The concept of freedom when employed rationally,presupposes the existence of reality, and with it the laws
of nature, the necessity of choice among alternatives, and the fact that if one resorts to force, one must expect to be
met by force. Of particular importance is the fact that it presupposes the necessity of having the voluntary coop-
eration of everyone who is to aid in an activity—including the owners of any property that may be involved.
After taking for granted the presence of all this, the rational concept of freedom then focuses on the absence
of one particular thing: the initiation of physical force—in particular, by the government.
In sharpest contrast to the rational concept of freedom is the anarchic concept. The anarchic concept of freedom
evades and seeks to obliterate the fundamental and radical distinction that exists between two sorts of obstacles
to the achievement of a goal or desire: “obstacles” constituted by the ordinary facts of reality, including other
people’s voluntary choices, and obstacles constituted by the government’s threat to use physical force. For exam-
ple, by the nature of things, it is impossible for me to square circles, walk through walls, or be in two places at
the same time. It is also not possible for me, in the actual circumstances of my life, to win the Nobel prize in
chemistry or the Academy Award for best actor of the year, or to enter the automobile or steel business. There
are all kinds of such things I simply cannot do. And among the things I could do, there are many I choose not
to do, because I judge the consequences to myself to be highly undesirable. For example, I cannot arbitrarily
decide to walk off my job in the middle of winter to take a vacation in the sun, without the very strong likelihood
of being fired. I cannot drive down a city street at ninety miles an hour, nor can I strike or kill another, without
running the risk of paying the penalty for violating the law. And then, there are things that are possible for me
to do, and that I would very much like to do, but that would require the consent of other people, which consent
they are unwilling to give. In this category, are such things as having my views published in The New York
Times or having this book assigned in courses at leading “liberal” universities.
Absolutely none of these facts constitutes a violation of freedom, a denial of rights, or anything of the kind. In order
for a violation of freedom to exist, it is not sufficient merely that someone be unable to achieve what he desires.
What is necessary is that the specific thing stopping him be the initiation of physical force; in particular, the
government’s threat to use force against him in response to an action of his that does not represent the use of force.
The stock-in-trade of the anarchic concept of freedom, however, is to construe precisely such facts as a
violation of freedom and rights. On the basis of the anarchic concept of freedom, it is claimed that freedom
is violated any time there is anything that, for whatever reason, a person cannot do, from flying to the moon, to
being able to afford a house or a college education that is beyond his reach, to committing murder.
Ironically, the anarchic concept of freedom is implicitly accepted by conservatives and fascists, as well as
by anarchists and hippies. This is evident in the arguments they advance when they seek to establish the
principle that it is necessary and proper to violate freedom. For example, they argue that we do not allow a man
the “freedom” to murder his mother-in-law or to speed through red lights and thereby threaten the lives of others.
In propounding such arguments, the conservatives and fascists casually neglect the fact that such acts constitute the
initiation of force, and are so far from representing freedom that their prohibition is what actually constitutes freedom.
The anarchic concept of freedom, of course, is present in the assertions of Communists and socialists that their
freedom of speech is violated because they are threatened with arrest for attempting to disrupt the speech of an
invited speaker by shouting him down or by speaking at the same time. This assertion by the Communists and
socialists neglects the fact that their action constitutes the use of someone else’s property against his will namely,
the use of the meeting room against the will of the owner or lessee, who wants the invited speaker to speak, not the
disrupters. It is thus the action of the Communists and socialists which is a violation of freedom in this instance,
a genuine violation of the freedom of speech.
It follows from this discussion of the erroneous claims of the Communists and socialists that a prohibition on
arbitrarily shouting “fire” in a crowded theater should not be construed as any kind of limitation on the freedom of
speech. Arbitrarily shouting “fire” constitutes a violationof the property rights of the theater owner and of the other
ticketholders, whom it prevents from using their property as they wish. When one holds the context of the rational
concept of freedom, it becomes clear that it is no more aviolation of freedom of speech to prohibit such speech,
than it is to prohibit the speech of disruptive hecklers, or the speech of an uninvited guest who might choose to
deliver a harangue in one’s living room. Violations of freedom of speech occur only when the speaker has the
consent of the property owners involved and then is prohibited from speaking by means of the initiation of
physical force—in particular, by the government or by private individuals acting with the sanction of the gov-
ernment.
Because of the confusions that have been introduced into the concept of freedom, it is necessary to set matters
right in a number of important concrete instances. Thus, freedom of speech is violated not when an individual
does not receive an invitation to speak somewhere, but when he does receive it and is stopped by the government
(or by private individuals acting with the sanction of the government) from accepting the invitation or exercising
it. It is violated precisely by Communist and socialist disrupters whom the police refuse to remove. Ironically,
in the case of a live theatrical performance, it is violated precisely when someone arbitrarily shouts “fire.” Such a
person violates the freedom of speech of the actors on stage.
The freedom of the press is violated and censorship exists not when a newspaper refuses to publish a story or
a column that, for any reason, it regards as unworthy of publication, but when it is prepared to publish a piece and
is stopped from doing so by the government. Thus, if I want to print my views in The New York Times, but can
neither afford the advertising rates nor persuade the publisher to give me space, my freedom of the press is
not violated; I am not a victim of “censorship.” But suppose I do have the money to pay the advertising rates
or could persuade the publisher to print my views, and the government disallows it—that would be a violation
of the freedom of the press; that would be censorship. It is a violation of my freedom of the press if the govern-
ment stops me from mimeographing leaflets, if that is all I can afford to do to spread my ideas. Again, censorship
exists not when the sponsor of a television program refuses to pay for the broadcast of ideas he considers false
and vicious, but when he does approve of the ideas he is asked to sponsor and yet is stopped from sponsoring
them—for example, by an implicit threat of the govern ment not to renew the license of the television station, or
arbitrarily to deny him some permission he requires in some important aspect of his business.
In the same way, if I ask a woman to marry me, and she says no, my freedom is not violated. It is only violated
if she says yes, and the government then stops me from marrying her—say, by virtue of a law concerning mar-
riages among people of different races, religions, or blood types. Or, finally, if I want to travel somewhere,
but lack the ability to pay the cost of doing so, my freedom of travel is in no way violated. But suppose I do
have the ability to pay the cost, and want to pay it, but the government stops me—say, with a wall around my
city (as existed until recently in East Berlin), a passport restriction, or a price control on oil and oil products that
creates a shortage of gasoline and aviation fuel and thus stops me from driving and the airlines from flying—then
my freedom of travel is violated.
What is essential in all these cases is not the fact that there is something I cannot do for one reason or another,
but what it is, specifically, that stops me. Only if what stops me is the initiation of physical force—by the gov-
ernment in particular—is my freedom violated.