No, it’s relevant. Honor, courage &c. are not necessarily moral qualities, so they’re hardly different from being “educated”, at least not in any relevant way. If they’re fuzzy in the way you postulate, I maintain that “intelligent”, “educated”, “artistic” are all equally fuzzy and meaningless.
This being?
Rational = capable of acting rationally. Please do show where I said “will always act rationally”.
Oh, speaking from experience? Stick to the context, though. What does it say about one’s character if they refuse to face the facts of reality? It is a form of weakness.
Oh, and why is that? Yes, one can ruin themselves if they so please. But, why should I regard this as moral behaviour, that is behaviour conforming with one’s capacity for thoughtful reflection? The arbitrariness is a figment of your own imagination, stemming from your utter lack of in-depth understanding of natural-end ethics.
Yes, again I ask what this has to do with the logical validity of the claims raised by these systems. Mises advocated conscription (which is a form of slavery.) Am I to thus discard his contributions, because I mean how could I possibly agree with someone who advocated slavery?
What difference does that make ? If the nature of man is to be a ‘rational’ animal, then he’s supposed to act rationally - period. What happens when man doesn’t act rationally ? Maybe his nature is magically changed into something else for a while ? A==A from 10:00 to 20:00 but A!=A from 20:01 to 9:59 ?
Haha. What a clueless remark =] Now, can you please explain why your views on what is virtue should be valid for everybody ?
So what. I asked “what’s wrong with that” and you are not answering. People who can’t face reality are weaklings you say ? - great. But maybe they are acting according to their weak natures ?
It turns out it’s not aggressive behaviour, so it is ‘moral’ as far as I’m concerned. I imagine that some people, after thoughtful reflection, decide that suicide is a good option. What exactly makes you think that you know better than them ?
Please specify which ‘claims’ you’re referring to.
Do whatever you please. I personally would be very careful with the ideas of a philosopher who advocated conscription.
Please spare me your black and white nonsense. A rational animal is one that has the capacity for rationality, not one that will unfailingly act rationally. It can choose otherwise. A = A always and everywhere. You’re discounting the possibility that A can change to B.
Nothing that surpasses anything you’ve said, though, in this regard.
Which views would those be, in particular? All a virtue is generally, is a mean between two extremes (e.g. courage is the mean between courage and cowardice), and it consists in one using one’s judgement to exert control over their emotions and react appropriately to each challenge as it presents itself.
And doing nothing to overcome them.
It may indeed be their best option, the most rational one to undertake. If, on the other hand, they have obligations to others of their own making, it may be that they’re shirking them and seeking a quick escape.
For instance, their arguments on the nature of morality.
I forget, why are you on a forum dedicated to such a philosopher?
I believe there is some confusion here on the part of Juan about what is meant by the term “rational”. I’d propose that there are two different ways in which the term can be used. In the first sense, all human action is rational in that the very nature of action involves a volitional process. Man is inherently a “rational agent” in this sense, as this is a mere description of fundamental features of being a human being and the process by which people think and act. In the second sense, rationality refers to whether or not one’s means actually obtain their ends or whether or not their judgement for favored ends actually makes sense. When rationality is being mentioned by the above posters, I believe the former and more broad meaning is being used. If this distinction is not recognized, I totally understand the objection that “how can one say that man IS rational while simultaneously saying that they SHOULD be rational, implying that they may sometimes NOT be rational?”, but if one understands the context this objection should easily be cleared up.
A similar objection to the concept of natural law (I.E. “if it’s natural, it simply IS; everything is natural, so the natural law would reduce to whatever happens to occur and hence it would truly be impossible to defy the natural law”) and natural rights can be cleared up in a similar way.
Well, within the confines of economics and as a mere descriptive agent-relativity, Mises is absolutely correct. The problem comes into play when one tries to rigidly adhere to this outlook while ignoring the other sense of rationality; in effect, refusing to investigate as to whether or not one’s ends make any sense or are conductive to ethics. So I agree with Rothbard that a purely economic outlook is dangerous in that it is ethically neutral. If one wants to make a meaningful case for liberty, one cannot confine oneself to value-free economics, and in some cases confining oneself to economics actually functions to legitimize unethical things.
Some may accuse Rothbard of trying to inject ethics into economics (as I saw on the comments section of that article), but this is a straw man and if one actually reads what he’s saying he quite clearly is suggesting the ethical approach as something separate from economics. He’s merely saying that economics isn’t enough to make the case for liberty and that if one wants to make such a case they make have to step outside of their role as a mere economist and more broadly act as a political philosopher.
