Utility and Relativism

[gplauche]

Some excerpts from Henry Veatch’s “Concerning the Distinction Between Descriptive and Normative Sciences,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:

"[ E ]very man recognizes the pertinence of this question “Why?” to his own conduct, and even in his own behavior he acknowledges at least by implication that it is incumbent upon him to try to answer the question and to give a justification for the things which he does. And to prove the point, let us consider the hypothetical case of a man who pointedly denies that he feels any such responsibility. We may suppose that he honestly believes he need render no accounting to any man. Yet inevitably his belief must serve as a reason in his own mind for his refusing to render any such accounting. But to consider that he has a reason means that he has accepted the very responsibility which he thought he was denying. For what is it to give a reason in such a context but to recognize both the validity of the question “Why?” and the necessity of answering the question with some sort of self-defense? In short, even to refuse to consider oneself accountable is an action for which any man will quite inescapably and unwittingly consider himself accountable.

"But let us make the case even stronger. Let us suppose - which is contrary to fact - there to be a man who has never felt called upon to defend himself for anything he has ever done. In short, he has never felt any sense of responsibility of any kind whatever. He has not even felt called upon to justify his very irresponsibility. Still it must be admitted that such a man has had to make decisions from time to time as to courses of action that he would follow. Moreover, such decisions have naturally been based on considerations as to which course would be better or preferable or pleasanter or more profitable. But what is this but to give a reason for what he does? And to give a reason is simply to justify or defend his own behavior, at least to himself if not to anyone else.

“Thus, there is no getting around the fact: all voluntary human acts, i.e., all acts that are truly and characteristically human, do call for justification. They are, so to speak, within the universe of discourse of the justifiable, which means that while they may be unjustifiable, they can never be non-justifiable.”

[…]

"But with this the skeptic has given away his case. For no sooner does he give a reason than he is engaged in the act of justification. Indeed, it is as if he felt that in reply to the question “Why?,” whether put by himself or someone else, he could successfully defend himself. And how does he defend himself? By appealing to the proposition that all ethical norms and standards are non-existent. But what is this but to claim justification on the ground that there are no possible grounds for justification? In other words, the very denial of all natural laws of right and wrong, of all moral norms and standards, becomes itself a standard in terms of which the skeptic tries to defend himself for acting in disregard of all standards. Certainly, no more untenable situation is conceivable.

"Moreover, it is interesting to note the sense in which such a self-contradiction is, as I said earlier, practical rather than theoretical. For in itself there is no self-contradiction involved in the proposition “there are no normal norms,” comparable to the self-contradiction involved in the proposition “there is no truth.” Rather the contradiction emerges only subsequently and after action, so to speak. For as soon as we act, we must act on our knowledge, but the knowledge on which the skeptic acts is that there is no knowledge on which to act. This, then, is what I meant by my expression practical self-contradiction in contrast to theoretical.

"But with this, it seems to me that my thesis has been sustained: norms do exist and hence normative science is possible. Why? Because man is a justifying animal, and because this justification in which he engages is necessarily a significant process. Moreover, if human justification is significant, then it is simply true that human actions have the quality of being either right or wrong. And if they be either right or wrong, then there must be natural moral laws in terms of which this rightness or wrongness is determined. Further, from all this it would follow that the positivistic account of human nature is unquestionably misleading and oversimple. For the question as to whether an act is right or wrong has been shown to be pertinent to human behavior. Accordingly, man cannot be regarded just like any other object of nature, nor must it be supposed that the ordinary scientific description of human conduct is in any way adequate.

[…]

"However, in order to make clear how such a thing is possible [“moral norms being at one and the same time natural laws and human prescriptions”], let me revert once more to the simple fact that man is a justifying animal. For just what does this mean? As I have already shown, it means that man acts, not just as one blindly impelled by the forces of nature, but rather as one who must be convinced of the wisdom and justice both of what he has done and of what he is about to do. From this two consequences follow. First, if human action necessarily involves justification, and if justification is a meaningful process, then moral norms must have some sort of real existence, i.e., they must be natural and not man-made, they must be recognized as principles that are true and not mere products of our own wishful thinking. Second, if justification is presupposed in all truly human conduct, in the sense that a man must be convinced that what he is doing is right and just, otherwise he would not do it, then it follows that a human being not only knows what he is doing in the sense of having a purely theoretical or speculative knowledge of what he actually does do, but also in the sense of having a practical knowledge of what he ought to do and wants to do. In short, man has the kind of knowledge by virtue of which a person can govern,
regulate, and prescribe his own conduct.

