I don’t think there’s much point pursuing this thread if you don’t even understand what the calculation problem is. You’ll have to convince me that you do, preferably by justifying your statements in the OP about how centralized economies will fail because of it.
If you don’t want to answer, just say so. But know that I will simply drop out of this thread. Presumabely you wanted me to participate, or you wouldn’t have responded so quickly to my posts.
Speculation. Proof?
Unproven dichotomy.
Just for kicks, if you’re really interested in a discussion you should start another thread. I think we should let Rettoper have his.
ravochol,
i agree, with a caveat.
praxeological precepts dont require “history as a guide” – they are irrefutable.
in those cases, praxeology trumps empiricism — or more accurately praxeology confirms or parallels the empirical research of classical liberals.
nonetheless, there appears to be ZERO praxeological support for the assertion that anarchism is more effective at providing societal economic health and security against external threats relative to minarchism.
Moreover, there is a wealth of empiricial evidence that confirms the efficacy of minarchism over anarchism, iceland circa 1200 notwithstanding.
The existence of anarchy is not some sort of self-sustaining system.–olovetto
Thanks for answering my question.
Thanks for answering my question.
I’m not sure you understand what I mean. Maybe “self-assuring” or something would have been a better word. I certainly didn’t mean that order can’t be maintained without a state, as I already said that there are numerous historical examples of it.
We’ve seen the failure of central planning from the times of ancient Egypt. No stated society is safe from the same problem as a stateless society. There are quite a few economic arguments against limited government. It just doesn’t make sense for someone who wants protection to vest power in a certain group, bow to their sovereignty, and say “limit yourself”. Early America allowed government to grown to the huge leviathan it is today. That is what I was talking about. You have no way of proving that America will “last forever”.
nonetheless, there appears to be ZERO praxeological support for the assertion that anarchism is more effective at providing societal economic health and security against external threats relative to minarchism.
You still have not read Sechrest’s paper it seems.
Speculation. Proof?
Unproven dichotomy.
Just for kicks, if you’re really interested in a discussion you should start another thread. I think we should let Rettoper have his.
speculation. proof? – seiben
why dont you just cite the praxeological a priori to rebut ravochol? for example, if you claim his assertion is speculation, isnt your rebuttal in the absence of praxeological precepts pure speculation also?
Indeed, there is considerable empirical evidence to support ravochol’s assertion. For example, there are numerous statist armies in existence today and ZERO anarchic societies.
this alone confirms the failure of anarchism.
However, if you can cite the praxeological a priori to challenge ravochol’s assertion, then I for one, will stand corrected on this issue.
Just for kicks, if you’re really interested in a discussion you should start another thread. I think we should let Rettoper have his.–seiben
this quote is telling.
again I ask the question to seiben for the umpteenth time:
What praxeological precept(s) confirms anarchism over minarchism in providing societal economic prosperity and societal security from external threats?
Speculation. Proof?
Nearly every single army ever. Name a victorious military force which you would consider to be market-based.
unproven dichotomy
Why was Sputnik the first satelite in space? Because the Soviet Union could deploy resources effectively to achieve certain goals (like, putting Sputnik into space). It wasn’t efficient - investing so much in heavy industry and high technology involved starving the peasants, for example. Nevertheless, it effectively got Sputnik into space before any rival state, and long, long before any private company.
From a purely Darwinian point of view, if central planning was good for nothing, it would have died out long ago. So, it must be good for something - what it’s good at is effectiveness.
Centrally planned economies have agency, where market based economies are purely responsive - th.ey respond to market factors. The latter is almost always better, but agency is needed to respond to crisis
From this paper by Hoppe: (I guess I have to paste it here since you don’t take the time to read, yet claim to know what praxeology is.)
