Ok, too many responses to aswer them individually, so I’ll try to sum it up and articulate my point which I think was left unanswered
I’ll skip nitpicking like “I am a thing too.” Obviously I meant inanimate things.
First of all, I agree that the definition of a right was quite confusing, or bizzare if you will. English is not my first language and I got excited a little. What “I” (centuries of legal thought actually) meant was that a right is a way of acting/behaving/living that is allowed/approved by the law. I.e. it is possible not physically, but legaly.
I am not coflating law and ethics, I am fully aware that those are tow distinct entities, they are not identical, but they overlap. And in this particular they do overlap.
To every right there is an opposite duty. In case of what you call negative rights there are duties to refrain from actions that would interfere with acting/behaving/living that is allowed by the law.
The right to life is based on the fact that one is conscious of his life. I agree that animals are not (or it seems so) conscious of their lives. Or at least not in the way humans are. Therefore they don’t have the right to life, i.e. the right not to be killed and the right to make decisions about the way they live.
However, it would be a mistake to think of it as either-or. Animals are still conscious of pain. And therefore they have the right not to be exposed to pain. Obviously in many cases the absence of the right not to be killed and the right not to feel pain will be in conflict. If I were a hardcore animal welfare advocate I could reasonably argue that one can kill an animal only if it doesn’t cause any pain. One could kill only a sleeping animal with one clean shot or something like that. However, such interpretation seems absurd to me and I agree with the interpretation that animals have the right not to be exposed to unncessary pain.
As I said, to every right there is an appropriate opposite duty. So, the natural law obliges every human not to cause unncessary pain.
I can imagine several objections (and some of them have been already posted), so I’ll answer them in advance:
1) That’s absurd. You’re saying that if I step on a beetle, I am a murderer?
First of all, this whole “stepping on a beetle” argument assumes that incesct can feel pain, which we can’t really tell, because if it can, it cannot express it, but let’s assume it can. No, you are not a murderer, murder requires intent.
2) What if I step on a beetle willfully? Am I a murderer now?
No, murder implies the right to life. But you did break the natural law and personally I think you are an idiot.
3) Oh, so if I my house is infested by beetles I have to suck on it?
No, just like acquiring food, making your house inhabitable is a reason to kill them even if it means causing pain. However, you are obliged to cause as little pain as possible. In case of beetles it is hard to say what amount of pain is caused, so you are more or less free to do anything.
4) Animals kill other animals quite painfully. You are actually saying that predators break the natural law.
No, I am not. As I said, a right is a right only if there is an appropriate opposite duty. Animals who are not capable of controlling their behaviour cannot be obliged to behave in a certain way (ultra posse nemo tenetur). Therefore they don’t break the natural law
5) How do you define the “necessity”?
I don’t. It is impossible to define or describe every single aspect of life in advance. Even the most ardent proponents of codification acknowledge that. The measure is simply proportionality. Take the self defence for example. Libertarians say that initiation of violence justifies the violence caused by the defender to the attacker. Quite right,but surely you’re not saying that if somebody pushes me, I am free to respond to it by shooting him between eyes. Or (to make it more obvious) by slowly disembowling him. It is up to the particular judge of the particular case to consider the level of proportionality with regards to all circumstances.
Please note that so far I talked about the substantive law only. Of course, there is a problem with legal proceedings, but the fact that one cannot personally excercise or defend his right in courts doesn’t mean he doesn’t have them. A newborn baby is incapable of entering contracts, but is still capable of owning (inanimate, for some nitpickers) things. So the question is who is capable to act on behalf of an animal whose right has been infringed.
There are two distinct scenarios:
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One is witnessing unnecessary cruelty. I think that just like in case of witnessing an assault or murder, everybody is entitled to intervene.
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The act of cruelty is over. Well, if the unncessary pain was caused by somebody else’s than the owner of the animal, then it is obviously the owner. If it was caused by the owner, then in a stateless society it would probably be a lex imperfecta. But a lex imperfecta is a lex nonetheless
The final question is what kind of punishment would follow unnecessary cruelty. Well, obviously the material damage is not the issue. If an animal’s value was damaged the owner can demand compensation even if the animal is considered an inanimate thing. The punishment should be analogous to punishment of rape/battery/murder and actually I would be interested in libertarian solutions for punishing crimes which don’t necessarily cause monetary damage.