"But with this, the difficulties about prescriptions being natural laws, as well as the difficulty about how a practical or normative judgment could constitute real knowledge, would seem to be largely dissolved. To be sure, men do prescribe for themselves the courses of action which they are convinced they ought to follow. But this does not mean that such prescriptions are mere human creations and in no sense natural. On the contrary, the reason men prescribe for themselves a certain way of life is in the final analysis only because they are convinced that such a way of life is prescribed for them by the very nature of things.

"Similarly, the ultimate objective of all normative science is to prevail upon men to behave in a certain way. Hence, all the propositions of ethics and politics are practical judgments, that is to say, they are implied commands, stating what men ought to do and ought not to do. And yet it is a feeble argument indeed to infer that because the ultimate purpose of normative science is to order certain things be done and other things not to be done, therefore, it is impossible in normative science ever to attain any such thing as a real knowledge of what ought to be done or ought not to be done.

"But now, supposing this suffices to call attention to the simple fact, viz., that moral norms enjoy a sort of dual existence, as prescriptions issued by human beings and also as natural laws rooted in the very order of things, there still is required a more careful description of this fact and of what it implies. To this end I should like to rely upon the very illuminating analysis which Professor Simon has given of the various possible states or conditions under which a law may be said to exist. Following St. Thomas, Professor Simon asserts that “the first and most essential element of the definition of law” is that it is “an ordinance of reason.” Nevertheless, St. Thomas points out that law is also capable of existing under another state or condition: not only may a law exist in the prescribing reason, but it may also exist in that which submits to the prescriptions of reason. The whole passage from St. Thomas will bear quoting: “Since law is a kind of rule and measure, it may be in something in two ways. First, as in that which measures and rules: and since this is proper to reason, it follows that, in this way, law is in reason alone. Secondly, as in that which is measured and ruled. In this way, law is in all those things that are inclined to something by reason of some law: so that any inclination arising from a law may be called a law, not essentially but by participation as it were.”

"Accordingly, if it be asked how that which is by nature a prescription as to what ought to be can be regarded as a description of what actually is, the answer is that it all becomes clear in the light of the distinction between a law as it exists in mensurante and that same law as it exists in mensurato. For instance, Professor Simon cites an example from the field of positive law: “Observing the behavior of cab drivers in a crowded city, I see that it embodies a certain rule; this rule has been issued by a governing reason, it has existed in a governing reason before existing in the factual behavior of these cab drivers. We must say that the rule, as existing in this factual behavior, is subordinated to, or participates in the rule as existing in the governing reason.”

"However, when it is of natural laws that we are speaking, the conditions under which they may exist are more complicated. Thus like mere positive laws, they too are capable of existing in the governing reason of some human being and also in the factual behavior of that same human being or of others over whom he may happen to exercise authority. But in addition to these states of existence, a law, if it be natural, must also have an existence prior to that which it enjoys in human reason. “Now the rule,” Simon says, “is one and the same; if rightly enforced it has the same content, both in the factual behavior which embodies it, and in the governing reason which issues it, in mensurato et in mensurate. This is the way that natural law, as a precept of the human reason, is subordinated to the natural law immanent in human nature.”

“By this simple device, then, of distinguishing between the various states or conditions under which a law is capable of existing, the ground is cut right out from under the current prejudice that the prescriptive character of moral laws makes it impossible for them to be natural.”

[cheimison]

"But let us make the case even stronger. Let us suppose - which is contrary to fact - there to be a man who has never felt called upon to defend himself for anything he has ever done.

Arguments such as this have been dealt with in the essay (it’s similar to some of Tibon Machan’s comments). The fact that people can or do argue about what they think is ‘moral’ is irrelevant. People argue over what they think supernatural dimensions consist of, they’re still talking nonsense. The fact that people engage in forms of speculation and debate does not mean that there are rational premises for that debate.

[cheimison]

These are essentially straw man arguments. Irrelevant with regard to Aristotelians since we hold nothing resembling either view.

It does when you consider that no matter what you think you have proven to be universally true as moral still has absolutely no meaning to any individuals actual utility scales and rational choices except insofar as he is concerned with air castles and susceptable to nonsensical arguments. No one can ever have any reason to do anything except their own. Insofar as whatever you may call ‘justice’ contradicts with their ends, they would be behaving foolishly to be stopped by it. Furthermore, no one has to justify their actions. The need for justification is circular reasoning since it presumes the existence of morality. The attempt at ‘justifying’ actions according to ends or standards outside the personal preferences of oneself (or to another according to his preferences) is to misuse the word.

