z1235
Who is submitting to whom when they all have equal capacity for aggression/defense against/from another (a gun)?
They all submit to rules(law), a calm arbiter of disputes(court), and an enforcer of rules and rulings(police/quickdraw). Upon ceding a fraction of their individual self-determination, they gain the freedom to let down their guards. If this were an unusually rough bunch of castaways, this system would not work. If this were an unusually nice bunch, it might not be necessary, as you would prefer–and I, too. I’m using a run-of-the-mill mix of humanity. And such a motley crew is not even close to ancap ready, let alone on a deserted island.
Why not ten separate groups, each comprised of a man with a gun? How is two groups more special, likely, neccesary, or desirable than ten? And why must the two groups be arranged “as separate states” (with compulsion and coercion) and not as voluntary (market) entities (i.e. firms)?
I honestly don’t quite understand the second question. If it’s every man for himself, and a normal range of personalities, there will likely be good reason not to let down one’s guard–a high likelihood that at least one man be a dangerous character; that two or more will form a secret alliance; that conflict over limited coconuts will lead to all-out "war,"etc. The two groups might not be arranged as separate “states.” Maybe one group is comprised of people of your ilk, who only agree as necessary, after much discussion–so if a member doesn’t feel like picking coconuts or standing guard, he doesn’t have to. The other group uses my system. Now the coconuts are running low; and because my group has taken steps to force its members to contribute to the survival of all, who do you suppose will have the upper hand?
How do 200 countries manage to co-exist, trade, and flourish under division of labor without establishment of enforcable law (world constitution, military, police)?
The military might of the largest states has put them all in a stalemate. The smaller countries depend upon the larger for protection; and the larger tax their people to build up their militaries. Trade is a price exacted by the larger countries from the smaller ones for that protection. And a rough international law is guaranteed by the larger nations (the quickdraw/police).
The correlation between (1) the existence of an enforcer with overwhelming power and (2) prosperity is non-existent (plenty of counter-factual examples), and even if it was, it would not imply causation between them.
Name one counterfactual example of a prosperous society without an enforcer of law.
I don’t see how resource allocation is relevant.
If there were unlimited resources everywhere, no one would need to fight for survival. All exchanges could and probably would be voluntary. If survival itself depends upon securing control of limited natural resources–which it has throughout all of history–and such control cannot be maintained absent a limited state system–which it couldn’t be throughout history–primarily in the form of a combined defense against competing collectives; then individual rights must be partially subsumed by a state system–only to the extent necessary for ensuring life itself.