Merely because somebody doesn’t explicitly accept something doesn’t define itself as a refutation. A person sets out two oranges on the table says there are three. They are absolutely wrong.
Axiomatically you affirm natural rights
I axiomatically affirm the Torah is the word of God. Are you persuaded yet?
You affirm you exist by denying it. Convinced?
But I do not affirm the existence of natural rights by denying them.
Answering that question is beyond the scope of this thread. [;)]
But seriously, Long has said that his natural law theory is a work in progress, so there is no fully completed defense (yet).
So you’re saying that the burden of proof lies with the natural law theorist? If so, what do you make of Long’s argument that the burden of proof rests with the opponents of natural law?
Long’s ethics is hypothetical-imperative in this sense, except he argues that everyone has an ultimate end, eudaimonia. So given that everyone has the goal of eudaimonia, we can objectively say what they ought to do.
Well, Long’s project is explicitly praxeological. See his Foundations of Libertarian Ethics seminar.
for yourself or for your interlocutor?
By denying them, you claim ownership of yourself. You know the standard drill on this. You know you can’t get anywhere due to the apriori nature.
This isn’t necessarily true. Some people may very well may have as the goal of their life be that other people die. I would not be able to say to the person who is trying to set off a nuke right next to him in the middle of New York that he is objectively immoral, since his objective is to kill as many people as he possibly can. If his actual goal was to live, and it was of a higher priority than killing innocent people, then and only then could I say that his action is immoral, since he is clearly mistaken in his actions leading to his living.
I will however note that you and I probably do have as our goal our own lives, especially considering that evolution practically ensures that that is the case. And so it is for the vast vast majority of humans that we may say act immorally when they violate other’s rights.
That would happen in the very rare occurrence of one side claiming to speak something with which every human being should agree with, i.e. “natural right”, “inherently valid morality”, “build-in ethics”. Of course in other, more ‘modest’ discussions the argument is of no use.
so disagreement on an issue is proof that neither side is correct because …
please fill in the blank.
I already said I do not. Juan does, or was it you?
Well, he is completely correct in saying that opponents of natural law (meaning very specifically those who aim to refute a particular conception of natural law as logically false) have a burden of proof, but so do proponents of natural law. The form of Long’s argument is essentially as follows.
Premise 1: It seems to people that they are expressing more than subjective preference when they condemn something as immoral (moreover, our ordinary practices assume this to be true).
Premise 2: What seems to be (and what our ordinary practices assume) determines where the burden of proof lies: i.e., the burden of does not lie with proving what seems to be, but with proving something contrary to what seems to be.
Conclusion: The burden of proof is not on natural rights theorists, but on anyone proposing anything different from natural rights.
I certainly accept Premise 1, and I’m willing to grant Premise 2 for now. However, the conclusion does not seem to follow. The conclusion that is drawable seems more like the following:
Revised Conclusion: The burden of proof is on anyone who claims that people are only expressing subjective preference when they condemn something as immoral.
This I agree with, but I don’t claim that people are only expressing subjective preference when they condemn something as immoral (that position is called emotivism). It follows from Long’s premises that there is a burden of proof on emotivists.
However, it does not seem to follow from his premises that there is no burden of proof on objective ethicists or on natural rights theorists. After all, they assert something more than simply, “It is not the case that all condemnations of acts as immoral are simply expressions of subjective preference.” In particular, I think most objective ethicists go further and actually assert that people are making objective ethical statements when they use moral language. But just because someone is not expressing a subjective opinion does not automatically mean they are making an objective statement either (let alone one that coincides with natural law). So the notion that objective ethics or natural law are a priori or logically irrefutable is something that I think does require proof.
Additionally, if we accept Long’s Premise 2, then the fact that people’s ethical intuitions differ and conflict, sometimes wildly (both in what “seems to be” for each individual, and what is practiced in society), seems to undermine the notion that there is no burden of proof on a specific conception of universal natural law or universal objective ethics.
Now even if the above is unconvincing, my own position qua position is not that of an opponent to objective ethics or natural law (i.e., I’m not arguing that they are false or don’t exist), but that of one awaiting a coherent exposition. I have refuted specific conceptions of objective ethics and natural law, but there can always be more, so I can’t say I am an opponent to those notions in general. I can’t accept or reject a position until it is actually made clear.
Does he argue that everyone’s eudaimonia is the same?
I’ll be interested in hearing what he has to say. For now, though, I will have to leave this part to someone better versed in praxeology.
Long argues here that rational agency requires language, which contains agent neutral values, which must be incorporated into our ultimate end (eudaimonia). So any action commits you to eudaimonia. So all actors (i.e humans) are committed to eudaimonia.