IV - Two Hundred Years Later …
After more than two centuries of “constitutionally limited government,” the results are clear and incontrovertible. At the outset of the American “experiment,” the tax burden imposed on Americans was light, indeed almost negligible. Money consisted of fixed quantities of gold and silver. The definition of private property was clear and seemingly immutable, and the right to self-defense was regarded as sacrosanct. No standing army existed, and, as expressed in George Washington’s Farewell Address, a firm commitment to free trade and a noninterventionist foreign policy appeared to be in place. Two hundred years later, matters have changed dramatically.[16]
Now, year in and year out, the American government expropriates more than 40 percent of the incomes of private producers, making even the economic burden imposed on slaves and serfs seem moderate in comparison. Gold and silver have been replaced by government-manufactured paper money, and Americans are being robbed continually through money inflation. The meaning of private property, once seemingly clear and fixed, has become obscure, flexible, and fluid. In fact, every detail of private life, property, trade, and contract is regulated and re-regulated by ever-higher mountains of paper laws (legislation). With increasing legislation, ever more legal uncertainty and moral hazards have been created, and lawlessness has replaced law and order.
Last but not least, the commitment to free trade and noninterventionism has given way to a policy of protectionism, militarism, and imperialism. In fact, almost since its beginnings the US government has engaged in relentless aggressive expansionism and, starting with the Spanish-American War and continuing past World War I and World War II to the present, the United States has become entangled in hundreds of foreign conflicts and risen to the rank of the world’s foremost warmonger and imperialist power. In addition, while American citizens have become increasingly more defenseless, insecure, and impoverished, and foreigners all over the globe have become ever more threatened and bullied by US military power, American presidents, members of Congress, and Supreme Court judges have become ever more arrogant, morally corrupt, and dangerous.[17]
What can possibly be done about this state of affairs? First, the American Constitution must be recognized for what it is — an error.
As the Declaration of Independence noted, government is supposed to protect life, property, and the pursuit of happiness. Yet in granting government the power to tax and legislate without consent, the Constitution cannot possibly assure this goal but is instead the very instrument for invading and destroying the right to life, property, and liberty. It is absurd to believe that an agency that may tax without consent can be a property protector. Likewise, it is absurd to believe that an agency with legislative powers can preserve law and order. Rather, it must be recognized that the Constitution is itself unconstitutional, i.e., incompatible with the very doctrine of natural human rights that inspired the American Revolution.[18]
Indeed, no one in his right mind would agree to a contract that allowed one’s alleged protector to determine unilaterally, without one’s consent, and irrevocably, without the possibility of exit, how much to charge for protection; and no one in his right mind would agree to an irrevocable contract which granted one’s alleged protector the right to ultimate decision making regarding one’s own person and property, i.e., of unilateral lawmaking.[19]
Second, it is necessary to offer a positive and inspiring alternative to the present system.
While it is important that the memory of America’s past as a land of pioneers and an effective anarchocapitalist system based on self-defense and popular militias be kept alive, we cannot return to the feudal past or the time of the American Revolution. Yet the situation is not hopeless. Despite the relentless growth of statism over the course of the past two centuries, economic development has continued, and our living standards have reached spectacular new heights. Under these circumstances, a completely new option has become viable: the provision of law and order by freely competing private (profit-and-loss) insurance agencies.[20]
Even though hampered by the state, insurance agencies protect private property owners upon payment of a premium against a multitude of natural and social disasters, from floods and hurricanes to theft and fraud. Thus, it would seem that the production of security and protection is the very purpose of insurance. Moreover, people would not turn to just anyone for a service as essential as that of protection. Rather, as de Molinari noted,
Before striking a bargain with [a] producer of security … they will check if he is really strong enough to protect them … [and] whether his character is such that they will not have to worry about his instigating the very aggressions he is supposed to suppress.[21]
In this regard insurance agencies also seem to fit the bill. They are big and in command of the resources — physical and human — necessary to accomplish the task of dealing with the dangers, actual or imagined, of the real world. Indeed, insurers operate on a national or even international scale. They own substantial property holdings dispersed over wide territories and beyond the borders of single states and thus have a manifest self-interest in effective protection. Furthermore, all insurance companies are connected through a complex network of contractual agreements on mutual assistance and arbitration as well as a system of international reinsurance agencies representing a combined economic power that dwarfs most if not all contemporary governments. They have acquired this position because of their reputation as effective, reliable, and honest businesses.
