You are free to find it amusing. I find it dissapointing (and amusing too) that conservatives think conservatism is OK if it can be repackaged as voluntarist - but of course, conservatism is not voluntarist.
Oh well. Principle can always be given up if the consequences of sticking to it are not PC.
Heh–sometimes you sound like an objectivist, and sometimes a humanities major. [:)]
For the record, there’s no such thing as hyper-rationalism. Being “too rational” is like being “too alive.” Property crimes are explicitly included, because they’re part of the definition of “aggression.” The other ideas are expressible in terms of non-aggression, not in a pretzel-logic fashion, but quite naturally. For example, “liberty” is what I call it when nobody is attempting to aggress against me. Do you really have a different definition?
There are some good reasons for defining the NAP broadly, and then defining libertarianism narrowly around it. It’s handy for pedagogic purposes: most of the work is done once we’ve taught someone what “aggression” is, and how it differs from uses of force for defense, say, or property recovery. The resulting, broad definition of aggression is very close to folks’ intuitive sense of the concept, which makes it handy for teaching. And it’s easily summarized, hence easily remembered.
It also serves a useful rhetorical purpose. The golden rule is virtually universal, and even children can grasp the outlines of it. The NAP is a weak form of the golden rule, but it’s impossible to refute without obviously confessing to an intention to do unto others what one would NOT want them doing to onself. The moral argument is as airtight as the logical argument.
It also avoids some pitfalls: more muddy-thinking libertarians can embroil themselves in contradictions, which almost always follow directly from a bad definition of “aggression.”
All this, and it fits on a bumper sticker!
–Len
This thread is the proof that I haven’t fallen into that trap.
I and others I’ve known, such as Block, Hoppe and several on this forum, are not the sort to accidentally import extra assumptions. Also note that we all may count as “thin” libertarians, but we don’t all restrict ourselves to one axiom. Hoppe includes self-ownership as an axiom, while I’d call that a simple consequence of non-aggression. I.e., I can use my body without aggressing; nobody else can use my body without aggressing against me; therefore, I’m the de facto owner of it.
That depends what you call “principled.” I assumed that flat-out superstition wouldn’t count as “principled reason” for you. Would it still count as “principled” if I made it even crazier? Like, “Non-aggression is where it’s at, cuz, like, my teeth won’t like me otherwise!”? It appeared that you were suggesting judgment of one’s reasons for embracing the NAP.
I think that was obvious from the start: NAP stands for non-aggression principle. It’s clear that there’s a vast difference between, “I’ve never killed anyone,” and, “killing is wrong.” The former is a happenstance; the latter is a principle.
There’s that implied judgment again. Look, I believe that aggression is wrong because vanilla pudding is yummy. And I cling to that faithfully, in the name of vanilla pudding, amen. (makes the sign of the non-sequitur with thumb and pinky) So, can I be in your libertarian club, or not?
Goes without saying. A libertarian is someone who holds the NAP, not someone who happens not to violate it.
–Len
Yes, there is. I’m talking about the false rationalist/empiricist dichotomy here, not about being rational.
But others have. :o)
I’m not religious, but I don’t think a principled reason has to be true to count as being principled. I don’t think believing in the NAP because your teeth won’t like you otherwise would count though. So what? Not just any reason counts. Doing the right thing out of fear of punishment, for example, does not make one virtuous.
No, because that’s illogical. Look, are you suggesting total relativism here? There are no standards? For if you are, you can throw libertarianism right out the window too.
Ah. Then I think you’re being hyperphilosophical here. There is no such dichotomy, although Rand and Mises seemed to think there was. The axiom that “man acts” is only a good axiom because we live in a universe where it’s true–and one learns that one lives in such a universe by observation. Mathematical and empirical research are practiced differently, but they are not dichotomous at all.
BTW, a nice illustration of that is in the axiom of choice. While the axiom as stated is “non-empirical,” it’s extremely probable that eventually we will run into a consequence of the axiom, and a consequence of its negation, where one or the other fits the real world (they can’t both). At that time, we will finally decide whether to keep or reject the axiom, and that decision will be empirical in nature.
–Len.
I’m not giving up any principles. You just don’t understand how to apply them correctly.
?