I think this premise should be revised to “It seems to people that they are assuming an objective moral standard when they condemn something as immoral (moreover, our ordinary practices assume this to be true).” In which case your original conclusion would follow.
Since when does something being known prior to experience make it logically irrefutable? Just because a statement is a priori doesn’t guarantee that it’s true.
Fair enough. But remember that Long’s point is that “the justifiability of accepting Natural Law as part of one’s picture of the universe does not require that the positive case for Natural Law be established first.” And also that the positive case for natural law (its principium essendi) is not the only way to justify our belief in it; we can also rely on its principium cognoscendi “to be able to say what natural rights we have or what Natural Law requires of us.”
Yes and no. Since there are both universal and particular aspects to flourishing, it would be similar in the universal aspects and different in the particular ones. For example, he quotes Cicero’s hierarchy of four roles: human nature, individual nature, social role, and chosen role; each role can trump the next. So everyone would be similar in the human nature part, but different in the individual nature part (because particular talents and inclinations overrule social roles).
It would follow, but there is one reason I have for questioning that people assume an objective moral standard: What is the definition of “objective moral standard”? Since I’ve seen that people usually have a very hard (or impossible) time defining this notion even on these forums, it makes me doubtful that people in general would assume it.
Practically speaking, it seems that people mean all sorts of things when the utter condemnation of an act as immoral. Some really mean “God doesn’t like it,” some mean “We don’t like it,” some mean it “It’s unhealthy for you (and all of us),” or a combination of all of these.
Moreover, the moral standard people assume in different cultures and countries is different. If we apply Long’s logic to all of those different cultures we end up with many different “natural laws” that all enjoy being on the good side of the burden of proof (for each respective individual).
I don’t mean that a priori implies logically irrefutable, just that some proponents of natural law seem to say that it is a priori, and some say it is logically irrefutable.
Well, I see natural law as a useful persuasive concept. The more I hear of Long’s position, the more he seems to view it that way. But I know his views are always quite nuanced.
Interesting. I suppose I’d have to read/listen to more Long to evaluate this body of theory.
Can I ask what you see as the role of natural law (and/or the benefit of advocating it) for libertarianism?
Long would do well to integrate Anthony De Jasay’s insights here. Freedom must be presumed due to epistemological reasons. Therefore, not only is it the case that arguing in favour of alternatives to Freedom/PrivateProperty is performatively contradictory (Hoppe) , but the presumption is in favour of Freedom/Private Property (DeJasay)
Again, I think Long’s point is that we don’t need a fully elaborated theory to justify our belief in natural law. People just need to understand that there are immutable moral principles that transcend culture and preferences; why can be left to the philosopher. So if our ordinary moral practices (e.g. condemning Nazism) commit us to believing in natural law, the burden rests with the opponents.
I think the upshot is that each culture’s ordinary practices would be on the good side of the burden of proof. Now these practices may be different and even incompatible, but this doesn’t show that there are different conceptions of natural law. Presumably after applying the method of reflective equilibration we would be left with a single, unified theory.
This is a peculiar question. As I see it, libertarianism is a theory of justice. Natural law is a conception of justice. So natural law is the core of libertarianism.
Is my english really that bad?
Protracted disagreement on an issue, in which one of the parties assumes to be speaking of something that is “self-evident” and “inherent”, is proof enough that it isn’t.
In our case, if “natural righters” assume that there is such a thing as an inherent moral code in all individuals, but debate over this topic has been raging from a long time and amid many individuals who otherwise share many values, this should be proof enough that there are indeed no “natural rights”, for a large minority (at least) feels whithin themselves no such thing.
the natural rights position is not typically ‘intuitionist’.
I don’t think that examining the length of time that a disagreement persists can shed any such definitive knowledge. maybe its a sign of how dense the party that doesn’t get it is? or any number of other explanations…
That’s not even Long’s point. That’s what natural law is about: it is the intellect grasping for what is (in reality). Whether what is, is discovered in a person’s heart, mind, spirit, and external world. That’s no small feat. I hypothesize that humans will be learning about the universe for thousands of years to come in the future. Imagine if there was more peace and thus liberty. People would be active in more productive activities and the efficiency in production would lead people into realms yet unknown, some on the horizon now and some not even thought of yet, both in knowledge and application ie. technology, the way education is presented, etc… In liberty, in other words, without coercion initiated upon people, again in other words, when natural law is derived from not arbritrary whims that incline to initiate coercion, each individual will be able to discover for him or her self what is, not only of the outside world but of the inner world of human nature. This is the optimistic take on human nature. I am optimistic that human’s in liberty will prosper, grasp wisdom, and do well.
No, it isn’t. Never underestimate the power of self-delusion.