Any rule requires an understanding of its meaning and for it to take effect some form of enforcement. The determination of the meaning and enforcement of the rules of governance is jurisdiction. Ownership is possessive discretion over things according to some set of rules. Those with jurisdiction determine and enforce the rules regarding ownership.
They’re not the same thing.
So when you join a PDA and they place limits on the things you can do with your property upon membership you’re transferring ownership to them?
So owners cannot “determine the meaning” and cannot “enforce the rules of governance” over their property? Owners don’t have jurisdiction over their property?
It seems as though, according to your definition, jurisdiction is something like super-ownership as those “with jurisdiction” excercise superior “possesive discretion over things according to some set of rules” than the owners themselves. Btw, how do “those with jurisdiction” acquire jurisdiction? Looks like not a bad to thing to have.
No. You subscribe to a provision of defense/insurance services by signing a contract – just like when you buy car insurance. If you breach the contract, you suffer the consequences as they are listed in the contract. A service provider does not (can not) have jurisdiction (ownership) over its clients or their property.
They could. As i said originally, in case you’ve forgotten, in the feudal period jurisdiction and ownership were not distinct from one another and governance was personal.
You could look at it like that, but I don’t think it’s useful to. Making the distinction between the emergence of rules and acting within the confines of those rules is substantively useful in my estimation. To collapse them into the same thing seems somewhat heavy handed and ideologically motivated.
As far as how jurisdiction is acquired, it can be through a number of ways. Historically, the most prevalent seems to be some form of conquest or domination. I would agree, it probably is a pretty useful to exercise jurisdiction.
Please do elaborate on this.
So clients own property and then they contract with a PDA. Where do the rules for acquiring, transferring and holding property prior to contracting with a PDA come from and why are they followed?
Before I spend anytime responding to you I’m gonna need you to agree to keep a respectful tone and refrain from conspiratorial theorizing about my intentions that lead you to disregard the things I say in favor of flights of your imagination.
Why could not (ought not?) owners have jurisdiction over their property today? What types of governance (other than personal) are there?
How did I not make that distinction and how is this related to jurisdiction?
How am I collapsing emergence of rules and acting within their confines?
Is it useful for those that don’t have it, though, and could the ones who have it be able to hold it without the consent of those who don’t? Must there be jurisdiction (ultimate discretion) of others over you and your property, for example? If yes, why?
As you said, the rules emerge. They are followed by self-interested agents as means towards their (inter)subjectively valued ends.
First I’d like you to please demonstrate where I’ve disregarded things you’ve said in favor of “flights of my imagination”.
I am simply going to state how the United States is and you can infer whatever social theory you like:
There is no right to commerce without resorting to violence in nature.
“Inasmuch as every government is an artificial person, an abstraction, and a creature of the mind only, a government can interface only with other artificial persons. The imaginary, having neither actuality nor substance, is foreclosed from creating and attaining parity with the tangible. The legal manifestation of this is that no government, as well as any law, agency, aspect, court, etc. can concern itself with anything other than corporate, artificial persons and the contracts between them*.”*
Penhallow v. Doane’s Administraters 3 U.S. 54; 1 L.Ed. 57; 3 Dall. 54, (1795)
Government is an enclosure … AoC .. the “stile” of this confederacy … an enclosure for property
Prior to 1933 commerce meant
COMMERCE, trade, contracts. The exchange of commodities for commodities; considered in a legal point of view, it consists in the various agreements which have for their object to facilitate the exchange of the products of the earth or industry of man, with an intent to realize a profit.
A Law Dictionary by John Bouvier, Revised 6**th** Edition (1856);
after 1933 commerce has come to mean
COMMERCE. The exchange of goods, productions, or property of any kind.