Rand rejected it. But many people adhere to it self-consciously and many fall into the trap of thinking in the mode of one false side of the coin or the other.
Libertarianism happens to be virtuous (for some reasonable definition of virtuous), but you’re falling into the “true Christian” trap. Is one a “true Christian” if one fears damnation? Are a given man’s beliefs “really real,” or is he simply trying to bribe God for goodies or escape punishment? What if one adopts Christianity motivated by fear of punishment, and then grows to love and truly believe this new religion of his?
The entire discussion is moot. We’re not in the business of judging minds and hearts. If one “really believes in” the NAP, he’s a libertarian. It doesn’t matter whether he does so because he believes it will maximize prosperity, or because it’s “just right,” or because he thinks it will protect him from others’ aggression, or keep him out of hell, or lead him to Nirvana, or give him washboard abs. It suffices that the NAP is embraced.
So is embracing the NAP because the FSM told you to. So what?
That’s a funny question, since I maintain at least as staunchly as anyone that the NAP is an absolute. I merely state that as long as you accept this, your motivations for accepting it are of no interest to me. (Except, as I mentioned before, that some motivations might suggest instability, and prompt me to keep an eye on you.)
–Len.
Block has a few kooky ideas of his own when it comes to applying the NAP in some situations.
As for Hoppe, he tries to develop a realist rationalism but I think he is ultimately unsuccessful. I have a working paper, in need of revision, on my website critiquing his neo-Kantian conception of praxeology and arguing in favor of completing Rothbard’s attempt to ground praxeology in Aristotelian philosophy.
Did you not read the rest of my post? Anyone who thinks there’s a genuine dichotomy between rationality and empricism is epistemologically confused. There is no dichotomy. A rationalist who eschews empiricism doesn’t understand rationalism. An empiricist who eschews rationalism doesn’t understand empiricism.
Rand considered herself an empiricist and eschewed rationalism (i.e., “a priorism”). To that extent, she didn’t really understand empricism. Mises was a rationalist (i.e., an “a priorist”) who eschewed empiricism. To that extent, he didn’t really understand rationalism. (His diatribes against mathematics illustrate that further, BTW. His praxeology is not rigorous, but it is distinctly mathematical–despite the dearth of equations.)
–Len
Oh yeah. But you are so much clever than me - you do understand how to apply them.
I’m not at all advocating such intervention. I’m just pointing out that the way parents deal with ‘their’ children is arbitrary most of the time. That is a fact, and it probably has consequences.
My ideal size of government is zero - so I can hardly be advocating political control of religion. On the other hand, church and state have always been partners in crime - a fact that the paleos here are quite glad to ignore.
So the golden rule on vegetables wasnt’t true after all ? =]
Rand rejected a belief in Platonic rationalism and the analytic-synthetic dichotomy. Rationalism to her was a form of intuitionism. She did not reject the notion of necessary truths though, which many empiricists do. As for Mises’ praxeological system being non-rigorous and mathematical, what do you mean?
-Jon
That’s because he tries to evade the iron law of rationalism: one cannot start without axioms and definitions. He tries, like the misguided greeks, to prove axioms. It can’t be done.
Philosophers have never learned that lesson, so I hope that my emphatic statement doesn’t rub you the wrong way–odds are good that you too are trying to derive morality from nothing. References to eudaimonia virtually prove it: I’m willing to bet that at the bottom of your ethics is the notion that “morality” consists in fish being fully fish, humans being fully human, and so on. The iron law will nail you every time: down deep in your discourse, your definition of being “true to one’s humanity” will include the NAP. That’s the spot where you’re assuming what you’re trying to prove.
I don’t try to prove the NAP, because I know it can’t be done. Any argument I use will lead back to the most basic assumptions, one of which is guaranteed to be the NAP (or a disguised equivalent). Instead I try to convince people, by appealing to their desire not to be aggressed against.
–Len
It’s not a trap. It’s sound ethical theory. We’re not concerned here with epistemic problems like whether we can tell someone is really virtuous. But from the standpoint of ethical theory, he doesn’t count as virtuous if he only does it out of fear of punishment.
