If you use rationality as “the use of reasons (justifications) to make decisions”, then anytime you do anything can be described as rational thought. But that is not the same as “the use of reason (the faculty or power of acquiring intellectual knowledge, either by direct understanding of first principles or by argument) to make decisions”. A person can say “I’m doing a raindance because the gods will bring rain if I do”. “The gods wil bring rain if I do” is a reason that a person developed by using their brain. They believe that their reason is valid. But it isn’t valid, because their belief in the existence of gods is based on nothing more than feelings and emotion. Decisions based on emotion are not rational (animals make decisions based on feeling and emotion, do they possess rationality?). It is not based on reason, which only humans possses.
As far as economics is concerned though, it doesn’t really matter if reasons are rational or not, it only matters that people create reasons for doing things.
I would argue that humans have a strong emotional response to logic, which is why they sometimes listen to logic rather than superstition.
I make most of my decisions based on emotion, since my feelings are the basis for my ethics. What you mean to say is something like when one encounters a problem that needs to be solved using logic or empiricism, it is not optimal to try to substitute a different method.
Mises didn’t consider tautologies fruitless. If in your view tautologies are fruitless, this may be why you have an aversion to Mises’s conceptions in general, and his conception of rationality in particular.
For the benefit of those following this thread, I’ll post a few important passages:
“Aprioristic reasoning is purely conceptual and deductive. It cannot produce anything else but tautologies and analytic judgments. All its implications are logically derived from the premises and were already contained in them. Hence, according to a popular objection, it cannot add anything to our knowledge.”
“All geometrical theorems are already implied in the axioms. The concept of a rectangular triangle already implies the theorem of Pythagoras. This theorem is a tautology, its deduction results in an analytic judgment. Nonetheless noboby would contend that geometry in general and the theorem of Pythagoras in particular do not enlarge our knowledge. Cognition from purely deductive reasoning is also creative and opens for our mind acces to previously barred spheres. The significant task of aprioristic reasoning is on the one hand to bring into relief all that is implied in the categories, concepts, and premises and, on the other hand, to show what they do not imply. It is its vocation to render manifest and obvious what was hidden and unknown before.”
“In the concept of money all the theorems of monetary theory are already implied. The quantity theory does not add to our knowledge anything which is not virtually contained in the concept of money. It transforms, develops, and unfolds; it only analyzes, and is therefore tautological like the theorem of Pythagoras in relation to the concept of the rectangular triangle. However, nobody would deny the cognitive value of the quantity theory. To a mind not enlightened by economic reasoning, it remains unknown. A long line of abortive attempts to solve the problems concerned shows that it was certainly not easy to attain the present state of knowledge.” (Human Action, 3rd rev. Ed. page 38)
"One does not annul the cognitive significance of the a priori by qualifying it as tautological. A tautology must ex definitione be the tautology—restatement—of something said already previously. If we qualify Euclidian geometry as a hierarchical system of tautologies, we may say: The theorem of Pythagoras is tautological as it expresses merely something that is already implied in the definition of a right-angled triangle.
But the question is: How did we get the first—the basic—proposition of which the second—the derived—proposition is merely a tautology? In the case of the various geometries and answers given today are (a) by an arbitrary choice or (b) on account of its convenience or suitability. Such an answer cannot be given with regard to the category of action." (The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science, p.17-18)
As I understand Mises, there are two parts to his approach:
First, he believes that tautological reasoning expands our knowledge by making explicit what was already implicit in an original concept and/or phenomenon.
Second, he believes that the concept and/or phenomenon of action is “provided” (it is “given” to an actor), by virtue of the fact he is an acting being.
Thus, the original premise of action (consciously aiming at ends) is given to an actor, and tautological deduction from this given premise yields new knowledge (knowledge that was implicit in the concept and/or phenomenon of aiming at ends, and which aprioristic reasoning tries to make explicit).
“The scope of praxeology is the explication of the category of human action. All that is needed for the deduction of all praxeological theorems is knowledge of the essence of human action. It is knowledge that is our own because we are men…The only way to a cognition of these theorems is logical analysis of our inherent knowledge of the category of action. We must bethink ourselves and reflect upon the structure of human action. Like logic and mathematics, praxeological knowledge is in us; it does not come from without.”
“All the concepts and theorems of praxeology are implied in the category of human action. The first task is to extract and to deduce them, to expound their implications and to define the universal conditions of acting as such…” (Human Action, p. 64)
Mises does not consider tautological reasoning useless or fruitless. He believes that exact theoretical science brings to explicit knowledge that which was previously only implied in an original premise.
This conception of things is reinforced, for example, by this passage by Hayek:
“The data which here are supposed to be objective facts and the same for all people are evidently no longer the same thing as the data which formed the starting-point for the tautological transformations of the Pure Logic of Choice…” (essay: Economics and Knowledge)(bold added)
For further reference, here is Menger:
"The aim of this orientation, which in the future we will call the exact one, an aim which research pursues in the same way in all realms of the world of phenomena, is the determination of strict laws of phenomena, of regularities in the succession of phenomena which do not present themselves to us as absolute, but which in respect to the approaches to cognition by which we attain to them simply bear within themselves the guarantee of absoluteness. It is the determination of laws of phenomena which commonly are called “laws of nature,” but more correctly should be designated by the expression “exact laws.”(Investigations Into the Method of the Social Sciences, book 1, chapter 4)(bold added)
Mises, Hayek, and Menger are all talking about the same thing. The absoluteness or certainty of praxeological laws results from the laws being tautological in nature.