While this may suffice to establish insurance agencies as a possible alternative to the role currently performed by states as providers of law and order, a more detailed examination is needed to demonstrate the principal superiority of such an alternative to the status quo. In order to do this, it is only necessary to recognize that insurance agencies can neither tax nor legislate; that is, the relationship between the insurer and the insured is consensual. Both are free to cooperate or not to cooperate, and this fact has momentous implications. In this regard, insurance agencies are categorically different from states.
The advantages of having insurance agencies provide security and protection are as follows. First, competition among insurers for paying clients will bring about a tendency toward a continuous fall in the price of protection per insured value, thus rendering protection more affordable. In contrast, a monopolistic protector who may tax the protected will charge ever-higher prices for his services.[22]
Second, insurers will have to indemnify their clients in the case of actual damage; hence, they must operate efficiently. Regarding social disasters — crime — in particular, this means that the insurer must be concerned above all with effective prevention, for unless he can prevent a crime, he will have to pay up. Further, if a criminal act cannot be prevented, an insurer will still want to recover the loot, apprehend the offender, and bring him to justice, because in so doing the insurer can reduce his costs and force the criminal — rather than the victim and his insurer — to pay for the damages and cost of indemnification. In distinct contrast, because compulsory monopolist states do not indemnify victims and because they can resort to taxation as a source of funding, they have little or no incentive to prevent crime or to recover loot and capture criminals. If they do manage to apprehend a criminal, they typically force the victim to pay for the criminal’s incarceration, thus adding insult to injury.[23]
Third and most important, because the relationship between insurers and their clients is voluntary, insurers must accept private property as an ultimate given and private property rights as immutable law. That is, in order to attract or retain paying clients, insurers will have to offer contracts with specified property and property damage descriptions, rules of procedure, evidence, compensation, restitution, and punishment, as well as intra- and interagency conflict resolution and arbitration procedures.
Moreover, out of the steady cooperation between different insurers in mutual interagency arbitration proceedings, a tendency toward the unification of law — of a truly universal or international law — will emerge. Everyone, by virtue of being insured, would thus become tied into a global competitive effort to minimize conflict and aggression. Every single conflict and damage claim, regardless of where and by or against whom, would fall into the jurisdiction of exactly one or more specific and enumerable insurance agencies and their contractually agreed-to arbitration procedures, thereby creating “perfect” legal certainty.
In striking contrast, as tax-funded monopoly protectors, states do not offer the consumers of protection anything even faintly resembling a service contract. Instead, they operate in a contractual void that allows them to make up and change the rules of the game as they go along. Most remarkably, whereas insurers must submit themselves to independent third-party arbitrators and arbitration proceedings in order to attract voluntary paying clients, states, insofar as they allow for arbitration at all, assign this task to another state-funded and state-dependent judge.[24]
Further implications of this fundamental contrast between insurers as contractual versus states as noncontractual providers of security deserve special attention.
Because they are not subject to and bound by contracts, states typically outlaw the ownership of weapons by their “clients,” thus increasing their own security at the expense of rendering their alleged clients defenseless. In contrast, no voluntary buyer of protection insurance would agree to a contract that required him to surrender his right to self-defense and be unarmed or otherwise defenseless. To the contrary, insurance agencies would encourage the ownership of guns and other protective devices among their clients by means of selective price cuts, because the better the private protection of their clients, the lower the insurers’ protection and indemnification costs would be.
Moreover, because they operate in a contractual void and are independent of voluntary payment, states arbitrarily define and redefine what is and what is not a punishable “aggression” and what does and does not require compensation. By imposing a proportional or progressive income tax and redistributing income from the rich to the poor, for instance, states in effect define the rich as aggressors and the poor as their victims. (Otherwise, if the rich were not aggressors and the poor not their victims, how could taking something from the former and giving it to the latter be justified?) Or by passing affirmative action laws, states effectively define whites and males as aggressors and blacks and women as their victims. For insurance agencies, any such business conduct would be impossible for two fundamental reasons.[25]
First, all insurance involves the pooling of particular risks into risk classes. It implies that to some of the insured, more will be paid out than what they paid in, and to others, less. However — and this is decisive — no one knows in advance who the “winners” and who the “losers” will be. Winners and losers — and any income redistribution among them — will be randomly distributed. Otherwise, if winners and losers could be systematically predicted, losers would not want to pool their risk with winners but only with other losers because this would lower their insurance premium.