That’s not much of a leg to stand on. The strongest objection one can make is that it is annoying, obnoxious and stupid? Stupid…how so? In terms of economic efficiency?

Well, none of its defenders have any sensical arguments, they typically don’t even acknowledge what it actually is. I am fond of civilization and many of the things that come with it, therefor I dislike the state; a stateless society would be superior to one with a state for myself and for most things that I would want to be around. It’s true that I can’t make absolute claims that somehow ‘command’ other people to prefer libertarianism. But, from my perspective, neither can you. I don’t have to be the ‘good guy’.

Then I realised what utter useless nonsense it really is. Without reading any Stirner, Nietzsche, or something like that (which I still haven’t)

It’s all a con game. It’s a kind of power or perceived legitemacy that almost all ‘movements’ strive after, but it’s not only nonsensical but pointless.

I’m sure the statists would love to know we have no real problem with their rule over us

You act like the State gives a damn what we think, anyway. It’s in the rational interest of 98%+ of the population to evade the state whenever possible, and most of them obey it as much as they do because of …drumroll…‘moral’ obligation.

It just renders one toothless against a State, or its minions, because conversely, they do not have to justify their actions either.

Rollins made a response precisely to the point, that rights do not protect you from the state. Only actual positively enforced ‘rights’ will protect you, the only thing that can make you safe is to have more power than your adversary (which includes the ability to avoid, circumvent, deceive etc). Of course ideas are very important and powerful in human society, but the standards of society at large are objective and positive facts which will protect you, all the theoretical rights in the world will not.

[Juan]

It does when you consider that no matter what you think you have proven to be universally true as moral still has absolutely no meaning to any individuals actual utility scales and rational choices except insofar as he is concerned with air castles and susceptable to nonsensical arguments

What about soldiers who after happily massacring hundreds of their fellows, one day they find that they have a guilty conscience ? That is, you know, a fact. Do you think that such a feeling of guilt is the result of 'air castles and ‘nonsensical arguments’ ?

edit :

It’s in the rational interest of 98%+ of the population to evade the state whenever possible, and most of them obey it as much as they do because of …drumroll…‘moral’ obligation.

I thought the state is obeyed because it has a tendency to kill dissidents ?

[cheimison]

What about soldiers who after happily massacring hundreds of their fellows, one day they find that they have a guilty conscience ? That is, you know, a fact. Do you think that such a feeling of guilt is the result of 'air castles and ‘nonsensical arguments’ ?

No, humans are influenced by social norms as well as evolutionary traits. No one ever said people did not have emotions or a great interest in one another. Everyone knows they do. I wouldn’t be here if that weren’t the case. But there is nothing moral to this. They may be factually held values, but they are individual and specific values; they are unique as he is unique.

I thought the state is obeyed because it has a tendency to kill dissidents ?

You should read La Boetie or many of the anarchists available on mises.org. The State’s power rests in ideology, the state, democracy, social justice and irrational ideas about the legitemization of violence for some arbitrary group - these sorts of ideas are all deeply rooted in ‘justification psychology’, which is where I think the moral error comes from. It is not entirely an intellectual error, we do wish to make statements to other people which we expect them to accept. For this we must appeal to certain commonly held values and objective facts about reality. But this is incorrectly interpreted if called ‘moral’, it is merely communication of one thinking, valueing entity with another; both of whom share an objective reality.

[Juan]

No, humans are influenced by social norms as well as evolutionary traits.

Oh, the evolution myth ? =] Anyway, I provided an instance of people feeling they did something wrong not because they were told so, but because of ‘something’ within themselves, which is usually referred to as conscience. Such a natural phenomenon doesn’t seem to square well with amoralism, does it ?

Also, there’s the natural phenomenon of sympathy, which admittedly is not as extended as it should be (haha), but it’s there nevertheless.

You should read La Boetie or many of the anarchists available on mises.org. The State’s power rests in ideology

I answered that one yesterday - here . Yes, I know La Boetie. I also understand that people who like philosophy have a tendency to think that ideas are oh so important. I think they are at least partially wrong. The state exists basically thanks to the cops and the military, not to the nonsense the media and other ‘intellectuals’ spout.

the state, democracy, social justice and irrational ideas about the legitemization of violence for some arbitrary group -

Okay, now what about the system of ‘rational’ ideas which delegitimizes all aggressive violence and favors no arbitrary group but all individuals ?