Thus, Mises believes, as quoted above, that “One does not annul the cognitive significance of the a priori by qualifying it as tautological.”
Were doctors who bled their patients in the 18th century acting irrationally or erroneously? How about a 16th century alchemist trying to transmute lead into gold? Do you think there are no commonplace practices today among experts which will in the future be proven to be incorrect? Would you deem such practices irrational?
Here is how I understand Mises’s conception of rationality. Rationality in his conception is essentially identical to consciously aiming at ends. All action is thus rational in this conception. In fact, Mises rejected the concept of “rational action.”
“Human action is necessarily always rational. The term “rational action” is therefore pleonastic and must be rejected as such. When applied to the ultimate ends of action, the terms rational and irrational are inappropriate and meaningless. The ultimate end of action is always the satisfaction of some desire of the acting man.” (Human Action, 3rd rev. Ed. p.19)(bold added)
All action is comprised of the means utilized, and the end(s) sought.
Praxeology is concerned with what specific means must necessarily entail, or what specific means cannot possibly entail.
To the extent that the entailment of a means can be conceived as the end sought, then praxeology is concerned with what ends must necessarily result or cannot possibly result, by the adoption of specific means.
Example:
Let’s say dad wants to vacuum the living room carpet. So he politely asks all family members to get off the carpet. In Mises’s conception, any action they take to get off the carpet is rational, by definition. If they attempt to remove themselves from the carpet, then they consciously aim at an end, and thus act rationally.
However, Mises will claim that some means cannot attain the ends sought by logical necessity (as opposed to inductive probability).
Thus, one of the children, in trying to get out of the way so dad can vacuum the carpet, places his hands under his feet and lifts up, in an attempt to lift himself up off the carpet. He acts rationally in Mises’s conception: he utilizes means to attain an end.
However, that the end cannot be attained (the child’s removal from the carpet) by these specific means, is logically entailed in the specific means here utilized (the child placing his hands under his feet and lifting).
Though the child acted “rationally” (he attempted to get off the carpet), the means he chose were, by logic, incapable of resulting in the end specified.
As Mises writes:
“When applied to the means chosen for the attainment of ends, the terms rational and irrational imply a judgment about the expediency and adequacy of the procedure employed. The critic approves or disapproves of the method from the point of view of whether or not it is best suited to attain the end in question. It is a fact that human reason is not infallible and that man very often errs in selecting and applying means. An action unsuited to the end falls short of expectation. It is contrary to purpose, but it is rational, i.e., the outcome of reasonable—although faulty—deliberation and an attempt—although an ineffectual attempt—to attain a definite goal.” (Human Action, 3rd. rev. Ed. p.20)
We might think of it this way:
Mises’s theory of action refers primarily to an actor’s conscious effort to attain an end. This is a theory that is concerned only with individual action. It is not a theory about the observation by person X, of the actions of another person Y.
As the terms “rational” and “irrational” are typically used, they refer to the opinion, judgment, or conclusion reached by an observer, about the means chosen by an observed person. Mises’s theory of action is not a theory about observation; it is a theory about the logical implications of individual action.
When we use the terms rational and irrational in the context of a discussion about action, we have to be clear whether we are referring to the consciousness of an actor as he tries to attain his end, or, the consciousness of an observer as he observes an actor trying to attain his end. There is an important distinction to be made:
“For it is obvious that an action has only one subjective meaning: that of the actor himself. It is X who gives subjective meaning to his action, and the only subjective meanings being given by F and S in this situation are the subjective meanings they are giving to their own actions, namely, their actions of observing X.” (Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World, chapter 1, section 5, Subjective and Objective Meaning)
Indeed praxeological economics is a branch of logic; and logic is at bottom tautological. Studying tautology is only “useless” if the tautology is obvious.
“Hence, in the last analysis, logic and the universally valid science of human action are one and the same.” (Epistemological Problems of Economics, Ch.1, sec.6)
Lilburne and Adam, thanks for the great responses.
The quotations you’ve offered are convincing, and after posting I remember the superb Hayek quotation that Adam cited (by the way. anybody who hasn’t read “Economics and Knowledge”). Leeson and Boettke seem to be making the same point that Hayek does in the aforementioned paper. Looks like I’ll have to read that paper, I’ve got it printed off and in a binder somewhere, I just need to find it.
Once again, thanks for the responses.
As I said to nirgrahamUK, I didn’t mean to challenge anybody here. It was really just meant as a quick question, replies to which I hoped would be forthcoming. Even after a few posts with nirgrahamUK the only objection I had would really be a semantic quibble, so I didn’t follow it up.