Second, it is not possible to insure oneself against any conceivable risk. Rather, it is only possible to insure oneself against accidents, i.e., risks over whose outcome the insured has no control whatsoever and to which he contributes nothing. Thus, it is possible to insure oneself against the risk of death or fire, for instance, but it is not possible to insure oneself against the risk of committing suicide or setting one’s own house on fire.
Similarly, it is impossible to insure oneself against the risk of business failure, of unemployment, of not becoming rich, of not feeling like getting up and out of bed in the morning, or of disliking one’s neighbors, fellows or superiors, because in each of these cases one has either full or partial control over the event in question. That is, an individual can affect the likelihood of the risk. By their very nature, the avoidance of risks such as these falls into the realm of individual responsibility, and any agency that undertook their insurance would be slated for immediate bankruptcy.
Most significantly for the subject under discussion, the uninsurability of individual actions and sentiments (in contradistinction to accidents) implies that it is also impossible to insure oneself against the risk of damages that are the result of one’s prior aggression or provocation. Rather, every insurer must restrict the actions of its clients so as to exclude all aggression and provocation on their part. That is, any insurance against social disasters such as crime must be contingent on the insured submitting themselves to specified norms of nonaggressive, civilized, conduct.
Accordingly, while states as monopolistic protectors can engage in redistributive policies benefiting one group of people at the expense of another, and while as tax-supported agencies they can even “insure” uninsurable risks and protect provocateurs and aggressors, voluntarily funded insurers would be systematically prevented from doing any such thing. Competition among insurers would preclude any form of income and wealth redistribution among various groups of insured, for a company engaging in such practices would lose clients to others refraining from them. Rather, every client would pay exclusively for his own risk, respectively that of people with the same (homogeneous) risk exposure that he faces.[26] Nor would voluntarily funded insurers be able to “protect” any person from the consequences of his own erroneous, foolish, risky, or aggressive conduct or sentiment. Competition between insurers would instead systematically encourage individual responsibility, and any known provocateur and aggressor would be excluded as a bad insurance risk from any insurance coverage whatsoever and be rendered an economically isolated, weak, and vulnerable outcast.
Finally, with regard to foreign relations, because states can externalize the costs of their own actions onto hapless taxpayers, they are permanently prone to becoming aggressors and warmongers. Accordingly, they tend to fund and develop weapons of aggression and mass destruction. In distinct contrast, insurers will be prevented from engaging in any form of external aggression because any aggression is costly and requires higher insurance premiums, implying the loss of clients to other, nonaggressive competitors. Insurers will engage exclusively in defensive violence, and instead of acquiring weapons of aggression and mass destruction, they will tend to invest in the development of weapons of defense and of targeted retaliation.[27]
Related to the original advantages of states at the dawn of civilization, and why this permanence is not assured, read the chapter by Hummel, especially section 5, from The Myth of National Defense.
Maybe “self-assuring” or something would have been a better word. I certainly didn’t mean that order can’t be maintained without a state, as I already said that there are numerous historical examples of it.-- olovetto
Interesting argument that you are citing history as “confirmation” of anarchism’s efficacy when there are exactly ZERO anarchic societies in existence today.
it would seem by any objective, rational, and independent thinking measure that history has shown the exact opposite of what you assert.
Moreover, your arguments on the efficacy of limited government notwithstanding – you have still not answered the question:
What praxeological a priori confirm the efficacy of anarchism relative to minarchism in providing societal prosperity and security?
Nearly every single army ever. Name a victorious military force which you would consider to be market-based.
rovochol, appeal to tradition is a logical fallacy and not a valid argumentation tactic.
Interesting argument that you are citing history as “confirmation” of anarchism’s efficacy when there are exactly ZERO anarchic societies in existence today.
Try reading.
rovochol, appeal to tradition is a logical fallacy and not a valid argumentation tactic.
Observing that a ball consistently falls from my hand when I drop it, and then predicting it will drop again is the basis of science.