[Andrew]

I look at it from the point that their are no Rights. They are a social construct. I believe no morality exists at all outside what person think and feel.

I do not need an ethical justification for opposing the state because it by its very existence opposes me. The state degrades my integrity of being an individual and imposes its will upon me. Not only does it do this to me, but others as well. No individual is going to do the actions of his will if someone stops him from doing it. How is one suppose to form their own opinion of personal ethics if they can not pursue that action. What brings the most pain and pleasure will be learned, and either the individual engages these ethics or he will re-evaluate his own.

My biggest defense of viewing things from a amoral point of view is that one can claim something is moral and create damage to me and others. Morality and god are always the last argument for an action or thought. People do not question things if people tell them they are moral and are the “right” things to do. What is moral to one person can be immoral to another. Then creating this social construct to apply to all by force subverts individual thought into group think.

I posted a forum a long time ago about one’s feelings about the state and why one opposes it. Two primary reasons I see are individual and social. Individualism sees the state as evil because it gets in the way of one’s will. It is almost a crushing of my spirit when I can’t do something I want to do. Granted I wish someone people could die from my hand, but I view that as against my personal ethics and would not do so, or the impact on my spirit would not be so great to subvert that action. But the state controls my actions and this enslaves me to others’ will, and I do not feel like a person. And I only have one life to live, so I will rebel to the end against those which poison my life. That is why I oppose the State. I need no other grounds, even though I have them, to justify my rebellion.

The social reasons are the fact that the state is destructive of society/economics/ and people and retards civilization’s progress. Nearly everyone blends these positions, but I think either one is the core position of a person.

[Jon_Irenicus]

Arguments such as this have been dealt with in the essay (it’s similar to some of Tibon Machan’s comments). The fact that people can or do argue about what they think is ‘moral’ is irrelevant. People argue over what they think supernatural dimensions consist of, they’re still talking nonsense. The fact that people engage in forms of speculation and debate does not mean that there are rational premises for that debate.

Well, actually that isn’t what he is saying at all. He is saying justification is inescapable.

-Jon

[Jon_Irenicus]

Furthermore, no one has to justify their actions. The need for justification is circular reasoning since it presumes the existence of morality. The attempt at ‘justifying’ actions according to ends or standards outside the personal preferences of oneself (or to another according to his preferences) is to misuse the word.

The need? No, there is no “need” per se. There’s just the inescapable fact of it. It amuses me, immensely, when nihilists rally against morality, and then expect to be taken seriously when they think arguments appealing to self-interest (namely, economic ones) cannot be brushed off with similar ease. That is the real con game going on here. What hindered me from converting to anarcho-capitalism, initially, were precisely moral objections, as I was convinced on the economics of it all.

-Jon

[gplauche]

@R.J. Moore II

These are essentially straw man arguments. Irrelevant with regard to Aristotelians since we hold nothing resembling either view.

It does when you consider that no matter what you think you have proven to be universally true as moral still has absolutely no meaning to any individuals actual utility scales and rational choices except insofar as he is concerned with air castles and susceptable to nonsensical arguments. No one can ever have any reason to do anything except their own. Insofar as whatever you may call ‘justice’ contradicts with their ends, they would be behaving foolishly to be stopped by it.

I don’t see how this is a compelling objection, insofar as I don’t see any real understanding of Aristotelian virtue ethics in it. This is all question-begging assertion.

@R.J. Moore II

Furthermore, no one has to justify their actions. The need for justification is circular reasoning since it presumes the existence of morality. The attempt at ‘justifying’ actions according to ends or standards outside the personal preferences of oneself (or to another according to his preferences) is to misuse the word.

You miss the point. People justify their actions. It’s unavoidable.

@R.J. Moore II

Well, none of its defenders have any sensical arguments, they typically don’t even acknowledge what it actually is. I am fond of civilization and many of the things that come with it, therefor I dislike the state; a stateless society would be superior to one with a state for myself and for most things that I would want to be around.

That won’t get you very far in convincing others.

@R.J. Moore II

It’s true that I can’t make absolute claims that somehow ‘command’ other people to prefer libertarianism. But, from my perspective, neither can you.

Unsupported assertion. And what do you mean “command”? Sounds like another straw man.