Not from the standpoint of ethical theory it doesn’t, and libertarianism is in part an ethical theory. You seem to be falling back on your conception of libertarianism as only a legal philosophy here but in doing so you are in danger of excluding morality from it as well. You’ve claimed that you don’t exclude morality from it but by excluding principle reasons from consideration you are effectively doing that.
They may not be of any interest to you. But from the standpoint of ethical theory they are important. As far as the law is concerned, motivations don’t generally matter. As far as being concerned with you leaving me in peace is concerned, your motivations don’t matter much either (except to the extent you pointed out). But motivations do matter for whether someone counts as respecting rights or merely refraining from violating them.
Mathematics is reasoning logically from axioms–no more, no less. It has very little to do with equations. In fact many areas of mathematics don’t have any equations at all. So whenever someone reasons logically from axioms, he’s doing math. Mises attempts to do just that in Human Action, so he’s doing math. He thought he wasn’t, though, because he wasn’t using equations.
It was non-rigorous because he didn’t pin down his axioms and definitions well enough to make them airtight. A cranky mathematician might call that “bad” mathematics, but ALL mathematics was “bad” in that sense up until about 150 years ago. Mises was a pioneer, and plowed ahead rather than stopping to dot his i’s and cross his t’s. Praxeology can be made rigorous, and I’d like to see it done (but it’s bloody hard, so I’ve basically given up looking for low-hanging fruit there).
–Len
I think you’re speaking in ignorance here. Aristotle, for example, never tried to prove any axiom. And how does Hoppe try to prove any axiom for that matter?
Proof refers to logical deduction. By definition one can’t prove an axiom (i.e., via logical deduction). Aristotel knew that. I think Hoppe knows that too.
This is all mistaken and confused.
The NAP is not an axoim, btw; it is a conclusion derived from a long chain of reasoning. It simply can’t be a philosophically satisfactory starting point.
This is mistaken in a number of ways. And I think it’s based on mistaken assumptions about metaphysics, epistemology, and ethical theory. Yes, any argument in favor of the NAP will lead back to discussions of metaphysics and epistemology because the NAP is not an axiom. And no, the NAP will not be at the base of all premises.
Your approach may be good for persuading people, good rhetorically, but it doesn’t suffice for providing a philosophical defense of the NAP.
Then you’re setting yourself an unsolveable problem. The depths of the human psyche are vast and murky–you yourself can’t even say whether you do something “only” for this reason or that. It’s extremely rare that a person has “only” one reason anyway. I’m honest to my wife, not only because I uphold that virtue, but also because I know I won’t like the consequences if I don’t. So am I virtuous? Evil? 30% virtuous? 50%? God alone knows–I sure don’t, and you certainly have no idea.
The whole quest is a fool’s errand. But I’m leery of entering into conflict with you on this point, because we’re also on the boundaries of a religious war between philosophers and mathematicians. I think that most of what philosophers do is a fool’s errand, because it always boils down to arguing definitions through an infinite regression.
Aside from the philosopher/mathematician thing, I have a pragmatic question: would you rather get your theory just right, and die in slavery, or would you rather be free, though you don’t finish your theory? Does your theory matter more to you, or the reality of freedom? Having watched Christians go through the same tail-chasing regression, I can tell you: first, you’ll end up either concluding that nobody is a “real” libertarian, or divorcing your model from reality and accepting us at face value despite your theory to the contrary; second, you’ll not get much closer to attaining actual freedom while you try to chase this recursion to its bottom. It has no bottom. It should suffice for me to assure you that I embrace non-aggression. If I turn out to be a liar, call me on it. Otherwise, take me at my word.
–Len
Did you not read mine? From the beginning I called it a false dichotomy. But your post seemed to treat it as if no one ever accepted one side or the other of this false dichotomy.
This is quite simply mistaken and evinces misinterpretations of both Rand and Mises. Rand criticized Mises’ “apriorism” because she saw it as Kantian and rationalist. Mises rejected positivist-empiricism and rightly so. But Rand accepted conceptual truths. She most emphatically did not consider herself an empiricist in the sense implied by the false dichotomy. And Mises didn’t reject experience and a non-positivist-empiricist conception of the empirical. There are problems with Mises’s conception of praxeology along Kantian lines, but you grossly overstate them.