Blacks Law Dictionary, 4**th** Edition (1968);
everything government in the U.S. does today interacting with citizens is based on contracts … it is 100% voluntary (but for whatever reason people aren’t willing to own up to this simple fact) … every single thing … because there is no money to tender payment of debt only dischage debt … every single thing is based on federal bills of credit which is a federal privilege of exchange (ie. federal reserve notes, commercial paper, checks, etc.)
if you go to the grocery store and purchase food using money of intrinsic value there is no intent to profit
if you purchase groceries using worthless paper you derived a gain using that federal privilege of exchange and club fed wants a cut
“When the United States, with constitutional authority, makes contracts, it has rights and incurs responsibilities similar to those of individuals who are parties to such instruments. There is no difference _…_ *except that the United States cannot be sued without its consent.*”
United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U. S. 839 (1996),
United States v. National Exchange Bank of Baltimore, 270 U.S. 527, 534 (1926),
Perry v. United States, supra at 352 (1935);
“The United States, when they contract with their citizens, are controlled by the same laws that govern the citizen in that behalf.”
United States v. Bostwick, 94 U.S. 53, 66 (1877);
“[When the United States] comes down from its position of sovereignty, and enters the domain of commerce, it submits itself to the same laws that govern individuals there”
Cooke v. United States, 91 U.S. 389, 398 (1875);
*As was well said in the last case, “*From the daily and unavoidable use of commercial paper by the United States, they are as much interested as the community at large can be in maintaining these principles.”
The Floyd Acceptances, 7 Wall. 557,
United States v. Bank of Metropolis, 15 Pet. 377 (1841);
Laches is not imputable to the government, in its character as sovereign, by those subject to its dominion.
United States v. Kilpatrick, 9 Wheat. 735 (1985);
*“*Still a government may suffer loss through the negligence of its officers. If it comes down from its position of sovereignty, and enters the domain of commerce, it submits itself to the same laws that govern individuals there.”
Gibbons v. United States, 8 Wall. 269 (1869);
Thus, if it becomes the holder of a bill of exchange, it must use the same diligence to charge the drawers and endorsers that is required of individuals, and if it fails in this, its claim upon the parties is lost.
United States v. Barker, 12 Wheat. 559 (1827);
“Even in the domain of private contract law, the author of a standard-form agreement is required to state its terms with clarity and candor. Surely no less is required [397 U.S. 222] of the United States of America when it does business with its citizens*.*”
United States v. Seckinger, 397 U. S. 203 (Dissenting opinion)(1970);
“Governments descend to the level of a mere private corporation, and take on the characteristics of a mere private citizen … where private corporate commercial paper [Federal Reserve Notes] and securities [checks] is concerned. … For purposes of suit, such corporations and individuals are regarded as entities entirely separate from government.**"
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States 318 U.S. 363-371 (1943);
just to drive a point home to the “its not voluntary crowd” …
*“*Complete freedom of the highways is so old and well established a blessing that we have forgotten the days of the Robber Barons and toll roads, and yet, under an act like this, arbitrarily administered, the highways may be completely monopolized, if, through lack of interest, the people submit, then they may look to see the most sacred of their liberties taken from them one by one, by more or less rapid encroachment."
Robertson vs. Department of Public Works, 180 Wash 133, 147 (1934);
“The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, by horse drawn carriage, wagon, or automobile, is not a mere privilege which may be permitted or prohibited at will, but a common right which he has under his right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Under this constitutional guaranty one may, therefore, under normal conditions, travel at his inclination along the public highways or in public places, and while conducting himself in an orderly and decent manner, neither interfering with nor disturbing another’s rights, he will be protected, not only in his person, but in his safe conduct.”
Thompson v. Smith, 154 SE 579,
Teche Lines vs. Danforth, Miss., 12 S.2d 784,
11 American Jurisprudence, Constitutional Law, section 329 (p. 1135);
" … the right of the citizen to drive on a public street with freedom from police interference … is a fundamental constitutional right"
White, 97 Cal. App. 3d. 141, 158 Cal. Rptr. 562, 566-67 (1979);
“citizens have a right to drive upon the public streets of the District of Columbia or any other city absent a constitutionally sound reason for limiting their access.”