@R.J. Moore II

It just renders one toothless against a State, or its minions, because conversely, they do not have to justify their actions either.

Rollins made a response precisely to the point, that rights do not protect you from the state. Only actual positively enforced ‘rights’ will protect you, the only thing that can make you safe is to have more power than your adversary (which includes the ability to avoid, circumvent, deceive etc). Of course ideas are very important and powerful in human society, but the standards of society at large are objective and positive facts which will protect you, all the theoretical rights in the world will not.

You keep citing this argument by Rollins as if Roderick hasn’t already refuted it thoroughly.

[Dynamix]

Wow. Here I thought the freethinking well had dried up on this forum.

I too have long since been disenchanted with the concept of “natural rights.” I was a rank-and-file Natural Rightsist (not a proper term, I know) for a while, mostly until I saw one of Len Budney’s posts on the old Austrian Forum, paraphrasing, “and I think man ‘discovering’ a rights-based ethical system in nature to be not much more than a philosophical pipe dream.” (Those last three words are verbatim.) That one simple post sent me on a torrent of exploration. And now, I agree.

Much to everyone’s irritation, I’m sure, I won’t go into why I think this is so. Suffice it to say that I’ve read lots of natural rights-based ebooks, articles, whatever, and also read Rollins’ The Myth of Natural Rights several months ago. I compared the ideas of both with the ideas I’d already held from the Christian religion, which I considered myself a part of at the time but subsequently rejected (yet I’ve still found no reason to reject Jesus…odd), and concluded that natural rights were an inordinately silly concept. I apologize if that offends some people.

One of the keys to my denial of natural rights was found in a book called Science and Sanity: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems and General Semantics, which I’ve brought up here on this forum before, much to the sound of crickets and heavy sighs. In it, the author suggests a denial of the “law” of identity, which, however it may sound, is not itself meant to be a denial of logic as such (non-contradiction and excluded middle are maintained). It holds instead that this law of identity itself is illogical in application.

I felt so strongly about this book’s conclusions that I typed out the first few chapters in PDF form so that others could read it. And though the small introduction almost certainly won’t convince everyone by itself (I expect it to be misinterpreted, as I misinterpreted the thesis several times myself even after reading nearly the whole book and sitting on it for a few months), if it piques anyone’s interest, I’d recommend buying the book.

Once again, I offer no further explanation for my views than already given, as I’ve now moved so far out into left field that I expect to make no progress at all on “interweb arguments yay,” even with intelligent people like you fine folks.

If mentioning all this leads some, as it led me, toward some revving of the curiosity engine, then I’m satisfied with that.

Science and Sanity - Book I, Part I:
http://www.mediafire.com/?jmnjmummi1e

[gplauche]

@Dynamix

In it, the author suggests a denial of the “law” of identity, which, however it may sound, is not itself meant to be a denial of logic as such

If it quacks like a duck…

@Dynamix

(non-contradiction and excluded middle are maintained).

These are dependent upon the Law of Identity. All of logic depends upon it, and therefore all of thought too.

@Dynamix

It holds instead that this law of identity itself is illogical in application.

Only if you don’t know what you’re doing.

[majevska]

I was a natural rights guy for a while but now I’m starting to question their existence and move toward amoralism.

Let’s get one thing clear though, the burden of proof is on the moralist. Even when I was a natural rights kinda guy I never thought it was anything but a human construct but I used it because I thought it was an advantageous human construct. Now I’m starting to think that morality as a whole is a damaging construct, close to as damaging, disgusting, and ridiculous as the constructs of race, the state, god, etc.

I think people act because of their own egoistic reasons no matter what moral reasons they give. Furthermore, I think it is psychologically unhealthy to tell yourself that you are doing something for any reason than an egoistic one. I’ve personally felt better since giving up morality and acting purely by my ego (and I haven’t had the desire to go out and kill people or do anything that would violate the imaginary human construct of natural rights).

I think there is room to talk about justice, fairness etc. without bringing morality in the picture; and I think things will be better if people stop kidding about why they do things by saying it’s for “morality.”

I’ll admit that I’m not nearly as well versed in philosophy as many of you. But what I don’t even understand what it could possibly mean that “natural rights,” “exist.” I can’t reach out and touch them.

[gplauche]

@majevska

I think there is room to talk about justice, fairness etc. without bringing morality in the picture; and I think things will be better if people stop kidding about why they do things by saying it’s for “morality.”

This makes absolutely no sense whatsoever. Justice and fairness are moral concepts.