Claiming that you are observing such a regularity only proves your sheer ignorance of history then. Anarchy is all around us. States are in a state of anarchy amongst themselves. Do you advocate one world government?
What makes the provision of security subsantively different than the provision of egg beaters or translator services? That’s right, nothing.
Finally, with regard to foreign relations, because states can externalize the costs of their own actions onto hapless taxpayers, they are permanently prone to becoming aggressors and warmongers. Accordingly, they tend to fund and develop weapons of aggression and mass destruction. In distinct contrast, insurers will be prevented from engaging in any form of external aggression because any aggression is costly and requires higher insurance premiums, implying the loss of clients to other, nonaggressive competitors. Insurers will engage exclusively in defensive violence, and instead of acquiring weapons of aggression and mass destruction, they will tend to invest in the development of weapons of defense and of targeted retaliation.-- hoppe
this single paragraph is another example of grand naivete from hoppe.
hoppe dangerously discounts the threat of statist preemptive attacks and the ability of statist regimes to fund military enterprises at a short term loss.
For example, statist regimes could offset their inefficiency relative to anarchic societies by operating at a loss for the short term. Moreover, they could plan and conduct offensive operations without the threat of preemptive attack from peaceful, decentralized, and profit driven anarchic defense enterprises.
In summary, the issues of decentralization of forces resulting from competing defense establishments, the necessity of having to operate at a profit (ravochol’s argument of effectiveness versus efficiency), the illogical belief that profit driven mercenaries will lay down thieir lives to protect the “bottom line”, the anarchist’s aversion to preemptive offensive warfare, and the openness of anarchic society to external machinations are a few of the many failures that explain why there are exactly ZERO anarchic societies today.
@ravachol, predicting it will fall again because it fell before is not science. Science is predicting it will fall again because of the existence of a pulling force we call gravity (yet still can’t explain, hah). Big difference.
Rettoper, you clearly don’t understand the terminology here. Praxeology is nothing more than the science of human action. There’s no “praxeological concept” that disproves statism. You can, however, deduce that statism is ineffecient.
olovetto,
noteworthy and interesting that your source (mises.org/daily/2701) is based on statist structures for its data:
United Nations Development Project, World Bank, CIA, and World Health Organization.
for someone who discounts statism, you draw heavily on it as a source to support your arguments.
moreover, with respect to somalia — indeed, I agree wholeheartedly that free markets are far more efficient and desirable than the statist alternative, however citing somalia as an example of the “efficacy” of anarchism is scraping the bottom of the barrel by any objective, rational, and independent thinking measure. for example, somalia’s existance is dependent on the whim of contiguous statist regimes. INdeed, there are thousands of statist troops in the area and myriad problems that your isolated and biased source forgot to mention:
http://www.africanews.com/site/Somalia_on_its_knees_for_urgent_support/list_messages/33254
Note that unlike your sources, mine are not statist organizations.
in summary, like iceland before it, somalia is irrelevent and of no consequence to adjacent statist regimes. as a result, like all other past (no extinct) anarchic societies it is allowed to function relatively unencumbered.
However, if circumstances beyond its control emerge (increased pirate activity, discovery of oil, et al) it will be subject to immediate and certain predation from even the weakest statist or minarchist regimes.
in summary, if you want to claim somalia as “proof” of the efficacy of anarchism, feel free to do so.
however, you have still not answered my question:
what praxeological precepts confirm the efficacy of anarchism relative to minarchism in providing societal prosperity and security from external threats?
@ravachol, predicting it will fall again because it fell before is not science. Science is predicting it will fall again because of the existence of a pulling force we call gravity (yet still can’t explain, hah). Big difference.–skyler collins
nonetheless, you have still not answered my question of what praxeological precept confirms anarchism relative to minarchism in providing for societal economic prosperity and societal security against external threats?
indeed, predicting anarchism because it occurred before (albeit in isolated, tiny, geographically insignificant enclaves) is not science either.
@Rettoper, I’m not interested in answering your question “of what praxeological precept confirms anarchism relative to minarchism in providing for societal economic prosperity and societal security against external threats?” That is why I have not.