Caneisha Mills v. D.C. (2009);
“The use of the automobile as a necessary adjunct to the earning of a livelihood in modern life requires us in the interest of realism to conclude that the right to use an automobile on the public highways partakes of the nature of a liberty within the meaning of the Constitutional guarantees … ”
Berberian v. Lussier 139 A2d 869, 872 (1958),
Schecter v. Killingsworth, 380 P.2d 136, 140; 93 Ariz. 273 (1963);
“The right to operate a motor vehicle [an automobile] upon the public streets and highways is not a mere privilege. It is a right of liberty, the enjoyment of which is protected by the guarantees of the federal and state constitutions.”
Adams v. City of Pocatello, 416 P.2d 46, 48; 91 Idaho 99 (1966);
“A traveler has an equal right to employ an automobile as a means of transportation and to occupy the public highways with other vehicles in common use.”
Campbell v. Walker, 78 Atl. 601, 603, 2 Boyce (Del.) 41;
“The owner of an automobile has the same right as the owner of other vehicles to use the highway, a traveler on foot has the same right to the use of the public highways as an automobile or any other vehicle.”
Simeone v. Lindsay, 65 Atl. 778, 779; Hannigan v. Wright, 63 Atl. 234, 236;
“The right of the citizen to drive on the public street with freedom from police interference, unless he is engaged in suspicious conduct associated in some manner with criminality is a fundamental constitutional right which must be protected by the courts.”
People v. Horton, 14 Cal. App. 3Rd 667 (1971);
“The right to make use of an automobile as a vehicle of travel long the highways of the state, is no longer an open question. The owners thereof have the same rights in the roads and streets as the drivers of horses or those riding a bicycle or traveling in some other vehicle.”
House v. Cramer, 112 N.W. 3; 134 Iowa 374,
Farnsworth v. Tampa Electric Co. 57 So. 233, 237, 62 Fla. 166;
“The automobile may be used with safety to others users of the highway, and in its proper use upon the highways there is an equal right with the users of other vehicles properly upon the highways. The law recognizes such right of use upon general principles.”
Brinkman v Pacholike, 84 N.E. 762, 764, 41 Ind. App. 662, 666;
“The law does not denounce motor carriages, as such, on public ways. They have an equal right with other vehicles in common use to occupy the streets and roads. It is improper to say that the driver of the horse has rights in the roads superior to the driver of the automobile. Both have the right to use the easement.”
Indiana Springs Co. v. Brown, 165 Ind. 465, 468;
“A highway is a public way open and free to any one who has occasion to pass along it on foot or with any kind of vehicle.”
Schlesinger v. City of Atlanta, 129 S.E. 861, 867, 161 Ga. 148, 159,
Holland v. Shackelford, 137 S.E. 2d 298, 304, 220 Ga. 104,
Stavola v. Palmer, 73 A.2d 831, 838, 136 Conn. 670;
“There can be no question of the right of automobile owners to occupy and use the public streets of cities, or highways in the rural districts.”
Liebrecht v. Crandall, 126 N.W. 69, 110 Minn. 454, 456;
“The use of the highways for the purpose of travel and transportation is not a mere privilege, but a common and fundamental Right of which the public and the individual cannot be rightfully deprived.”
Chicago Motor Coach vs. Chicago, 169 NE 221,
Ligare vs. Chicago, 28 NE 934,
Boon vs. Clark, 214 SSW 607,
25 Am.Jur. (1st) Highways Sect.163;
“The constitutional right to travel from one State to another, and necessarily to use the highways and other instrumentalities of interstate commerce in doing so, occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union. It is a right that has been firmly established and repeatedly recognized.”
U.S. v Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966);
“Since the Constitution guarantees the right of interstate movement … In moving from jurisdiction to jurisdiction appellees were exercising a constitutional right, and any classification which penalizes the exercise of that right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional.”