@majevska

I’ll admit that I’m not nearly as well versed in philosophy as many of you. But what I don’t even understand what it could possibly mean that “natural rights,” “exist.” I can’t reach out and touch them.

This is a straw man objection. Nobody would argue rights are some material thing out there that can be touched. That’s just silly. And only a modern day Platonist would even say they are “out there” at all. They are normative principles grounded in human nature. There’s nothing mystical about it. It’s a naturalist ethics. See here for starters.

[majevska]

@Geoffrey Allan Plauche

@majevska

I think there is room to talk about justice, fairness etc. without bringing morality in the picture; and I think things will be better if people stop kidding about why they do things by saying it’s for “morality.”

This makes absolutely no sense whatsoever. Justice and fairness are moral concepts.

@majevska

I’ll admit that I’m not nearly as well versed in philosophy as many of you. But what I don’t even understand what it could possibly mean that “natural rights,” “exist.” I can’t reach out and touch them.

This is a straw man objection. Nobody would argue rights are some material thing out there that can be touched. That’s just silly. And only a modern day Platonist would even say they are “out there” at all. They are normative principles grounded in human nature. There’s nothing mystical about it. It’s a naturalist ethics. See here for starters.

Justice and fairness have multiple definitions. In my dictionary, one of the definitions for fairness is “free from favoritism or bias; impartial” (this says nothing about the morality of fairness or impartiality); another one says, “consistent with rules, logic, or ethics,” (I would throw out the part about ethics in this instance). Justice also doesn’t necessarily refer to morality. Perhaps we could throw out the words “fairness” and “justice” what I mean is dispute resolution in a manner that would be beneficial to me and others.

My supposed straw man was actually supposed to be a question: “in what sense do natural rights exist.” I know you don’t believe that they’re corporeal.

I read most of the piece you sent and have some objections but am too lazy to type them now. It’s almost 2am and I need to get up early. gnite

[gplauche]

@majevska

Justice and fairness have multiple definitions. In my dictionary, one of the definitions for fairness is “free from favoritism or bias; impartial” (this says nothing about the morality of fairness or impartiality); another one says, “consistent with rules, logic, or ethics,” (I would throw out the part about ethics in this instance). Justice also doesn’t necessarily refer to morality. Perhaps we could throw out the words “fairness” and “justice” what I mean is dispute resolution in a manner that would be beneficial to me and others.

Justice is a moral and legal concept. Necessarily so.

As for fairness, it may mean other things in other contexts, like rules or logic but you can’t just arbitrarily throw out ethics. The way you used it and will inevitably use it when discussing social, political and legal matters will involve morality.

Even with the question of what would be beneficial to you or others, you can’t escape morality. Read the Veatch excerpts I posted earlier.

[Jon_Irenicus]

Now I’m starting to think that morality as a whole is a damaging construct, close to as damaging, disgusting, and ridiculous as the constructs of race, the state, god, etc.

You act as though it abused your fragile little psyche… apart from assertions that morality is a human construct, I see little of substance. Justice &c. are moral concepts. They make no sense apart from it.

As for denying the law of identity, that’d mean any argument denying it isn’t an argument denying it, as something now isn’t something that it is, and vice versa. Wow, profound.

-Jon

[Andrew]

If rights exist it would be impossible to “violate” them.

The fact that I can infringe on someone’s “natural rights” negates them. It would be UN-natural to violate these rights, and if I can, am I not natural. So if I am unnatural, what am I, a ghost. Using such terms as unnatural and natural leads to circular logic. Hence to make it easier, I would say “rights” don’t exist.

[Andrew]

@Jon Irenicus

You act as though it abused your fragile little psyche… apart from assertions that morality is a human construct, I see little of substance. Justice &c. are moral concepts. They make no sense apart from it.

-Jon

And that moral concept of “justice” has been used for otherwise immoral actions such as for the white race to pursue “justice” for itself, by killing Jews, which poisoned the white race. When’s the last time a horrific event was started by an appeal to relative immorality on behalf of those who started it?

[gplauche]

@Andrew

If rights exist it would be impossible to “violate” them.

The fact that I can infringe on someone’s “natural rights” negates them. It would be UN-natural to violate these rights, and if I can, am I not natural. So if I am unnatural, what am I, a ghost. Using such terms as unnatural and natural leads to circular logic. Hence to make it easier, I would say “rights” don’t exist.

Amateur mistake. You’re confusing normative principles with the laws of physics.