof for opposed statements.
xarthaz, the whole praxeological approach, in which the actions of others are interpreted and analysed teleologically is the result of a methodological compromise as Mises explains in Human Action and other works. I recommend you to have a look at this to understand the reason for this method.
Praxeology does not deny the reductionist hypothesis through which it is asserted that one day all human action and its subsequent effects will be explained and predicted completely from the external stimuli which originally stir them. There are actually plenty of reasons to doubt the feasibillity of this both from a scientific and philosophical perspective, but praxeology does not actually deny the ultimate validity of this assertion.
it simply says that as long as we do not have such a monistic theory in which all human action and its effects can be explained “naturally” from the causes from which it arises, we simply acknowledge the existence of action as a given, and follow what must result from this starting point. Furthermore, Mises points out well how it is actually quite ridiculous that people think such a natural theory would end up “refuting” praxeology when the latter is simply based on the results of discursive logic applied to different modes of action.
Sorry to dredge up this thread, but I am starting to work through Human Action. The comments above have been helpful in grasping these concepts.
It seems that xarthaz’s objection is irrelevant to the Misesian framework and even self-contradictory with respect to praxeology.
Since action is taken as the starting point for the aprioristic reasoning in praxeology, the teleologic nature of the action axiom is irrelevant.
Even if xarthaz’s contention that there is a mechanistic explanation to human action is correct, the application of this as a means to nullify the methodology and conclusions of praxeology is self-contradictory. If there is some mechanistic ultimate cause of human action, then human action can be deduced aprioristically. Therefore, selecting human action as the starting point for aprioristic reasoning is actually strengthened by attempts to supplant a teleologic explanation of action with a mechanistic one.
Am I on the right track?
Unfortunately, no. It would in fact be a great victory of behaviorist premises of policymaking. It would provide scientific for a framework of means of policy for ends of behavioral returns. In fact since statistically significant behavioral patterns exist(the causal nature of which action axiom in its dogmaticism denies) it is already used in policy making. In fact any kind of entrepreneurial or specualtive activity in regards to appealing to people is involved in that process: the process of creating theories over what the behavioral returns of people would be in reaction to stimuli presented by the entrepreneur.