Shapiro v Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969);
“the legislature has no power to regulate the people or their automobiles.”
Kalich v. Knapp, 73 Or. 558;
versus commerce …
" … For while a Citizen has the Right to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, that Right does not extend to the use of the highways, either in whole or in part, as a place for private gain. For the latter purpose, no person has a vested right to use the highways of the state, but is a privilege or a license which the legislature may grant or withhold at its discretion."
State vs. Johnson, 243 P. 1073,
Cummins vs. Homes, 155 P. 171,
Packard vs. Banton, 44 S.Ct. 256,
Hadfield vs. Lundin, 98 Wash 516;
“Heretofore the court has held, and we think correctly, that while a Citizen has the Right to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, that Right does not extend to the use of the highways, either in whole or in part, as a place of business for private gain.”
Willis vs. Buck, 263 P. l 982,
Barney vs. Board of Railroad Commissioners, 17 P.2d 82;
“The right of the citizen to travel upon the highway and to transport his property thereon, in the ordinary course of life and business, differs radically and obviously from that of one who makes the highway his place of business for private gain in the running of a stagecoach or omnibus.”
State vs. City of Spokane, 186 P. 864;
“[The roads] … are constructed and maintained at public expense, and no person therefore, can insist that he has, or may acquire, a vested right to their use in carrying on a commercial business.”
Ex Parte Sterling, 53 SW.2d 294,
Barney vs. Railroad Commissioners, 17 P.2d 82,
Stephenson vs. Binford, supra.;
“When the public highways are made the place of business the state has a right to regulate their use in the interest of safety and convenience of the public as well as the preservation of the highways … [The state’s] right to regulate such use is based upon the nature of the business and the use of the highways in connection therewith.”
Thompson vs. Smith, supra.;
“We know of no inherent right in one to use the highways for commercial purposes. The highways are primarily for the use of the public, and in the interest of the public, the state may prohibit or regulate … the use of the highways for gain.”
Robertson vs. Dept. of Public Works, supra.;
and that is just one tiny little subject … travel vs driving. now when is the last time you went into a traffic court and seen anyone stand up for their right to travel and demand it be proven they were in fact engaged in commerce at the time … no one does that except a small minority that everyone else calls crazy because everyone else is too busy being a good little slave!
No. You are placing limits upon youself, in return for a service, because you signed the contract. You still have ownership/jurisdiction of your property because you can always cancel the contract (and possible pay a fine).
I don’t think its theoretically impossible but no one has given a plan or strategy of any worth about how you could get to that point. I’m not sure all of the consequences of such a move have been entirely considered either.
Any form of government that differentiates governance and ownership by creating offices separate from the persons holding them is depersonalized.
Jurisdiction is about determining the rules, ownership is established by the rules. You’re trying to make jurisdiction as a type of ownership. That collapses the distinction.
It can be useful, depends how it is used.
Personalized government isn’t necessary but depersonalization has proven fairly effective and was integral to the rise of capitalism.
So that’s an open-ended evolutionary process. How do your ensure protections for all individuals and libertarian oriented rules emerge?
You can look at the pledge thread. You changed my words and refused to accept them in favor of words of your choosing.
Where do the rules for your ownership and ability to contract come from?
How is it determined that your claims actually qualify as ownership?
Your ability to cancel the contract comes from where and why would a PDA respect that?
I think you’re reifying property rights.
I did already.
Please support this contention.
Still waiting on this, National Acrobat.
You can have some fun with something along these lines:
Social contract theory has been the name given to the mainstream form of political propaganda oriented to educated people.
The object of social contract theory is to manufacture the delusion of a righteous relationship between some State-entity and some Society-entity.
Imaginary beings that do not belong in the real world.
This mythos persists as it serves several purpose of politically interested groups.
And as all self-serving lie, those dedicated to propagate it end up by believing in it.