Right, though I’m still wary of using Mises’s concept of rational even in economics, as it can lead to misunderstandings, but it does help shed the illusion that catallactics is purely concerned with some homo oeconomicus.
What you call b&w nonsense is also known as logic.
So man is not a rational animal. At the very least you should call him a ‘potentially’ rational animal - which of course only pushes the moral problem back a step.
Which means that for something to exist it must have a definite form or nature. If man had a definite nature, then man would be compelled to act according to it. But man can choose, so maybe you’d be better off calling man a ‘choosing’ animal ?
So, you also subscribe to Greek mythology and metamorphosis ? =]
The typical Aristotelian ‘formula’. But aren’t emotions a given which can’t be controlled ? Furthermore, aren’t some emotions, or sensations, part of a signaling mechanism that helps keeping organisms alive ? Fear happens to be a signal that tells an organism that something dangerous is threatening it ?
Again, so what ? Why should a being with a definite nature do something to overcome its nature ? Because you don’t like ‘weaklings’ ?
That’s Mises’ own definition of rationality, which is not related to morals and is indeed value-free.
And that is still praxeology. Say I want to kill my neighbor using a candy bar. I’m sure that economists will tell me I better use a gun. Using a means which can’t lead to a sought-after end is an intellectual mistake and could be called ‘irrational’ thinking, I guess.
Isn’t that a third meaning for the word rationality ? What do you mean by “whether or not one’s ends make any sense” ? The problem is, I think, that for some people aggression ‘makes sense’.
I personally would say that violating the NAP is ‘irrational’, but on second thoughts, I’m not sure I can argue that correctly. In a word, choosing what’s morally good (i.e. non aggression) is not merely a ‘rational’ process which can be described in logical terms.
Not really. The “contradiction” you came up with isn’t one at all.
Nope. Just because something possesses a distinctive active property (namely, rationality), it does not mean it will necessarily exercise it. One can attain one’s rational potentiality, or one can be closer to the animal level, ruled by impulses.
But why should I do that, when man’s defining characteristic is his rationality?
No, I acknowledge that change is a part of the world. Your pissant little remarks bore me.
That’s often asserted, that emotions are simply inescapable. In a large number of cases that’s nonsense. Through habituation, one can overcome one’s emotive responses. A man immensely fearful of mice, for no reason other than evolutionary mechanisms, is one who is displaying disproportionate fear.
Again, why don’t you actually stick to the topic, which was why could I say X action is immoral? Next time you criticise someone’s preferences (e.g. when you begin a rant about ‘racism’) I will bring this up. After all, it’s just because you don’t like ‘racists’.
Right. Why should you stick to a consistent use of definitions ? It’s much better to use words loosely and be able to spout any kind of nonsense. Well, have fun, I’m not wasting any more time.
And in ‘some’ cases it is true, which means your ‘theory’ has been disproved. Too bad logic is not your strong suit.
This is the third time or so that you fail to answer why people should follow your arbitrary idea of virtue. You indeed stick stubbornly to…evasion.
Go ahead. There seems to be a fair amount of racists here so I guess you’ll soon have a chance.
I 've come to the conclusion that there are no defenses against immorality, that does not lead to an argument of utility.
Morality is for bums. Anyone who tells you that whatever best serves you is not ‘good’ either does not know what the word means or has fundamentally skewed views about reality. Appealing to irrational, impersonal ideals can only promote irrationalism and slavery. For an example, look at the so-called ‘egoist’ Randroids. Morality is a way to control people.
Also, Rand in the essay “The Objectivist Ethics” in The Virtue of Selfishness, Henry Veatch in For An Ontology of Morals and Rational Man and Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics defend natural-end ethics.
One of the funniest things about libertarian ethics is that most libertarians will not admit that a solid proof has been put forth, that most arguments for libertarian rights are tenative or incomplete at best and that (what’s more) many of these theories are mutually exclusive. Yet they preach it as though it had absolute certitude.
In response to many of the above authors I would cite the little known but very insightful Myth of Natural Rights by LA Rollins. I had to manually type this up using Wordpad, so it’s missing footnotes. Some of the text is too blocky, but it should be readable.
“But if natural rights are merely fake or metaphorical rights, what then are real rights? Real rights are those rights actually conferred and enforced by the laws of a State or the customs of a social group.”
It may sound funny to a libertarian, so well versed on explaining how state-granted rights are inconsistent and nonsensical, but the position of Rollins is precisely that ‘natural rights’ is categorical nonsense. Right and law in fact have no ‘moral basis’, nor does anything else, rights and laws are things which are actually enforced, no matter how contrary and baseless they may be.